THE BOXER INDEMNITY 673 added,the indemnity could be said to approximate a billion taels!This total is meaningless.17 The decision that repayment was to be in 'gold'introduced another apparent ambiguity,apparently insignificant at the time but which caused problems later,as to how much silver China was to pay to meet Indemnity payments.The Protocol states that the debt was a gold debt.However,the term 'gold'in the context of international loans was popularly considered to refer to loans repayable in currencies on a gold or gold exchange standard,for example,the United Kingdom,as opposed to those on a silver standard,for example,China.The terms of the Protocol and this ordinary understanding of a 'gold'loan were compatible so long as the signatory or creditor Powers retained the then value of their currencies defined in terms of a fixed weight and fineness of gold.If a 'gold'currency were devalued,however,China would nevertheless be required to pay silver sufficient to purchase the same quantity of gold,which in this instance would require purchase of more units of that foreign currency.18 This did not become a real issue until 1922,and,except in the case of France,was not a major problem. Irrespective of the provisions in the Protocol some believed that the debt ought to be considered a silver debt,and this for diverse reasons: first,and least supportable,the ambiguity referred to;secondly,as silver was depreciating in terms of gold,an already heavy burden was unfairly'increasing;and,thirdly,one suspects,a tinge of conscience. On the other hand,since provisions of the McKay Treaty called for currency reform with some expectation that China would opt for a gold exchange standard,however unlikely,there was a layman's argument 17 Interest payments would have to be discounted before adding;the concept is unacceptable. 18 There is a basic confusion arising from the history of monetary payments:many units of account have names identical to a specific weight,e.g.pound,lira,tael,which, if tendered in the correct metal,would satisfy payment of one such unit of account. This presents no confusion as long as the relationship between the weight of metal needed to satisfy the unit of account remains the same.Note also that the actual weight of,e.g.,a pound or a tael would vary from place to place.A tael is not a specific weight unless appropriately qualified.Thus in a recent case:Were bonds agreed to be repayable in Shanghai taels repayable in a fixed denominated weight of silver or should one follow the course of the unit of account,noting the exchange into the Shanghai dollar,then the fapi and then into gold yuan and finally the renminbi and thus render the bonds worthless?By stating explicitly that the indemnity was a gold debt,the Powers would seem to have determined on the first course,a position they successfully maintained.By stating that a tael is a weight of silver,one is possibly right or possibly wrong,depending on the context.THE BOXER INDEMNITY 673 added, the indemnity could be said to approximate a billion taels! This total is meaningless.17 The decision that repayment was to be in ‘gold’ introduced another apparent ambiguity, apparently insignificant at the time but which caused problems later, as to how much silver China was to pay to meet Indemnity payments. The Protocol states that the debt was a gold debt. However, the term ‘gold’ in the context of international loans was popularly considered to refer to loans repayable in currencies on a gold or gold exchange standard, for example, the United Kingdom, as opposed to those on a silver standard, for example, China. The terms of the Protocol and this ordinary understanding of a ‘gold’ loan were compatible so long as the signatory or creditor Powers retained the then value of their currencies defined in terms of a fixed weight and fineness of gold. If a ‘gold’ currency were devalued, however, China would nevertheless be required to pay silver sufficient to purchase the same quantity of gold, which in this instance would require purchase of more units of that foreign currency.18 This did not become a real issue until 1922, and, except in the case of France, was not a major problem. Irrespective of the provisions in the Protocol some believed that the debt ought to be considered a silver debt, and this for diverse reasons: first, and least supportable, the ambiguity referred to; secondly, as silver was depreciating in terms of gold, an already heavy burden was ‘unfairly’ increasing; and, thirdly, one suspects, a tinge of conscience. On the other hand, since provisions of the McKay Treaty called for currency reform with some expectation that China would opt for a gold exchange standard, however unlikely, there was a layman’s argument 17 Interest payments would have to be discounted before adding; the concept is unacceptable. 18 There is a basic confusion arising from the history of monetary payments: many units of account have names identical to a specific weight, e.g. pound, lira, tael, which, if tendered in the correct metal, would satisfy payment of one such unit of account. This presents no confusion as long as the relationship between the weight of metal needed to satisfy the unit of account remains the same. Note also that the actual weight of, e.g., a pound or a tael would vary from place to place. A tael is not a specific weight unless appropriately qualified. Thus in a recent case: Were bonds agreed to be repayable in Shanghai taels repayable in a fixed denominated weight of silver or should one follow the course of the unit of account, noting the exchange into the Shanghai dollar, then the fapi and then into gold yuan and finally the renminbi and thus render the bonds worthless? By stating explicitly that the indemnity was a gold debt, the Powers would seem to have determined on the first course, a position they successfully maintained. By stating that a tael is a weight of silver, one is possibly right or possibly wrong, depending on the context