War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 185 186 Charles Tilly monopolized the means of violence,and thereby increased his return from tions.The agreements on protection constrained the rulers themselves, tribute,continued on a larger scale into the logic of war.Early in the process. making them vulnerable to courts,to assemblies,to withdrawals of credit, external and intemnal rivals overlapped to a large degree.Only the services.and expertise. establishment of large perimeters of control within which great lords had To a larger degree.states that have come into being recently through checked their rivals sharpened the line between intemal and external.George decolonization or through reallocations of territory by dominant states have Modelski sums up the competitive logic cogently: acquired their military organization from outside,without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled.To the extent that Global power...strengthened those states that attained it relatively to all other outside states continue to supply military goods and expertise in return for political and other organizations.What is more,other states competing in the commodities,military alliance or both,the new states harbor powerful global power game developed similar organizational forms and similar unconstrained organisations that easily overshadow all other organizations hardiness:they too became nation-states-in a defensive reaction,because within their territories.To the extent that outside states guarantee their forced to take issue with or to confront a global power,as France confronted boundaries,the managers of those military organisations exercise ex- Spain and later Britain,or in imitation of its obvious success and effectiveness, traordinary power within them.The advantages of military power become as Germany followed the example of Britain in Weltmacht,or as earlier Peter enormous,the incentives to seize power over the state as a whole by means the Great had rebuilt Russia on Dutch precepts and examples.Thus not only of that advantage very strong.Despite the great place that war making Portugal,the Netherlands,Britain and the United States became nation-states, occupied in the making of European states,the old national states of Europe but also Spain,France,Germany,Russia and Japan.The short,and the most almost never experienced the great disproportion between military parsimonious,answer to the question of why these succeeded where "most of organization and all other forms of organization that seems the fate of client the European efforts to build states failed"is that they were either global states throughout the contemporary world.A century ago,Europeans might powers or successfully fought with or against them.12 have congratulated themselves on the spread of civil government throughout the world.In our own time,the analogy between war making and state making, This logic of international state making acts out on a large scale the logic of on the one hand,and organized crime,on the other,is becoming tragically local aggrandizement.The external complements the internal. apt. If we allow that fragile distinction between "internal"and "external" state-making processes,then we might schematize the history of European state making as three stages:(a)The differential success of some power holders in "external"struggles establishes the difference between an"internal" and an "external"arena for the deployment of force;(b)"external"competition generates "internal"state making;(c)"external"compacts among states influence the form and locus of particular states ever more powerfully.In this perspective,state-certifying organisations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations simply extended the European-based process to the world as a whole.Whether forced or voluntary,bloody or peaceful,decolonization simply completed that process by which existing states leagued to create new ones. The extension of the Europe-based state-making process to the rest of the world,however.did not result in the creation of states in the strict European image.Broadly speaking,internal struggles such as the checking of great regional lords and the imposition of taxation on peasant villages produced important organizational features of European states:the relative subordination of military power to civilian control,the extensive bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance,the representation of wronged interests via petition and parliament.On the whole,states elsewhere developed differently.The most telling feature of that difference appears in military organization.European states built up their military apparatuses through sustained struggles with their subject populations and by means of selective extension of protection to different classes within those popula-War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 185 monopolized the means of violence, and thereby increased his return from tribute, continued on a larger scale into the logic of war. Early in the process, external and internal rivals overlapped to a large degree. Only the establishment of large perimeters of control within which great lords had checked their rivals sharpened the line between internal and external. George Modelski sums up the competitive logic cogently: Global power ... strengthened those states that attained it relatively to all other political and other organizations. What is more, other states competing in the global power game developed similar organizational forms and similar hardiness: they too became nation-states – in a defensive reaction, because forced to take issue with or to confront a global power, as France confronted Spain and later Britain, or in imitation of its obvious success and effectiveness, as Germany followed the example of Britain in Weltmacht, or as earlier Peter the Great had rebuilt Russia on Dutch precepts and examples. Thus not only Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States became nation-states, but also Spain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. The short, and the most parsimonious, answer to the question of why these succeeded where "most of the European efforts to build states failed" is that they were either global powers or successfully fought with or against them.12 This logic of international state making acts out on a large scale the logic of local aggrandizement. The external complements the internal. If we allow that fragile distinction between "internal" and "external" state-making processes, then we might schematize the history of European state making as three stages: (a) The differential success of some power holders in "external" struggles establishes the difference between an "internal" and an "external" arena for the deployment of force; (b) "external" competition generates "internal" state making; (c) "external" compacts among states influence the form and locus of particular states ever more powerfully. In this perspective, state-certifying organisations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations simply extended the European-based process to the world as a whole. Whether forced or voluntary, bloody or peaceful, decolonization simply completed that process by which existing states leagued to create new ones. The extension of the Europe-based state-making process to the rest of the world, however, did not result in the creation of states in the strict European image. Broadly speaking, internal struggles such as the checking of great regional lords and the imposition of taxation on peasant villages produced important organizational features of European states: the relative subordination of military power to civilian control, the extensive bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance, the representation of wronged interests via petition and parliament. On the whole, states elsewhere developed differently. The most telling feature of that difference appears in military organization. European states built up their military apparatuses through sustained struggles with their subject populations and by means of selective extension of protection to different classes within those popula- 186 Charles Tilly tions. The agreements on protection constrained the rulers themselves, making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, to withdrawals of credit, services, and expertise. To a larger degree, states that have come into being recently through decolonization or through reallocations of territory by dominant states have acquired their military organization from outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled. To the extent that outside states continue to supply military goods and expertise in return for commodities, military alliance or both, the new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organisations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories. To the extent that outside states guarantee their boundaries, the managers of those military organisations exercise ex￾traordinary power within them. The advantages of military power become enormous, the incentives to seize power over the state as a whole by means of that advantage very strong. Despite the great place that war making occupied in the making of European states, the old national states of Europe almost never experienced the great disproportion between military organization and all other forms of organization that seems the fate of client states throughout the contemporary world. A century ago, Europeans might have congratulated themselves on the spread of civil government throughout the world. In our own time, the analogy between war making and state making, on the one hand, and organized crime, on the other, is becoming tragically apt