Introduction Northeast Asian development has entered an interesting period.For many years, Japan,South Korea and Taiwan were held up to the rest of the developing world as a model for successful industrialisation.The economic problems that they con- fronted in the 199os,however,cast doubt on their developmental experience.At the heart of an analysis of Northeast Asian development is the notion of the develop- mental state.The current literature has focused on state economy and state- business relations in creating economic successes and problems in Northeast Asia, and very few studies have gone beyond those relations to investigate the origins and possible demise of the developmental state.This paper argues that we must understand how the developmental state came about if we are to comprehend what part it played in Northeast Asian development and how it has evolved since the early 198os. The inquiry begins with a simple question:what is the developmental state?In his 1982 book,Mrrt and the Japanese miracle,Chalmers Johnson coined the term the capitalist developmental state,and used it to describe the Japanese state in relation to bureaucratic autonomy,administrative guidance for industrial development and selective intervention in the economy.Other scholars later extended this idea to describe the Taiwanese and Korean states.In fact,the very name,'capitalist develop- mental state,tells us much about the basic characteristics of this type of state:it has to be 'capitalist,it has to be'developmental'and,with a few clarifications,it has to be 'cohesive'. By 'capitalist,I mean that the state has to commit itself to some basic values of capitalism,such as private property rights and market mechanisms.This study,like many others,discusses the developmental state in a capitalist world,so its'capital- istic'character will not be a focus but an assumed constant.By'developmental,I mean that the state has to have a consistent commitment to industrialisation.In order to establish this consistent commitment,the state should not be subordinate to any special business interests.This point is directly connected to the third charac- teristic of the developmental state,its'cohesiveness,meaning that the state has to be a unified force in dealing with business groups.Peter Evans argues that internal coherence,corporate identity and cohesive organisation are key elements of the developmental state.These elements contribute to state cohesiveness,which,in turn,guarantees that selective economic intervention by the developmental state will not be severely disrupted by special interests.Conflict, Security & Development 2:1 2002 6 Introduction Northeast Asian development has entered an interesting period.1 For many years, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were held up to the rest of the developing world as a model for successful industrialisation. The economic problems that they con￾fronted in the 1990s, however, cast doubt on their developmental experience. At the heart of an analysis of Northeast Asian development is the notion of the develop￾mental state. The current literature has focused on state economy and state– business relations in creating economic successes and problems in Northeast Asia, and very few studies have gone beyond those relations to investigate the origins and possible demise of the developmental state. This paper argues that we must understand how the developmental state came about if we are to comprehend what part it played in Northeast Asian development and how it has evolved since the early 1980s. The inquiry begins with a simple question: what is the developmental state? In his 1982 book,  and the Japanese miracle, Chalmers Johnson coined the term the ‘capitalist developmental state’, and used it to describe the Japanese state in relation to bureaucratic autonomy, administrative guidance for industrial development and selective intervention in the economy.2 Other scholars later extended this idea to describe the Taiwanese and Korean states.3 In fact, the very name, ‘capitalist develop￾mental state’, tells us much about the basic characteristics of this type of state: it has to be ‘capitalist’, it has to be ‘developmental’ and, with a few clarifications, it has to be ‘cohesive’. By ‘capitalist’, I mean that the state has to commit itself to some basic values of capitalism, such as private property rights and market mechanisms. This study, like many others, discusses the developmental state in a capitalist world, so its ‘capital￾istic’ character will not be a focus but an assumed constant. By ‘developmental’, I mean that the state has to have a consistent commitment to industrialisation. In order to establish this consistent commitment, the state should not be subordinate to any special business interests. This point is directly connected to the third charac￾teristic of the developmental state, its ‘cohesiveness’, meaning that the state has to be a unified force in dealing with business groups. Peter Evans argues that internal coherence, corporate identity and cohesive organisation are key elements of the developmental state.4 These elements contribute to state cohesiveness, which, in turn, guarantees that selective economic intervention by the developmental state will not be severely disrupted by special interests