Conceptual Objection: Execution is degrading to the executioner. Even if capital punishment does no damage to the sanctity of life and no indignity to the murderer being killed nonetheless, asking an otherwise decent human being to so ruthlessly take the life of another person damages the soul of the executioner-so the argument goes. Although I understand this concern and accept that many real executioners may feel this way, I think there is a basic misunderstanding here If execution is honoring of life and justice, then it cannot be the case that doing it would be harmful to the executioner. A just action cannot pollute the soul of the doer. Only unjust acts can do this. So, once the propriety of capital punishment is established, the issue of its impact on the executioner should be settled. An execution is properly understood as the only way to honor the capacity of the murderer to pay for what he has done. Likewise, allowing another human being to make this honoring possible is itself an honor, not a pollutant Conceptual Objection: The victims family often does not want execution. I have often seen interviews with family members of the victim who encourage leniency in sentencing the murderer On the other hand, I have also seen interviews where the family wants something atrocious done to the defendant verging on torture. In both cases my response is the same. We neither execute people in order to satisfy the wrath of the victims family, nor do we refrain from doing so if such wrath is not present Our justice system is not based on the idea that we do whatever the particular victim or his family wants done, but on the idea that we do what is decided upon as right by the calm, rational deliberations of the entire society. We seek justice, not the satisfying of particular, emotionally-connected impulses. Thus, individuals do not get to decide the punishment. In fact, ignorin what such people want is an important element of keeping this practice from being the unpredictable barbarity it might otherwise b9 of 9 Conceptual Objection: Execution is degrading to the executioner. Even if capital punishment does no damage to the sanctity of life and no indignity to the murderer being killed, nonetheless, asking an otherwise decent human being to so ruthlessly take the life of another person damages the soul of the executioner—so the argument goes. Although I understand this concern and accept that many real executioners may feel this way, I think there is a basic misunderstanding here. If execution is honoring of life and justice, then it cannot be the case that doing it would be harmful to the executioner. A just action cannot pollute the soul of the doer. Only unjust acts can do this. So, once the propriety of capital punishment is established, the issue of its impact on the executioner should be settled. An execution is properly understood as the only way to honor the capacity of the murderer to pay for what he has done. Likewise, allowing another human being to make this honoring possible is itself an honor, not a pollutant. Conceptual Objection: The victim’s family often does not want execution. I have often seen interviews with family members of the victim who encourage leniency in sentencing the murderer. On the other hand, I have also seen interviews where the family wants something atrocious done to the defendant verging on torture. In both cases my response is the same. We neither execute people in order to satisfy the wrath of the victim’s family, nor do we refrain from doing so if such wrath is not present. Our justice system is not based on the idea that we do whatever the particular victim or his family wants done, but on the idea that we do what is decided upon as right by the calm, rational deliberations of the entire society. We seek justice, not the satisfying of particular, emotionally-connected impulses. Thus, individuals do not get to decide the punishment. In fact, ignoring what such people want is an important element of keeping this practice from being the unpredictable barbarity it might otherwise be