Theoretical Inquiries in Lan Vol.4659 laid the theoretical foundations of law and economics and occupy a mythical position in its official history, they were not awarded the Nobel Prize for their contribution to this field, but, rather, for their work in economics in general Nor did they operate in the field of law and economics as later defined by Posner, and they failed to shift the field's research agenda to studying the effects of the law on the economy or the economy on the law It was Richard Posner who, in fact, set and shaped the boundaries of the Chicago school of law and Economics. limiting them to the economic analysis of the law. This school of thought marginalized and may even have prevented other potential connections between law and economics The boundaries set by Posner and his colleagues held strong for at least three decades. a discussion of the reasons for this is beyond the scope of this article. I believe that it is related to Posner's personal interest and eminent position in the field. Limiting the boundaries of law and economics made sense for a newly formed field, as it enabled concentrating on research resources and rapidly advancing learning on a narrow front Moreover, law and economics was institutionalized as a discipline in law schools rather than in economics departments. By analyzing legal rules and providing prescriptions for legal reforms, law and economics scholars could participate in the major areas of discourse within legal academia. They could even demonstrate the power of their coherent and rigorous theory over the confused intuitions of other legal scholars. This further expanded their sphere of activity within the law schools. Only in the last decade has research transgressing these boundaries begun to appear In sum, on the assumption that law has no methodology of its own to contribute to the study of economics, three potential outcomes of the interaction between the disciplines of economics and law appeared around 1960: 1)the study of the effects of law on the economy; 2) the study of the effects of the economy on legal change; and 3)the application of economic methodology to the analysis of law. Until recently, only the third of these possible research agendas was considerably advanced within the field of law and economics. The narrow scope of the newly created field partly explains its a-historical nature and its lack of interaction with economic and legal In addition to developing a normatively-based policy analysis, Posner and colleagues developed a positive branch of law and economics. The two were unified in the framework of the theory of the common law's tendency toward fficiency. This theory deals with the effects of law on economic growth or the effects of economic growth on the law. It also can be understood as encompassing both the positive and normative research agendas by creating identification between them, at least insofar as the common law664 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 4:659 laid the theoretical foundations of law and economics and occupy a mythical position in its official history, they were not awarded the Nobel Prize for their contribution to this field, but, rather, for their work in economics in general. Nor did they operate in the field of law and economics as later defined by Posner, and they failed to shift the field’s research agenda to studying the effects of the law on the economy or the economy on the law. It was Richard Posner who, in fact, set and shaped the boundaries of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, limiting them to the economic analysis of the law. This school of thought marginalized and may even have prevented other potential connections between law and economics. The boundaries set by Posner and his colleagues held strong for at least three decades. A discussion of the reasons for this is beyond the scope of this article. I believe that it is related to Posner’s personal interest and eminent position in the field. Limiting the boundaries of law and economics made sense for a newly formed field, as it enabled concentrating on research resources and rapidly advancing learning on a narrow front. Moreover, law and economics was institutionalized as a discipline in law schools rather than in economics departments. By analyzing legal rules and providing prescriptions for legal reforms, law and economics scholars could participate in the major areas of discourse within legal academia. They could even demonstrate the power of their coherent and rigorous theory over the confused intuitions of other legal scholars. This further expanded their sphere of activity within the law schools. Only in the last decade has research transgressing these boundaries begun to appear. In sum, on the assumption that law has no methodology of its own to contribute to the study of economics, three potential outcomes of the interaction between the disciplines of economics and law appeared around 1960: 1) the study of the effects of law on the economy; 2) the study of the effects of the economy on legal change; and 3) the application of economic methodology to the analysis of law. Until recently, only the third of these possible research agendas was considerably advanced within the field of law and economics. The narrow scope of the newly created field partly explains its a-historical nature and its lack of interaction with economic and legal history. In addition to developing a normatively-based policy analysis, Posner and colleagues developed a positive branch of law and economics. The two were unified in the framework of the theory of the common law’s tendency toward efficiency. This theory deals with the effects of law on economic growth or the effects of economic growth on the law. It also can be understood as encompassing both the positive and normative research agendas by creating identification between them, at least insofar as the common law is