JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA'S"DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1271 roots of contemporary South Korean political econ- officials-cum-aristocrats,the Yangban,mutually omy are indeed as deep as a relatively unique colonial checked each others powers.The power of the experience.can others really emulate the experience? Yangban class rested in part on access to hereditary Second,at a higher level of generality,there are theo- land wealth but also on a close identification with the retical issues revolving around the concept of"devel- centralized bureaucracy,which helped both secure opmental states":what characterizes them and where socioeconomic privileges and was a further source of do they come from?Finally,at the most general level. wealth and power.Royal authority,in turn,was sel- there is at least an implication in this essay that some dom all that great.Being under Chinese suzerainty, of the variations we notice today among the more or Korean emperors did not enjoy the "mandate of less dynamic Third World political economies may heaven"that the Chinese emperors possessed.In addi- have some of their roots in a variable colonial past.If tion,the recruitment of the aristocracy to the bureau- so,a further investigation of this analytical claim cracy via the examination system enabled landed would require reopening the issue of the colonial roots power to be deeply embedded all through the Korean of the contemporary Third World that has unfortu- state,checking the scope of Royal authority vis-a-vis nately been lost in the postdependency scholarship on the Yangban.10 While this balance of power was a development. source of stability for several centuries,as external pressures grew,and along with it the state's need for taxes and other socioeconomic resources,it also 2.THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COLONIAL became a major constraint on monarchial power to STATE initiate reforms:The monarchial state,according to Palais,"could not solve the problem of creating ade- (a)The old,"predatory"state quate political authority for the achievement of national goals."Yi state was thus simultaneously By the time the Japanese gained decisive influence "centralized and weak." over Korea-say around 1905.after the Japanese vic- In addition to the limiting balance of power tory in Russo-Japanese war of 1904-the old state between the monarchy and the Yangban,there were within Choson was already in an advanced state of other factors at work that contributed to the Yi state's disintegration.While it is not necessary to recall his- ineffectiveness.First,it was not merely the presence torical details,a brief understanding of the state-soci- of a powerful land-controlling strata in society that ety links in late Choson are essential to appreciate limited the state's capacity.As I discuss below,the changes wrought by Japanese colonial power.The Yi colonial state in Korea carved out a different type of dynasty had provided continuous and,for the most ruling alliance with the same landowning class,but part,stable rule to Korea for nearly 500 years.The with a vastly more effective state.The key factor at same intricate state and class alliances that were work in Yi Korea was thus the direct control that responsible for this stability,however,also became landed groups exercised on state offices (Fairbank. major constraints on successful adaptation to chang- Reischauer and Craig,1978,p.307).Second,the ing external pressures,especially in the second half of Korean monarchy remained to the end a highly per- the nineteenth century.For example,the clearest man- sonalistic,patrimonial institution.In the words of ifestation of the powerlessness of a centralized monar- Cumings (1981),the Korean monarchs were incap- chial state was the continued inability to collect taxes able of acting along"the modern distinction between owed to the state on agrarian incomes,especially from public and private realms"and thus incapable of the powerful Yangban elite,the landowning-official designing state-led national goals of economic devel- class of Korea(Palais,1975).This recurring inability, opment (p.10).Third,the ruling strata below the in turn.came to be associated with several problem- monarch was highly factionalized,2 Such strife in the atic political trends:First,the state resorted to squeez- ruling strata made it difficult to design cohesive ing the peasantry via"taxation"(e.g.,corvee labor and responses to growing challenges.Finally,it is impor- military service),contributing to brigandage and a tant to note that the reach of the Yi state from the cen- restive peasant population.Second,the state's limited ter to the periphery was rather limited.While provin- resources exacerbated the competition and tensions in cial and county officials were directly appointed from what was already a personalized and factionalized Seoul,each county magistrate was responsible for elite at the apex of the political pyramid.Finally, governing nearly 40,000 people (there being some financial limitations made it difficult to mobilize any 330 magistrates for about 12 million Koreans).3 Since serious military response to growing external pres- these magistrates were rotated frequently,they often sures. depended on the well-entrenched Yangban elite for How does one explain powerlessness in a central- local governance.Moreover,the lower level officials ized polity?The leading historian of late Yi Korea, below the magistrate-were not salaried employ James Palais,traces the roots of this conundrum back ees.They were rather a hereditary group who were to the manner in which the monarchy and the Korean allowed to collect and keep some local taxes as com-JAPANESE LINEAGE OF