How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities Garro.and Spenkuch 2017).such benefit accrues to or pivotal in individual donors'decisionmaking(Wilson ganizational members regardless of whether they have 1973;Moe 1980).In the context of PAC fundraising,I donated to the PAC,thus producing a collective action argue that one particularly salient purposive incentive problem.While the top personnel might have a suffi- is donors'partisan or ideological preference. ciently large stake in the economic success of the or. Stated formally,my main hypothesis is that donors ganization to find donating worthwhile,each of them with partisan preference should be less likely to donate can give no more than $5,000 per year to their PAC. to their affiliated access-seeking PACs when a greater For other eligible donors,the marginal benefit to their share of PAC contributions go to out-partisan(rather donations might not justify the cost(Olson 1965). than copartisan)politicians.Note that while I focus To tackle this collective action problem,organiza- on partisanship in this paper,it could also be a proxy tions sponsoring access-seeking PACs provide vari- for individuals'ideological preferences (Bonica 2014; ous benefits to induce giving,though it is unclear Barber.Canes-Wrone,and Thrower 2017).In the re- how well these tactics work.Many encourage em- mainder of this section,I argue that this hypothesis, ployees to authorize payroll deductions to maintain if true,implies that partisan preferences of donors can a steady stream of incoming donations,although the significantly constrain PACs'ability to raise funds and Federal Election Commission (hereafter the FEC)re- thereby obtain access.Additionally,I provide three rea- quires such programs to be opt-in rather than opt-out sons for why this hypothesis could be true. (Sabato 1985).Additionally,the parent organizations To see why donors'partisanships could affect the sponsoring these PACs offer various selective benefits strategic success of access-seeking PACs,it is worth em- 元 to donors,from casino nights to golf tournaments to phasizing that the share of PAC contributions to one "high-donor clubs"(Sabato 1985).However,these se- party versus the other may influence not only the rate of lective benefits not only constitute a costly means to returns to PAC contributions.which motivates much of sustain donations (Wilson 1973:Moe 1980).but also the existing literature on PACs'contribution patterns, risk violating campaign finance regulations(Berman but also the amount of fundraising.These components 2014). jointly determine the total returns to PAC contributions Furthermore,even though coercion is expressly for- (in the simplest case,total returns would be the prod- bidden,the parent organizations of access-seeking uct of the two).If PAC donors behave as I hypothesize, PACs often try to cultivate a norm of giving (So- access-seeking PACs may have to strike a compromise rauf 1984).Again,however.its effectiveness on boost- between increasing the per-dollar rate of return to PAC ing PAC fundraising has not been empirically eval- contributions,and raising more donations from eligible uated and might,in fact,be limited.Social pressure, PAC donors.s Consider the case of Google whose PAC especially when coupled with monitoring,could help appears to have a predominantly liberal donor base.? access-seeking organizations overcome collective ac- Under the current government,if Google's PAC prior- tion problems in many realms of political mobiliza- itizes giving to members of the majority (Republican) tion(Hertel-Fernandez 2017).But the general pressure party,it might get more bang for the buck for its PAC to conform might not be sufficient to mobilize many contributions at the expense of fundraising.If Google's prospective PAC donors,since giving to one's PAC en- PAC instead tries to raise more donations by focusing tails a greater personal cost than other forms of politi- on giving to Democratic legislators,it might reduce the 5.501g cal participation that need not conflict with one's parti- effectiveness of its PAC contributions in gaining valu- san or ideological preferences.An employer could,for able access and influencing policymaking. instance,arrange for Democratic-leaning workers to Having discussed why PAC donors'partisan prefer- contact influential legislators on the Democratic side ences might limit a PAC's ability to obtain access and and Republican-leaning workers to Republican legis- gain influence,I now turn to three factors that lend sup- lators.In contrast,since each organization is allowed to port for my hypothesis that PAC donors'willingness sponsor only one PAC,prospective donors cannot give to give decreases in the share of PAC contribution to to access-seeking PACs without compromising their out-partisan politicians.First,many PAC donors have partisanship or ideology at some point.The institu- strong and stable partisan preferences.For example, tional structure of access-seeking PACs could thereby among PAC donors who have given directly to candi- undercut the effectiveness of using social pressure to dates or party committees,77%have only given to one solicit donations party in their lifetime.This is evident in the left panel of eys THEORY:DONORS'PARTISAN PREFERENCES CONSTRAIN PACS'ABILITY tangible costs and benefits.Solidary incentives are intangible costs and benefits of a social nature,for example,from friendship,cama- TO RAISE FUNDS AND GAIN ACCESS raderie,recreational activity,status,social pressure,or a sense of be- longing.Purposive incentives are intangible costs and benefits ulti- When payroll deductions,selective benefits,and social mately grounded on values of a suprapersonal nature,e.g.,notions of pressure are insufficient to induce donations to access right and wrong,moral or religious principles,political ideology,and seeking PACs,other motivations,particularly purpo- notions of fairness and justice." sive benefits(Clark and Wilson 1961),could become Section A.1 of the online appendix illustrates this tradeoff in a sim- ple formal model of PACs'decision problem. 84.3%of Google's PAC donors who have given to candidates or This follows from the typology of incentives proposed in Clark party committees appear Democratic-leaning based on their dona- and Wilson (1961).As Moe (1980)explains:"Material incentives are tion histories. 