dence is the study of the relations of one leg em with other legal systems, the character of these relations and reasons for similarities/differences can be revealed only by means of theoretical and historical studies of legal systems. (17) An original compromise is reached by those comparatists who define comparative law to be both a method of legal science and an independent scientific discipline. The first case may be exemplified via comparative investigations in any branch of law, where the comparative method is used as the tool for collecting information on compared systems or legal phenomena In the second case, comparative law is juxtaposed with general theory of law and, therefore, it is obviously more expedient to speak about comparative jurisprudence as a science constituting an independent field of knowledge than merely a comparative method. It should be admitted, owever,that it is rather difficult to establish a precise evaluative criterion as to what constitutes an independent science as well as to determine ambits between traditional legal disciplines. A compromise may be a thesis about comparative law as a group of methods that composes in an aggregate a methodological basis of comparative research in any branch of law. (18) There is a group of scholars aspiring to prove an indissoluble connection between comparative law and theoretical jurisprudence. In their opinion, this unity corresponds to the unity of form and contents. i.e. these are basic elements of legal knowledge. the two sides of one coin without comparative law, theoretical jurisprudence remains an incomplete and formal science, while without theoretical jurisprudence comparative law is an inapplicable method. The path to theoretical jurisprudence goes through comparative law and vice versa. (19)When conducting research comparatists apply notional categories elaborated by legal theorists and, on the other hand, results of comparative investigations require a substantive theoretical evaluation. However, categories of theoretical jurisprudence can hardly encompass the peculiarities of all legal systems and difficulties may occur in the determination of sources, juridical systematization, fact-finding, etc. There are also other trends in the comparative law discourse of today, such as comparative law and legal history, comparative law and culture, comparative law and sociology, comparative lav and economics, comparative law and religion Some scholars welcome such successful scientific syntheses, while others argue that comparative law must maintain its independent character and not be swallowed up by new relationships. It must retain a separateness and distinctiveness. (20) A number of legal scholars tend to assert that comparative law is by no means a legal science for it exclusively represents an educational discipline which is taught in law schools and universities. It is argued that the designation of comparative law consists in the application of the comparative method in those instances where the process of comparison exceeds the frameworks of one legal system. The process of comparison does not in itself create legal norms; it only contributes to the creation of legal norms within the framework of one or more legal systems. (21)This thesis may nonetheless, be refuted by the fact that in the course of judicial proceedings the European Court of Human Rights and courts of member states of the European Union now more and more often resort to the comparative practice of analysing the judicial decisions and national legislation of member states. It thus confirms an evolutionary role of practical application of comparative law in the process of European integrationSince comparative jurisprudence is the study of the relations of one legal system with other legal systems, the character of these relations and reasons for similarities/differences can be revealed only by means of theoretical and historical studies of legal systems.(17) An original compromise is reached by those comparatists who define comparative law to be both a method of legal science and an independent scientific discipline. The first case may be exemplified via comparative investigations in any branch of law, where the comparative method is used as the tool for collecting information on compared systems or legal phenomena. In the second case, comparative law is juxtaposed with general theory of law and, therefore, it is obviously more expedient to speak about comparative jurisprudence as a science constituting an independent field of knowledge than merely a comparative method. It should be admitted, however, that it is rather difficult to establish a precise evaluative criterion as to what constitutes an independent science as well as to determine ambits between traditional legal disciplines. A compromise may be a thesis about comparative law as a group of methods that composes in an aggregate a methodological basis of comparative research in any branch of law.(18) There is a group of scholars aspiring to prove an indissoluble connection between comparative law and theoretical jurisprudence. In their opinion, this unity corresponds to the unity of form and contents, i.e. these are basic elements of legal knowledge, the two sides of one coin. Without comparative law, theoretical jurisprudence remains an incomplete and formal science, while without theoretical jurisprudence comparative law is an inapplicable method. The path to theoretical jurisprudence goes through comparative law and vice versa.(19) When conducting research comparatists apply notional categories elaborated by legal theorists and, on the other hand, results of comparative investigations require a substantive theoretical evaluation. However, categories of theoretical jurisprudence can hardly encompass the peculiarities of all legal systems and difficulties may occur in the determination of sources, juridical systematization, fact-finding, etc. There are also other trends in the comparative law discourse of today, such as comparative law and legal history, comparative law and culture, comparative law and sociology, comparative law and economics, comparative law and religion. Some scholars welcome such successful scientific syntheses, while others argue that 'comparative law must maintain its independent character and not be swallowed up by new relationships. It must retain a separateness and distinctiveness.'(20) A number of legal scholars tend to assert that comparative law is by no means a legal science for it exclusively represents an educational discipline which is taught in law schools and universities. It is argued that the designation of comparative law consists in the application of the comparative method in those instances where the process of comparison exceeds the frameworks of one legal system. The process of comparison does not in itself create legal norms; it only contributes to the creation of legal norms within the framework of one or more legal systems.(21) This thesis may, nonetheless, be refuted by the fact that in the course of judicial proceedings the European Court of Human Rights and courts of member states of the European Union now more and more often resort to the comparative practice of analysing the judicial decisions and national legislation of member states. It thus confirms an evolutionary role of practical application of comparative law in the process of European integration