authority. 33 Secondly, understand ing the relationship between law and the market in the context of a structured regulatory framework, such as can be found in an integrated or federal structure, may help suggest ways in which this can be achieved. In such a context, cross border externalities and market breakdowns are dealt with by the central legislative authority through harmonised substantive rules. 4 Whereas they take the form of minimum standards for internal market transactions, they are also projected into the world market in the form of internationally mandatory rules, in cases where the European legislator has decided that the connection with the Community is sufficient to justify its interest. 35 In both instances, they designed to provide an effective regulatory framework within which party choice of law can operate effectively. However, whereas harmonised substantive legislation can obviously project a coherent view of the requirements of collective welfare within the internal market, this is clearly not the case in a global setting. The new wine thus resides in the idea that conflicts of economic regulation should be fitted into a larger picture of coherent market regulation, with a clear focus on global welfare. More than a change in vocabulary, it implies redefining the scope and function of the conflicts of laws 5. The dual function of choice of law in the global market. The transformation in perspective highlighted by economic analysis is evidenced by the increasing pressure to include public regulation within the scope of conflicts of laws. Firstly, when desirable, inter-jurisd ictional competition is not perceived as being restricted to fields traditionally bearing the label of private law,, but also extends to the regulation of public goods on offer in different locations to mobile firms and capital. Secondly, absent a central authority or international agreement to deal with third-party effects, the only -albeit second-best -means to reduce the discrepancy between national laws and global markets would be to extend the scope of the conflict of laws to fields currently bearing a public law'label, in order to design appropriate tests with which to allocate economic regulatory authority. Here, then, is the political economy of Inconsistencies leading to over-regulation are obviously particularly intolerable each of the regulations involved provide for criminal sanctions. See the dilemma in the Nippon Papercase, Dorsey J Ellis Jr, Projecting the Long Arm of the Law. Extraterritorial Crim inal Enforcement of US Antitrust Laws in the global Economy, I Wash U Global Stud L Rev 477(2002). But of course, regulatory gaps and overlaps are a well known feature of the unilateralist and monopolistic methodologies by which states define the scope of their economic regulation(see text below, 8 13) asymmetries, see below, fn 49), or ensure aga inst restrictions to competition. On the scope of Europep e These may either provide for consumer/investor protection(essentially designed to cure information contract law, which extends to fields such as competition law not generally included in the category of private contract law, see Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Contract Law, 4 European Review of private ,505-528(2001) A close connectionwith the territory of a Mem ber State is usually required for consumer legislation n (see P Lagarde, 'Heurs et malheurs ). The reach of Community competition law is measured by a test resembling the US 'effects test(see below, fn 124) There is considerable debate as to the desirability and feasibility of intemational agreement on conflicts of econom ic regulation(for instance, under the aegis of the WTO); see Eleanor M Fox, 'Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways, NUY LR 1781(2000). It is also true-and this is the risk inherent in any second-best solution such as that proposed by this paper- that in the absence of agreement, if courts attempt to mimic what international agreement might achieve, prisoner's dilemma dynamics may also set in(see Dodge, Extraterritoria lity and Conflict-of-Laws Theory Shut, p On this discrepancy, see Eleanor Fox, National Law, Global Markets and Hartford Fire: Eyes Wideauthority.33 Secondly, understanding the relationship between law and the market in the context of a structured regulatory framework, such as can be found in an integrated or federal structure, may help suggest ways in which this can be achieved. In such a context, cross￾border externalities and market breakdowns are dealt with by the central legislative authority, through harmonised substantive rules.34 Whereas they take the form of minimum standards for internal market transactions, they are also projected into the world market in the form of internationally mandatory rules, in cases where the European legislator has decided that the connection with the Community is sufficient to justify its interest.35 In both instances, they are designed to provide an effective regulatory framework within which party choice of law can operate effectively. However, whereas harmonised substantive legislation can obviously project a coherent view of the requirements of collective welfare within the internal market, this is clearly not the case in a global setting. The new wine thus resides in the idea that conflicts of economic regulation should be fitted into a larger picture of coherent market regulation, with a clear focus on global welfare. More than a change in vocabulary, it implies redefining the scope and function of the conflicts of laws. 5. The dual function of choice of law in the global market. The transformation in perspective highlighted by economic analysis is evidenced by the increasing pressure to include public regulation within the scope of conflicts of laws. Firstly, when desirable, inter-jurisdictional competition is not perceived as being restricted to fields traditionally bearing the label of ‘private law’, but also extends to the regulation of public goods on offer in different locations to mobile firms and capital. Secondly, absent a central authority or international agreement to deal with third-party effects, the only - albeit second-best36 - means to reduce the discrepancy between national laws and global markets37 would be to extend the scope of the conflict of laws to fields currently bearing a ‘public law’ label, in order to design appropriate tests with which to allocate economic regulatory authority. Here, then, is the political economy of 33 Inconsistencies leading to over-regulation are obviously particularly intolerable each of the regulations involved provide for criminal sanctions. See the dilemma in the Nippon Paper case, Dorsey J Ellis Jr, ‘Projecting the Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of US Antitrust Laws in the Global Economy’, 1 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 477 (2002). But of course, regulatory gaps and overlaps are a well￾known feature of the unilateralist and monopolistic methodologies by which states define the scope of their economic regulation (see text below, § 13). 34 These may either provide for consumer/investor protection (essentially designed to cure information asymmetries, see below, fn 49), or ensure against restrictions to competition. On the scope of ‘European contract law’, which extends to fields such as competition law not generally included in the category of private contract law, see Stefan Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’, 4 European Review of Private Law, 505-528 (2001). 35 A ‘close connection’ with the territory of a Member State is usually required for consumer legislation (see P Lagarde, ‘Heurs et malheurs’). The reach of Community competition law is measured by a test resembling the US ‘effects’ test (see below, fn 124). 36 There is considerable debate as to the desirability and feasibility of international agreement on conflicts of economic regulation (for instance, under the aegis of the WTO); see Eleanor M Fox, ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down and Sideways’, NUY L R 1781 (2000). It is also true - and this is the risk inherent in any second-best solution such as that proposed by this paper - that in the absence of agreement, if courts attempt to mimic what international agreement might achieve, prisoner’s dilemma dynamics may also set in (see Dodge, ‘Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory’. 37 On this discrepancy, see Eleanor Fox, ‘National Law, Global Markets and Hartford Fire: Eyes Wide Shut’, 68 Antitrust LJ 73 (2000)