politically attractive, and less likely to vote. Constitutional law inverts the funnel. Suspects receive the most constitutional protection, criminal defendants get less, and prisoners get least of all Politically speaking, that structure is upside-down. Tens of millions of mostly nnocent criminal suspects can win political battles, at least sometimes. Two million mostly guilty felony defendants will find those battles harder to win. Several hundred thousand already-convicted prisoners may find victory impossible. To put the point in concrete terms, abused suspects like Rodney King have a lot more political appeal than prisoners like Willie Horton'-and the Kings outnumber the Hortons by a considerable margin. Yet constitutional law chiefly protects the suspects, not the prisoners. Politicians are freest to regulate where regulation is most likely to be one-sided and punitive a similar pattern characterizes criminal justice spending. Over the past generation-the time when constitutional law has played a large role in American criminal justice -state legislators and members of Congress have dramatically shifted the distribution of law enforcement dollars. Police spending has risen a little faster than other government spending. Spending on the adjudication process has For a good discussion of the rule barring voting by convicted felons and challenges to it, see Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Representation, Retribution, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L REV. 1147(2004). For an argument that few felons would vote even if the rule were changed, see Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and voter Turnout, 33 J LEGAL STUD. 85(2004) King was the Los Angeles motorist who, after a high-speed police chase, was beaten savagely by four officers; the beating was videotaped by a nearby civilian. The officers who beat King were tried and acquitted in state court, after which Los Angeles saw the second-worst urban riots in American history. Horton was the Massachusetts inmate who was freed on a prison furlough program during Michael Dukakis's governorship While on release, Horton committed assault, rape, and auto theft. In the 1988 presidential campaign, Vice President George Bush's campaign manager, Lee Atwater, used Horton case to attack Governor Michael dukakis for being soft on crime From 1972 to 2001, overall police spending rose 148%in constant dollars. This figure is taken from 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 5 tbl. 1. 4, and CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CENTER. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1974, at 33 tbl. 1. 2 [hereinafter 1974 SOURCEBOOK]. The inflation adjustment is taken from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-20058For a good discussion of the rule barring voting by convicted felons and challenges to it, see Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Representation, Retribution, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004). For an argument that few felons would vote even if the rule were changed, see Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85 (2004). 9King was the Los Angeles motorist who, after a high-speed police chase, was beaten savagely by four officers; the beating was videotaped by a nearby civilian. The officers who beat King were tried and acquitted in state court, after which Los Angeles saw the second-worst urban riots in American history. Horton was the Massachusetts inmate who was freed on a prison furlough program during Michael Dukakis’s governorship. While on release, Horton committed assault, rape, and auto theft. In the 1988 presidential campaign, Vice President George Bush’s campaign manager, Lee Atwater, used Horton’s case to attack Governor Michael Dukakis for being soft on crime. 10From 1972 to 2001, overall police spending rose 148% in constant dollars. This figure is taken from 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 5 tbl. 1.4, and CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CENTER,U.S.DEP’T OF JUSTICE,SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS — 1974, at 33 tbl.1.2 [hereinafter 1974 SOURCEBOOK]. The inflation adjustment is taken from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, 4 politically attractive, and less likely to vote.8 Constitutional law inverts the funnel. Suspects receive the most constitutional protection, criminal defendants get less, and prisoners get least of all. Politically speaking, that structure is upside-down. Tens of millions of mostly innocent criminal suspects can win political battles, at least sometimes. Two million mostly guilty felony defendants will find those battles harder to win. Several hundred thousand already-convicted prisoners may find victory impossible. To put the point in concrete terms, abused suspects like Rodney King have a lot more political appeal than prisoners like Willie Horton9 — and the Kings outnumber the Hortons by a considerable margin. Yet constitutional law chiefly protects the suspects, not the prisoners. Politicians are freest to regulate where regulation is most likely to be one-sided and punitive. A similar pattern characterizes criminal justice spending. Over the past generation — the time when constitutional law has played a large role in American criminal justice — state legislators and members of Congress have dramatically shifted the distribution of law enforcement dollars. Police spending has risen a little faster than other government spending.10 Spending on the adjudication process has