money, as well as cruelty to animals, food regulation, manufacturing of brushe and toupees(made of horsehair ) Instead, he suggested, we should look at olr u main historical categories and adjust them to the horse situation. Another commentator made a similar argument Nonetheless. the commentator wrote cyberspace does have a special place, citing William Blake To see a World in a grain of Sand And a heaven in a Wild Flo Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand And Eternity in an hour Whether Internet law will remain the grain of sand or grow to become a world of its own depends on our capacities for finding the materials and the way we remember and relate different contexts. Treatises on the legal problems concerning Telegraph and Trains have sprung up and disappeared as the general laws of torts and contracts and rate regulation have been adjusted to take into account these special situations. Statutes and their judicial gloss augmented common law solutions In contrast, securities regulation, the regulation of investment management, and antitrust law have become permanent categories of special ituations-the laws of certain horses. While they touch on fundamental areas and are composed of the common law and legislation, the materials are organized and compiled under their specific names. To avoid repetition those areas of the special laws leave out the"general categories" that can be regulated within those categories, such as usual tort, contract, and corporate law, and keeping those rules which adjust contract, tort, and corporate law to the particular context. For example, contract common law applies to the agreements between advisers and mutual funds. But in addition and superimposed on the law is section 15 of the ld.at207-08 Joseph A Sommer, Against Cyberlav, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147(2000)(Very few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic technologies. Tort law is not the law of the automobile.”) 5 Id. at 1231 The future may also depend on the extent to which the context, approach, institutional structures and common principles will underlie decisions concerning cy berspace and legislation relating to it. I owe these points to Professor Nicola Lugaresi, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy, who expressed them to an Internet discussion group "Cyberprof on March 2, 2001(the common denominator of internet issues may also include common"presuppositions"e.g,"distanc interaction, architecture, geographic locus(Weinberg); control( Chichester); anonymity information tracking; changes in politics and institutions; and lowered costs(Swire); or, at a different level, socially [sic] constructions of space,, property and identity; "unbundling libertaniarism [sic], friendly or challenging( Boyle); regulation of information(Ku)) 7 One reason for the classification may have been the comprehensive statutory regulation.Another eason may be that the context is sufficiently unique to give rise to unique and cohesive jurisprudence and enforcement institutions. Putting them under the umbrella of" contract woul not have helped. Impersonal agreements among the parties through intermediaries reduced the parties face to face bargaining protections. Internal rules of syndicates and exchanges failed to maintain efficient operations and public trust4 money,3 as well as cruelty to animals, food regulation, manufacturing of brushes and toupees (made of horsehair). Instead, he suggested, we should look at our main historical categories and adjust them to the horse situation. Another commentator made a similar argument.4 Nonetheless, the commentator wrote, cyberspace does have a special place, citing William Blake: “To see a World in a Grain of Sand And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand And Eternity in an hour.”5 Whether Internet law will remain the grain of sand or grow to become a world of its own depends on our capacities for finding the materials and the way we remember and relate different contexts.6 Treatises on the legal problems concerning Telegraph and Trains have sprung up and disappeared as the general laws of torts and contracts and rate regulation have been adjusted to take into account these special situations. Statutes and their judicial gloss augmented common law solutions. In contrast, securities regulation, the regulation of investment management, and antitrust law have become permanent categories of special situations—the laws of certain horses.7 While they touch on fundamental areas, and are composed of the common law and legislation, the materials are organized and compiled under their specific names. To avoid repetition those areas of the special laws leave out the “general categories” that can be regulated within those categories, such as usual tort, contract, and corporate law, and keeping those rules which adjust contract, tort, and corporate law to the particular context. For example, contract common law applies to the agreements between advisers and mutual funds. But in addition and superimposed on the law is section 15 of the 3 Id. at 207-08. 4 Joseph A. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (2000) (“Very few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic technologies. Tort law is not ‘the law of the automobile.’”). 5 Id. at 1231. 6 The future may also depend on the extent to which the context, approach, institutional structures and common principles will underlie decisions concerning cyberspace and legislation relating to it. I owe these points to Professor Nicola Lugaresi, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy, who expressed them to an Internet discussion group “Cyberprof” on March 2, 2001 (the common denominator of internet issues may also include common “presuppositions” e.g., “distance, interaction, architecture, geographic locus (Weinberg); control (Chichester); anonymity; information tracking; changes in politics and institutions; and lowered costs (Swire); or, at a different level, socially [sic] constructions of space,; property and identity; “unbundling”; libertaniarism [sic], friendly or challenging (Boyle); regulation of information (Ku)”). 7 One reason for the classification may have been the comprehensive statutory regulation. Another reason may be that the context is sufficiently unique to give rise to unique and cohesive jurisprudence and enforcement institutions. Putting them under the umbrella of “contract” would not have helped. Impersonal agreements among the parties through intermediaries reduced the parties face to face bargaining protections. Internal rules of syndicates and exchanges failed to maintain efficient operations and public trust