SPEAKING FROM IGNORANCE 227 Finally,for the Pragmatics versus Independence com found for mt p ain found fo ipant behavio and rar Fl,4= atics index 24) 69. atic than agre s an ors of motivational indexes for Ag r.the disagreement would be based on paying close attention to tion nstrained by truth ness and com both fo are equally i s are sensib social solidarity and pragmatics have e pnonty wit nd he impo iven that the Correctness)and the participant behavior (Agreers vs.Dis xplicitl tness in ansv which can only b 015 There wa o participan choices.which n a large number of partic D).A significan was found for Possible alternative While the vior.F(1.44)- port for atings for Di .20 458, 001 and reasons for ereingan wers bein offered at Positi of P f the cers Di 月d he the comp al So accounts.such accounts that 3193.p different e .00s between motivation and participant beh gree in order to differ ntiate themselves from others and/ r t then or th Social <001 and Agreers (24)=304=006.Thus even thoush (M=3.81)on the item"Iwanted to give the correct answer each Agreers always chose to agree.they indicated the priority of Socia ime,but I a in their Social Solidar en disa vers at Positions 5 and 6 is ugh Disagreers expressec or hypot that people do not like repeating other peopl ever, the disagreement would be based on paying close attention to others and the conversation, rather than ignoring others and their contributions. Finally, it should be noted that while these compar￾isons are sensible, there are other plausible comparisons that could be made, given the interrelatedness of truthfulness, pragmatics, and social solidarity. For each pair of motivations we compared, we first tested for a significant interaction between the motivation (e.g., Truthfulness vs. Correctness) and the participant behavior (Agreers vs. Dis￾agreers). For Truthfulness versus Correctness, a significant main effect was found for motivation type, F(1, 44) 6.37, p .015, with higher ratings for the Truthfulness index. There was no main effect for participant behavior (Agreers vs. Disagreers) on these items (F  1). A significant interaction was found for motivation and participant behavior, F(1, 44) 18.10, p  .001. As shown in Figure 3, Truthfulness ratings were significantly greater than Cor￾rectness ratings for Disagreers, t(20) 4.58, p  .001, and there was no difference between the two indexes for Agreers, t(24) 1.28, p .21. Disagreers expressed significantly more concern for truthfulness than Agreers, t(44) 2.24, p .030, while Agreers indicated greater concern for correctness than did Disagreers, t(44) 3.00, p .004. Thus, the pattern suggests that participants were concerned for both truthfulness and correctness but that truthful￾ness took the lead for Disagreers, while correctness and truthful￾ness were equally important for Agreers. For the comparison between Social Solidarity and Agreement, a significant main effect was found for motivation type, F(1, 44) 31.93, p  .001, with higher ratings for the Solidarity index. A significant main effect was also found for participant behavior (Agreers vs. Disagreers) on these items, F(1, 44) 7.65, p .008. The interaction between motivation and participant behavior (Agreers vs. Disagreers) was not statistically significant, F(1, 44) 2.45, p .125. As shown in the middle panel of Figure 3, ratings for the Social Solidarity index were significantly greater than ratings for the Agreement index for both Disagreers, t(20) 4.86, p  .001, and Agreers, t(24) 3.04, p .006. Thus, even though Agreers always chose to agree, they indicated the priority of Social Solidarity as a motivating concern. There was not a significant difference between Agreers and Disagreers in their Social Solidar￾ity ratings, t(44) 1.72, p .093, although Disagreers expressed significantly less agreement with the Agreement index than did Agreers, t(44) 2.80, p .008. Finally, for the Pragmatics versus Independence comparison, a significant main effect was found for motivation type, F(1, 44) 13.87, p .001, with higher ratings for the Pragmatics index. A significant main effect was also found for participant behavior (Agreers vs. Disagreers) on these items, F(1, 44) 11.56, p .001. The interaction between motivation and participant behavior (Agreers vs. Disagreers) was not statistically significant, F(1, 44) 0.55, p .463. As shown in the right panel of Figure 3, both Agreers and Disagreers’ ratings on the Pragmatics index were significantly greater than ratings on the Independence index, t(24) 2.69, p .013, and t(20) 2.57, p .018, respectively. Disagreers were significantly more motivated by pragmatic concerns than Agreers, t(44) 2.24, p .030, while the difference between Disagreers and Agreers in terms of expressing independence did not reach statistical significance, t(44) 1.85, p .071. Overall, the pattern of results regarding motivational indexes shown in Figure 3 is remarkably clear. First, choices in the SFI situation are constrained by truthfulness and correctness, both for Agreers and Disagreers, but truthfulness takes the lead over cor￾rectness for Disagreers, while for Agreers they are equally impor￾tant. Second, social solidarity and pragmatics have priority with respect to agreement and independence, respectively, as motiva￾tions for actions in the SFI situation, particularly for Disagreers. Third, the importance of truthfulness, social solidarity, and prag￾matics is particularly impressive given that the situation is one that explicitly calls for correctness in answers, which can only be achieved by agreement. This suggests there was an important role for values-pragmatics considerations in the dynamics constraining participants’ choices, which resulted in a large number of partic￾ipants sometimes giving disagreeing answers. Possible alternative explanations for SFI effect. While the results described thus far have provided encouraging support for a values-pragmatics account of SFI effects, it is possible that there are other reasons for disagreeing answers being offered at Position 6. The comparison of Positions 5 and 6, described earlier, provided a way to test the viability of some of these alternatives, while others were addressed by self-report measures. As noted earlier, all indexes were initially submitted to a MANOVA in which the only significant effects were due to differences between Agreers and Disagreers. Demand characteristics, imitation, and uniqueness. While the strong SFI effect supports values-pragmatics theory, it poses problems for alternative accounts, such as accounts that claim disagreeing answers are to be expected when people are put in different positions in a perception experiment. If this were correct, we would expect as many disagreeing answers in Position 5 as in Position 6. A similar argument holds for the hypothesis that people disagree in order to differentiate themselves from others and/or to express their uniqueness: If disagreement is motivated by a differ￾entiation motive, then there should be no difference between Positions 5 and 6. This finding is reinforced by the fact that there was no difference between Agreers (M 4.32) and Disagreers (M 3.81) on the item “I wanted to give the correct answer each time, but I also wanted to make a unique contribution to the experiment,” t(44) 0.92, p .36. Finally, the large difference between disagreeing answers at Positions 5 and 6 is problematic for the hypothesis that people do not like repeating other people Figure 3. Means and standard errors of motivational indexes for Agreers and Disagreers for Experiment 2. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. 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