use advertising revenues, not the number of stations. The present approach makes little sense. Technology-based distinctions today lack any conceptual or empirical link to con- sumer harm from ownership concentration. In a business with such rapidly changing strategies and technologies, in which consumers have demonstrated their willingness to adopt new media, it makes no more sense to legislate market definitions in quash ermanent rules than for King Canute to order away the oceans waves If the Commission adopted sound media ownership policies, i.e., policies based on ana- lytcally meaningful distinctions such as those found in the Merger Guidelines, it would necessarily duplicate the work of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 3 As the recent echoStar matter demonstrates. when the Commission applies sound economic principles to the analysis of proposed acquisitions, it ends up with essentially the same result as the Department of Justice both in terms of analysis and in terms of standards(compare the doJ complaint with the Commissions Hearing Order in the EchoStar matter. Clearly, such duplicative regulation is ineffH cient, a waste of public and private resources Iciencies Efficiencies are cost savings or other potential sources of increased economic welfare re- sulting from a merger. A weighing of efficiency gains against potential anticompetitive effects is a part of the Merger Guidelines case-by-case analysis, at least in principle. (In practice the antitrust agencies regard efficiency claims with considerable suspicion, ak- though the Commission need not. ) The problem of course is that any "natural" market Mergers and like transactions must be reported to and reviewed by the antitrust agencies if they exceed certain size thresholds. a small fraction are challenged those that are not challenged forward after the expiration of the review period., but in theory may be challenged later. The anti trust agencies retain jurisdiction to challenge non-reportable transactions. The Commission nor- mally must affirmatively approve any license transfer, no matter the amount of consideration Perhaps sensitive to the issue of wasteful duplication of effort, the Commission did attempt to dis tinguish its method of analysis. In the Matter of Application of Echo Star Communications Corpo- ration,(a Nevada Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation Delaware Corporations)(Transferors)and EchoStar Communications Corporation(a Delaware Corporation)(Transferee)HEARING DESIGNATION ORDER, CS Docket No. 01-348 FCC 02- 284Released:October18,2002.http:/ 4ALDdf12 use advertising revenues, not the number of stations. The present approach makes little sense. Technology-based distinctions today lack any conceptual or empirical link to con￾sumer harm from ownership concentration. In a business with such rapidly changing strategies and technologies, in which consumers have demonstrated their willingness to adopt new media, it makes no more sense to legislate market definitions in quasi￾permanent rules than for King Canute to order away the ocean’s waves. If the Commission adopted sound media ownership policies, i.e., policies based on ana￾lytically meaningful distinctions such as those found in the Merger Guidelines, it would necessarily duplicate the work of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. 13 As the recent EchoStar matter demonstrates, when the Commission applies sound economic principles to the analysis of proposed acquisitions, it ends up with essentially the same result as the Department of Justice both in terms of analysis and in terms of standards (compare the DOJ complaint with the Commission’s Hearing Order in the EchoStar matter.)14 Clearly, such duplicative regulation is ineffi￾cient, a waste of public and private resources. Efficiencies Efficiencies are cost savings or other potential sources of increased economic welfare re￾sulting from a merger. A weighing of efficiency gains against potential anticompetitive effects is a part of the Merger Guidelines case-by-case analysis, at least in principle. (In practice the antitrust agencies regard efficiency claims with considerable suspicion, al￾though the Commission need not.). The problem of course is that any “natural” market 13 Mergers and like transactions must be reported to and reviewed by the antitrust agencies if they exceed certain size thresholds. A small fraction are challenged; those that are not challenged go forward after the expiration of the review period., but in theory may be challenged later. The anti￾trust agencies retain jurisdiction to challenge non-reportable transactions. The Commission nor￾mally must affirmatively approve any license transfer, no matter the amount of consideration. 14 Perhaps sensitive to the issue of wasteful duplication of effort, the Commission did attempt to dis￾tinguish its method of analysis. In the Matter of Application of EchoStar Communications Corpo￾ration, (a Nevada Corporation), General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Corporation (Delaware Corporations) (Transferors) and EchoStar Communications Corporation (a Delaware Corporation) (Transferee) HEARING DESIGNATION ORDER, CS Docket No. 01-348 FCC 02- 284 Released: October 18, 2002. http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02- 284A1.pdf