795How Internal Constraints Shape Interest Group Activities Garro, and Spenkuch 2017), such benefit accrues to or￾ganizational members regardless of whether they have donated to the PAC, thus producing a collective action problem. While the top personnel might have a suffi￾ciently large stake in the economic success of the or￾ganization to find donating worthwhile, each of them can give no more than $5,000 per year to their PAC. For other eligible donors, the marginal benefit to their donations might not justify the cost (Olson 1965). To tackle this collective action problem, organiza￾tions sponsoring access-seeking PACs provide vari￾ous benefits to induce giving, though it is unclear how well these tactics work. Many encourage em￾ployees to authorize payroll deductions to maintain a steady stream of incoming donations, although the Federal Election Commission (hereafter the FEC) re￾quires such programs to be opt-in rather than opt-out (Sabato 1985). Additionally, the parent organizations sponsoring these PACs offer various selective benefits to donors, from casino nights to golf tournaments to “high-donor clubs” (Sabato 1985). However, these se￾lective benefits not only constitute a costly means to sustain donations (Wilson 1973; Moe 1980), but also risk violating campaign finance regulations (Berman 2014). Furthermore, even though coercion is expressly for￾bidden, the parent organizations of access-seeking PACs often try to cultivate a norm of giving (So￾rauf 1984). Again, however, its effectiveness on boost￾ing PAC fundraising has not been empirically eval￾uated and might, in fact, be limited. Social pressure, especially when coupled with monitoring, could help access-seeking organizations overcome collective ac￾tion problems in many realms of political mobiliza￾tion (Hertel-Fernandez 2017). But the general pressure to conform might not be sufficient to mobilize many prospective PAC donors, since giving to one’s PAC en￾tails a greater personal cost than other forms of politi￾cal participation that need not conflict with one’s parti￾san or ideological preferences. An employer could, for instance, arrange for Democratic-leaning workers to contact influential legislators on the Democratic side, and Republican-leaning workers to Republican legis￾lators. In contrast, since each organization is allowed to sponsor only one PAC, prospective donors cannot give to access-seeking PACs without compromising their partisanship or ideology at some point. The institu￾tional structure of access-seeking PACs could thereby undercut the effectiveness of using social pressure to solicit donations. THEORY: DONORS’ PARTISAN PREFERENCES CONSTRAIN PACS’ ABILITY TO RAISE FUNDS AND GAIN ACCESS When payroll deductions, selective benefits, and social pressure are insufficient to induce donations to access￾seeking PACs, other motivations, particularly purpo￾sive benefits (Clark and Wilson 1961),7 could become 7 This follows from the typology of incentives proposed in Clark and Wilson (1961). As Moe (1980) explains: “Material incentives are pivotal in individual donors’ decisionmaking (Wilson 1973; Moe 1980). In the context of PAC fundraising, I argue that one particularly salient purposive incentive is donors’ partisan or ideological preference. Stated formally, my main hypothesis is that donors with partisan preference should be less likely to donate to their affiliated access-seeking PACs when a greater share of PAC contributions go to out-partisan (rather than copartisan) politicians. Note that while I focus on partisanship in this paper, it could also be a proxy for individuals’ ideological preferences (Bonica 2014; Barber, Canes-Wrone, and Thrower 2017). In the re￾mainder of this section, I argue that this hypothesis, if true, implies that partisan preferences of donors can significantly constrain PACs’ ability to raise funds and thereby obtain access.Additionally, I provide three rea￾sons for why this hypothesis could be true. To see why donors’ partisanships could affect the strategic success of access-seeking PACs,it is worth em￾phasizing that the share of PAC contributions to one party versus the other may influence not only the rate of returns to PAC contributions, which motivates much of the existing literature on PACs’ contribution patterns, but also the amount of fundraising. These components jointly determine the total returnsto PAC contributions (in the simplest case, total returns would be the prod￾uct of the two). If PAC donors behave as I hypothesize, access-seeking PACs may have to strike a compromise between increasing the per-dollar rate of return to PAC contributions, and raising more donations from eligible PAC donors.8 Consider the case of Google whose PAC appears to have a predominantly liberal donor base.9 Under the current government, if Google’s PAC prior￾itizes giving to members of the majority (Republican) party, it might get more bang for the buck for its PAC contributions at the expense of fundraising. If Google’s PAC instead tries to raise more donations by focusing on giving to Democratic legislators, it might reduce the effectiveness of its PAC contributions in gaining valu￾able access and influencing policymaking. Having discussed why PAC donors’ partisan prefer￾ences might limit a PAC’s ability to obtain access and gain influence, I now turn to three factors that lend sup￾port for my hypothesis that PAC donors’ willingness to give decreases in the share of PAC contribution to out-partisan politicians. First, many PAC donors have strong and stable partisan preferences. For example, among PAC donors who have given directly to candi￾dates or party committees, 77% have only given to one party in their lifetime.This is evident in the left panel of tangible costs and benefits. Solidary incentives are intangible costs and benefits of a social nature, for example, from friendship, cama￾raderie, recreational activity, status, social pressure, or a sense of be￾longing. Purposive incentives are intangible costs and benefits ulti￾mately grounded on values of a suprapersonal nature, e.g., notions of right and wrong, moral or religious principles, political ideology, and notions of fairness and justice.” 8 Section A.1 of the online appendix illustrates this tradeoff in a sim￾ple formal model of PACs’ decision problem. 9 84.3% of Google’s PAC donors who have given to candidates or party committees appear Democratic-leaning based on their dona￾tion histories. 795 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000382