Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences VoL9 No.5 May2005 The cognitive control of emotion Kevin N.Ochsner1 and James J.Gross2 e,New York,NY 10027,USA The tion is im tant for bu models of the 'cold'control of dantation emotion regu ce.dir glhaegeentwyakeho memory(eg).The aim of this review mp or- ate recent im ext of 9 t in and anima cognitive processes difficult tos ecture draw upon highe cognitive control of emotion. uc have exam c meaningot.em0io 12 ally e evocative stimuli.These two regulation orms of en egu on d upon inter tion mechanisms is characterizing the pro emotions. Curent models posit thatm ns are Taken together,the results suggest a functional archi- mental representations that (i involve cha tecture or the co 1 th research on emotion If you are distressed by anything external,the pain (iii)can be either unlearned responses to stimuli intrins a ve s not di prop an e at any stimuli with acquired emotional value (e.g.a moment onditioned Marcus Aurelius(Meditations) and car the significance of stimuli to curn [11).that (v)depend upon different neura tems3,12,13. 25 initiation ures and los t time e to hrough the a ago,we humans have an extraordinary capacity Box 1.A brief history of psychological research on emotion gely determine regulation the impact dy of the ive control of er will have on our mental and he h motion regulation】 has a long history (Box 1).Past worl stre strategies and the neural systems involved in simple g168g9 of w on emotion regulation has entered a new phase unctional ima ging studies of reg atory ph 、。 tated in but,perhaps more importantl tudy of ld ob d b emotion that are dimcul nt work on the t thend ilds on lescribe when.howThe cognitive control of emotion Kevin N. Ochsner1 and James J. Gross2 1 Department of Psychology, Columbia University, Schermerhorn Hall, 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027, USA 2 Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Building 420, Stanford, CA 94305-2130, USA The capacity to control emotion is important for human adaptation. Questions about the neural bases of emotion regulation have recently taken on new import￾ance, as functional imaging studies in humans have permitted direct investigation of control strategies that draw upon higher cognitive processes difficult to study in nonhumans. Such studies have examined (1) control￾ling attention to, and (2) cognitively changing the meaning of, emotionally evocative stimuli. These two forms of emotion regulation depend upon interactions between prefrontal and cingulate control systems and cortical and subcortical emotion-generative systems. Taken together, the results suggest a functional archi￾tecture for the cognitive control of emotion that dove￾tails with findings from other human and nonhuman research on emotion. If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the thing itself, but to your estimate of it; and this you have the power to revoke at any moment. Marcus Aurelius (Meditations) Introduction Conflicts, failures, and losses at times seem to conspire to ruin us. Yet, as Marcus Aurelius observed nearly two millennia ago, we humans have an extraordinary capacity to regulate the emotions occasioned by such travails. Importantly, these regulatory efforts largely determine the impact such difficulties will have on our mental and physical well-being [1–3]. Given its importance to adap￾tive functioning, it is not surprising that research on emotion regulation has a long history (Box 1). Past work has investigated the cellular responses to stress, the behavioral consequences of adopting specific regulatory strategies, and the neural systems involved in simple forms of affective learning and social behavior in rodents and nonhuman primates [1,4–7]. In recent years, research on emotion regulation has entered a new phase as functional imaging studies of regulatory phenomena in humans have developed rapidly. This growth has facili￾tated investigation of human analogs to affective beha￾viors studied in animals, but, perhaps more importantly, has allowed study of the emotion regulatory power of higher cognitive control processes that are difficult to study in animal models. In so doing, current work on the ‘hot’ control of emotion draws on rapidly developing cognitive neuroscience models of the ‘cold’ control of attention and memory (e.g. [8,9]). The aim of this review is to evaluate recent imaging studies that, in the context of evidence from allied human and animal work, help to elucidate the functional architecture underlying the cognitive control of emotion. Emotion and emotion regulation An essential part of understanding emotion regulatory mechanisms is characterizing the processes that generate emotions. Current models posit that emotions are valenced responses to external stimuli and/or internal mental representations that (i) involve changes across multiple response systems (e.g. experiential, behavioral, peripheral physiological [10]), (ii) are distinct from moods, in that they often have identifiable objects or triggers, (iii) can be either unlearned responses to stimuli with intrinsic affective properties (e.g. an unconditioned response to an aversive shock) or learned responses to stimuli with acquired emotional value (e.g. a conditioned response or stimulus–reward association), (iv) and can involve multiple types of appraisal processes that assess the significance of stimuli to current goals [11], that (v) depend upon different neural systems [3,12,13]. Emotion regulation involves the initiation of new, or the alteration of ongoing, emotional responses through the Box 1. A brief history of psychological research on emotion regulation Study of the cognitive control of emotion has three major historical antecedents within psychology [1]. The first antecedent is the psychodynamic study of defense, which was initiated by Freud a century ago. This line of work has examined the regulation of anxiety and other negative emotions using clinical descriptions and individual difference studies of so-called perceptual defenses against processing negatively arousing stimuli, and specific defenses such as repressive coping [68,69]. The second antecedent is the stress and coping tradition that grew out of the psycho￾dynamic approach in the 1960s. This line of work has focused on the management of situations that ‘tax or exceed the resources of the person’ ([70], p. 141), and generated an early classic study of reappraisal showing that subjective and physiological responses decreased when a film of a potentially upsetting surgical procedure was viewed in analytical and detached terms [71]. The third antecedent is the developmental study of self-regulation, which had its roots in the study of socioemotional development. This work showed that children could obtain a preferred but delayed reward by thinking about available treats in abstract ways (e.g. putting a mental ‘picture-frame’ around a cookie) that decreased their immediate impulse to eat them [72]. Contemporary research builds on this foundation using both behavioral and neuroscience methods to describe when, how, and with what consequences individuals Corresponding author: Ochsner, K.N. (ochsner@psych.columbia.edu). regulate their emotions. Available online 5 April 2005 Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.9 No.5 May 2005 www.sciencedirect.com 1364-6613/$ - see front matter Q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.03.010