B.,F.StrackI Journal of Expermental Soclal Psychology(04)535-54 539 this assumption.cognitive dissonance affected only ex- Leippe and Eisenstadt (1994).Applying the notion of dissonance-related attitude changes to the domain of pants showed a mor prejudic hese researchers aske pa der low situational pressure than under high situational African American students at the expense of funding for pressure or control】 conditions.Implicit attitudes,in Caucasian students.Consistent with previous findings in sitive whe tions of high situational pressure and under control uational pressures to write the essay were low,than conditions. .but not when situational pressure was lov when they were high. ving on the ated ch assump tive associations when cognitive dissonance could be emerge only for explicit,but not for Most impor .this should be the case even when the unte at prejudic In the followi seem to have rejected the propositional implications of tested by using an IAT designed to assess implici thei chronic cognitive dissonance efor Caucasians over African Americans.and proposi pre ence assumptions about the propositional nature of cognitive sively with regard to their p cesses but directly corre dissonance one may object that the measures pond to one another with regard to the particular ment not respect to thus ruling out e explanations also with respect to their content.Whereas the T and Eisenstadt's (994)dissonance maninulation essed relative attitudes toward alcoholic versus nor were e ected to be pos In othe word the wo attitudes toward related but not necessarily corre- pressure. Acco rdingly,participant is in h the changing their attitudes toward alcoholic ve Particinants and design verages. This pattern,however,could be estern undergraduate f the propos )participated tudy on politica tive attitudes randomly assigned to the four conditions of a (ssa changed regardless of whether they are asse assignment:induced compliance vs.forced position)x2 explicitlyor implicitly Hence.in order to rule out this dr measuremen:implicit first vs.explic iment 2 aim irst)factorial measures that differ only with respect to the asse thus had to be excluded from analyses. ocesses,but not with respect to the particular attitude object edur ned by a white Experiment 2 a survey conducted by the university administration. The experimenter th adm otal ar ences in the attitude obiect rather than to differences in scholarships,the percentage committed to Africanthis assumption, cognitive dissonance affected only ex￾plicit, but not implicit attitudes. Specifically, partici￾pants showed a more favorable explicit attitude toward a previously advocated counterattitudinal position un￾der low situational pressure than under high situational pressure or control conditions. Implicit attitudes, in contrast, were unaffected by cognitive dissonance ma￾nipulations. Moreover, explicit and implicit attitudes showed a significant positive correlation under condi￾tions of high situational pressure and under control conditions, but not when situational pressure was low. Taken together, these results indicate that participants based their explicit judgments on their chronic evalua￾tive associations when cognitive dissonance could be reduced by finding an additional proposition that solved the inconsistency between their counterattitudinal be￾havior and the propositional implications of their chronic evaluative associations. However, participants seem to have rejected the propositional implications of their chronic associations when cognitive dissonance could not be reduced by an additional proposition. Even though these findings are consistent with our assumptions about the propositional nature of cognitive dissonance, one may object that the measures used in Experiment 1 differed not only with respect to the as￾sessed processes (i.e., associations vs. judgments), but also with respect to their content. Whereas the IAT as￾sessed relative attitudes toward alcoholic versus non￾alcoholic beverages, the employed explicit measure assessed attitudes toward a prohibition of alcoholic beverages. In other words, the two measures assessed attitudes toward related but not necessarily corre￾sponding attitude objects. Accordingly, participants in the present study could have changed their attitudes toward the particular policy in question without changing their attitudes toward alcoholic versus non￾alcoholic beverages. This pattern, however, could be independent of the proposed interpretation in terms of associative and propositional processes, such that rela￾tive attitudes toward alcoholic beverages remain un￾changed regardless of whether they are assessed explicitly or implicitly. Hence, in order to rule out this alternative interpretation, Experiment 2 aimed to repli￾cate the basic findings of Experiment 1 employing measures that differ only with respect to the assessed processes, but not with respect to the particular attitude object. Experiment 2 In order to rule out the alternative interpretation that the results obtained in Experiment 1 are due to differ￾ences in the attitude object rather than to differences in the cognitive processes, Experiment 2 employed a vari￾ant of the induced compliance paradigm developed by Leippe and Eisenstadt (1994). Applying the notion of dissonance-related attitude changes to the domain of prejudice, these researchers asked participants to write an essay in favor of a general increase of scholarships for African American students at the expense of funding for Caucasian students. Consistent with previous findings in the induced compliance paradigm, Leippe and Eisens￾tadt found that White participants exhibited a lower level of prejudice against African Americans when sit￾uational pressures to write the essay were low, than when they were high. Drawing on the present assumptions, we argue that such dissonance-related changes in prejudice should emerge only for explicit, but not for implicit prejudice. Most importantly, this should be the case even when explicit and implicit prejudice measures directly corre￾spond to one another with respect to their attitude ob￾ject. In the following study, these assumptions were tested by using an IAT designed to assess implicit preference for Caucasians over African Americans, and rating scales assessing explicit preference for Caucasians over African Americans. These measures differ exclu￾sively with regard to their processes, but directly corre￾spond to one another with regard to the particular attitude object, thus ruling out alternative explanations in terms of differing contents. Specifically, we expected Leippe and Eisenstadt
s (1994) dissonance manipulation to affect explicit, but not implicit prejudice. Moreover, explicit and implicit prejudice were expected to be pos￾itively correlated under conditions of high situational pressure, but not under conditions of low situational pressure. Method Participants and design Thirty-nine non-Black Northwestern undergraduates (24 female, 15 male) participated in a study on political issues in return for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to the four conditions of a 2 (essay assignment: induced compliance vs. forced position)
2 (order of attitude measurement: implicit first vs. explicit first) factorial design. Because of a computer error, data from one participant were only partially recorded, and thus had to be excluded from analyses. Procedure On arrival, participants were welcomed by a White experimenter and informed that they were taking part in a survey conducted by the university administration. The experimenter explained that the administration considers a new scholarship policy implying that of the total amount of money the university has available for scholarships, the percentage committed to African American students should at least be doubled (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994). The administration was said to B. Gawronski, F. Strack / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40 (2004) 535–542 539