Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 819 discussions primarily among the Francophone countries in 2001 that attracted twenty participants and yielded forty-two BITs,many of which involved noncontiguous, poor,highly indebted African countries for which it is difficult to imagine much benefit.(What are the chances that capital from Burkina Faso would flow to Chad, or investors from Benin would soon demand entree to Mali?)More understand- able,from an economic point of view,was the German-funded and supported meet- ing in October 2001 that drew together seven capital-poor countries(five of which were officially"highly indebted poor countries")and four wealthy European coun- tries,24 yielding both understandable (Belgium-Cambodia)and bizarre (Sudan- Zambia)bilateral treaty combinations.25 This recent turn toward BITs between developing states is more difficult for our theory to explain.It does seem to sug- gest that more political or sociological explanations may be increasingly relevant quite recently in some regions.However,these cases are still relatively few and of such recent vintage that they do not affect the broader relationships we report below. Leaders and Followers in BIT Agreements BITs present potential benefits for both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.But which group of countries initiates and drives the signing of such agreements?Our theory,to anticipate the following section,assumes that poten- tial host countries have an important(although not exclusive)role in initiating or nurturing BIT negotiations.Is this a plausible assumption?After all,power- based theories-or "coercive"theories in the language of Simmons,Dobbin,and Garrett26-suggest that dominant capital-exporting countries such as Germany or the United States control the agenda and begin BIT negotiations according to their schedule and needs.Indeed,the chronology described above suggests that some home countries establish BIT"programs"and sign agreements with a slate of devel- oping countries in concentrated periods of time. If the dominant powers determine the BIT schedule,then we should see evi- dence of home country"programs"when we look at BITs,by country,across time. Programs would look like clusters,or peaks,of activity in certain eras in a home country's history.By the same logic,if host countries take a lead role in produc- ing BITs,their histories would also show some evidence of concerted,program- matic activity.Figure 4 and Figure 5 chart the number of BITs signed since 1959 for the twelve most active BIT signatories from both home (Figure 4)and host (Figure 5)countries.It appears that most home countries have BIT activity that 24.Participants included Cambodia,Eritrea,Malawi,Mozambique,Sudan,Uganda,and Zambia. Upon the request of these countries,Belgium,France,the Netherlands,and Sweden were both invited to participate and responded affirmatively. 25.Notice that even multilateral meetings of this sort have not yielded multilateral treaties on invest- ment.The states involved have always chosen instead to sign a series of BITs.The question of why multilateral approaches are not adopted is interesting,but we leave it for another day. 26.Simmons.Dobbin,and Garrett,this volume.discussions primarily among the Francophone countries in 2001 that attracted twenty participants and yielded forty-two BITs, many of which involved noncontiguous, poor, highly indebted African countries for which it is difficult to imagine much benefit+ ~What are the chances that capital from Burkina Faso would flow to Chad, or investors from Benin would soon demand entrée to Mali?! More understand￾able, from an economic point of view, was the German-funded and supported meet￾ing in October 2001 that drew together seven capital-poor countries ~five of which were officially “highly indebted poor countries”! and four wealthy European coun￾tries, 24 yielding both understandable ~Belgium-Cambodia! and bizarre ~Sudan￾Zambia! bilateral treaty combinations+ 25 This recent turn toward BITs between developing states is more difficult for our theory to explain+ It does seem to sug￾gest that more political or sociological explanations may be increasingly relevant quite recently in some regions+ However, these cases are still relatively few and of such recent vintage that they do not affect the broader relationships we report below+ Leaders and Followers in BIT Agreements BITs present potential benefits for both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries+ But which group of countries initiates and drives the signing of such agreements? Our theory, to anticipate the following section, assumes that poten￾tial host countries have an important ~although not exclusive! role in initiating or nurturing BIT negotiations+ Is this a plausible assumption? After all, power￾based theories—or “coercive” theories in the language of Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett26—suggest that dominant capital-exporting countries such as Germany or the United States control the agenda and begin BIT negotiations according to their schedule and needs+ Indeed, the chronology described above suggests that some home countries establish BIT “programs” and sign agreements with a slate of devel￾oping countries in concentrated periods of time+ If the dominant powers determine the BIT schedule, then we should see evi￾dence of home country “programs” when we look at BITs, by country, across time+ Programs would look like clusters, or peaks, of activity in certain eras in a home country’s history+ By the same logic, if host countries take a lead role in produc￾ing BITs, their histories would also show some evidence of concerted, program￾matic activity+ Figure 4 and Figure 5 chart the number of BITs signed since 1959 for the twelve most active BIT signatories from both home ~Figure 4! and host ~Figure 5! countries+ It appears that most home countries have BIT activity that 24+ Participants included Cambodia, Eritrea, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia+ Upon the request of these countries, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden were both invited to participate and responded affirmatively+ 25+ Notice that even multilateral meetings of this sort have not yielded multilateral treaties on invest￾ment+ The states involved have always chosen instead to sign a series of BITs+ The question of why multilateral approaches are not adopted is interesting, but we leave it for another day+ 26+ Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, this volume+ Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 819