KOREA’S “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE” 1271 roots of contemporary South Korean political econ￾omy are indeed as deep as a relatively unique colonial experience, can others really emulate the experience? Second, at a higher level of generality, there are theo￾retical issues revolving around the concept of “devel￾opmental states”: what characterizes them and where do they come from? Finally, at the most general level, there is at least an implication in this essay that some of the variations we notice today among the more or less dynamic Third World political economies may have some of their roots in a variable colonial past. If so, a further investigation of this analytical claim would require reopening the issue of the colonial roots of the contemporary Third World that has unfortu￾nately been lost in the postdependency scholarship on development. 2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COLONIAL STATE (a) The old, “predatory” state By the time the Japanese gained decisive influence over Korea-say around 1905, after the Japanese vic￾tory in Russo-Japanese war of 1904 - the old state within Chosbn was already in an advanced state of disintegration. While it is not necessary to recall his￾torical details, a brief understanding of the state-soci￾ety links in late Chosen are essential to appreciate changes wrought by Japanese colonial power.‘The Yi dynasty had provided continuous and, for the most part, stable rule to Korea for nearly 500 years. The same intricate state and class alliances that were responsible for this stability, however, also became major constraints on successful adaptation to chang￾ing external pressures, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, the clearest man￾ifestation of the powerlessness of a centralized monar￾chial state was the continued inability to collect taxes owed to the state on agrarian incomes, especially from the powerful Yangban elite, the landowning-official class of Korea (Palais, 1975). This recurring inability, in turn, came to be associated with several problem￾atic political trends: First, the state resorted to squeez￾ing the peasantry via “taxation” (e.g., corvee labor and military service), contributing to brigandage and a restive peasant population. Second, the state’s limited resources exacerbated the competition and tensions in what was already a personalized and factionalized elite at the apex of the political pyramid. Finally, financial limitations made it difficult to mobilize any serious military response to growing external pres￾sures. How does one explain powerlessness in a central￾ized polity? The leading historian of late Yi Korea, James Palais, traces the roots of this conundrum back to the manner in which the monarchy and the Korean officials-cum-aristocrats, the Yangban, mutually checked each others powers. The power of the Yangban class rested in part on access to hereditary land wealth but also on a close identification with the centralized bureaucracy, which helped both secure socioeconomic privileges and was a further source of wealth and power. Royal authority, in turn, was sel￾dom all that great. Being under Chinese suzerainty, Korean emperors did not enjoy the “mandate of heaven” that the Chinese emperors possessed. In addi￾tion, the recruitment of the aristocracy to the bureau￾cracy via the examination system enabled landed power to be deeply embedded all through the Korean state, checking the scope of Royal authority vis-d-vis the Yangban. I0 While this balance of power was a source of stability for several centuries, as external pressures grew, and along with it the state’s need for taxes and other socioeconomic resources, it also became a major constraint on monarchial power to initiate reforms: The monarchial state, according to Palais, “could not solve the problem of creating ade￾quate political authority for the achievement of national goals.” Yi state was thus simultaneously “centralized and weak.“” In addition to the limiting balance of power between the monarchy and the Yangban, there were other factors at work that contributed to the Yi state’s ineffectiveness. First, it was not merely the presence of a powerful land-controlling strata in society that limited the state’s capacity. As I discuss below, the colonial state in Korea carved out a different type of ruling alliance with the same landowning class, but with a vastly more effective state. The key factor at work in Yi Korea was thus the direct control that landed groups exercised on state offices (Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, 1978, p. 307). Second, the Korean monarchy remained to the end a highly per￾sonalistic, patrimonial institution. In the words of Cumings (1981) the Korean monarchs were incap￾able of acting along “the modern distinction between public and private realms” and thus incapable of designing state-led national goals of economic devel￾opment (p. 10). Third, the ruling strata below the monarch was highly factionalized.r2 Such strife in the ruling strata made it difficult to design cohesive responses to growing challenges. Finally, it is impor￾tant to note that the reach of the Yi state from the cen￾ter to the periphery was rather limited. While provin￾cial and county officials were directly appointed from Seoul, each county magistrate was responsible for governing nearly 40,000 people (there being some 330 magistrates for about 12 million Koreans).” Since these magistrates were rotated frequently, they often depended on the well-entrenched Yangban elite for local governance. Moreover, the lower level officials -below the magistrate - were not salaried employ￾ees. They were rather a hereditary group who were allowed to collect and keep some local taxes as com-