another. Moreover, this Westphalian positivist view is often associated with the dominant anarchic, self-styled"realist" perspective on international relations that holds that these states are not bound by law, as they themselves maintain a monopoly on coercive force. However, this perspective is neither truly realist nor truly positivist This is why many international lawyers and international legal scholars reject the Westphalian positivist model. They argue that the model either ignores--or cannot expla many of the most important phenomena on the international legal scene, including the rise of non the binding force of international law. Thus, there is little room in Westphalian positiVIsm 6 s, and state actors, the importance and, at times, relative independence, of international organization binding treaties to allocate regulatory authority or for the pooling of regulatory authority in interests that motivated them; they are epiphenomenal to the power and interest equation rm international organizations. In this model, these agreements only last as long as the short-te lains egotistical state action of the moment. 21 There is little room for the incursions on sovereignty experienced in the European Union, or for the strengthened dispute resolution of the World Trade Organization(WTO), or for many of the other institutions that constitute the core of what international lawyers do and study. In this sense, international lawyers rightly understand positivism to turn a blind eye to precisely those phenomena that interest them the most is very different from the positivism associated with Westphalian realism. While Westphalia eE But"positivism"has different meanings in different disciplines, and the positivism ofL&E positivism is state centric, L&e positivism rests upon methodological individualism. 22 Methodological individualism assumes that each person is in charge of his or her own utility function and is a rational evaluative maximizer. 23 It posits no values other than that of individual choice. Methodological individualism, otherwise known as consumer sovereignty(perhaps more felicitously termed"individual sovereignty in a world in which markets are not the sole forum for revelation of preferences), is a cosmopolitan concept that stands in opposition to the state sovereignty erected by Westphalian positivism Methodological individualism easily lends itself to contractarian approaches to issues involving cooperation and/or conflict. Analogizing from the domestic to the international, the 21 See James E. Alt Lisa L. Martin, Contracting and the possibility of multilateral Enforcement, 150 J INST& THEo EcoN. 265(1994) n a Realist framework, institutions have no power to bind states or even significantly change the constraints in which they operate Hegemonic stability theory would predict that institutions will only be stable and effective as long as the distribution of power underlying their construction remains stable ld.at265-66 22 See, e.g, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, EXPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1989) assumption, it still provides the basis for most models. This rationalism entails self-interes this 23 Although economists and other social scientists are studying the limits and domain of although neither the definition of"self" nor the definition of"interest" is uncontested. Rather, self- interest is being re-examined, to accommodate behavior that seems or is normative, altruistic self-abnegatinganother. Moreover, this Westphalian positivist view is often associated with the dominant anarchic, self-styled “realist” perspective on international relations that holds that these states are not bound by law, as they themselves maintain a monopoly on coercive force. However, this perspective is neither truly realist nor truly positivist. This is why many international lawyers and international legal scholars reject the Westphalian positivist model. They argue that the model either ignores -- or cannot explain -- many of the most important phenomena on the international legal scene, including the rise of non￾state actors, the importance and, at times, relative independence, of international organizations, and the binding force of international law. Thus, there is little room in Westphalian positivism for binding treaties to allocate regulatory authority, or for the pooling of regulatory authority in international organizations. In this model, these agreements only last as long as the short-term interests that motivated them; they are epiphenomenal to the power and interest equation that explains egotistical state action of the moment.21 There is little room for the incursions on sovereignty experienced in the European Union, or for the strengthened dispute resolution of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), or for many of the other institutions that constitute the core of what international lawyers do and study. In this sense, international lawyers rightly understand positivism to turn a blind eye to precisely those phenomena that interest them the most. But “positivism” has different meanings in different disciplines, and the positivism of L&E is very different from the positivism associated with Westphalian realism. While Westphalian positivism is state centric, L&E positivism rests upon methodological individualism.22 Methodological individualism assumes that each person is in charge of his or her own utility function and is a rational evaluative maximizer.23 It posits no values other than that of individual choice. Methodological individualism, otherwise known as consumer sovereignty (perhaps more felicitously termed “individual sovereignty” in a world in which markets are not the sole forum for revelation of preferences), is a cosmopolitan concept that stands in opposition to the state sovereignty erected by Westphalian positivism. Methodological individualism easily lends itself to contractarian approaches to issues involving cooperation and/or conflict. Analogizing from the domestic to the international, the 21 See James E. Alt & Lisa L. Martin, Contracting and the Possibility of Multilateral Enforcement, 150 J. INST. & THEO. ECON. 265 (1994): In a Realist framework, institutions have no power to bind states or even significantly change the constraints in which they operate. . . . Hegemonic stability theory would predict that institutions will only be stable and effective as long as the distribution of power underlying their construction remains stable. Id. at 265-66. 22 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, EXPLORATIONS INTO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1989). 23 Although economists and other social scientists are studying the limits and domain of this assumption, it still provides the basis for most models. This rationalism entails self-interest, although neither the definition of “self” nor the definition of “interest” is uncontested. Rather, self￾interest is being re-examined, to accommodate behavior that seems or is normative, altruistic or self-abnegating. 8