Chapter 4 Agency Problems in Corporate Finance 4.1 Introduction the standard theory of co.apters 1 and 2 when we covered Modigliani-Miller As we discussed in the Ch apital structure that has been the mainstay of text- books is the trade-off theory This argues that the benefit of debt is the tax shield and the cost is the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The tradi tional view was that these deadweight costs were bankruptcy and liquidation costs. In the 1970,s this theory was criticized because it didnt seem it could satisfactorily explain observed capital structures. For long periods of time corporations in the US have on average had long term debt worth about 30-40% of their total value(see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales(1995). They have also paid corporate taxes most of the time. Evidence on bankruptcy costs provided by Warner(1977) and others suggested that the direct costs of bankruptcy such as lawyers'fees were low. Haugen and Senbet(1978) pointed out that bankruptcy and liquidation costs should not be confused If liquidation costs were high they could be avoided by renegotiation with debtholders in bankruptcy. Given bankruptcy costs are low and corporate tax rates in the US at that time were 46% the standard theory seemed to suggest that if corporations increased their debt slightly they could increase their value. The fact that they did not do this suggested that the theory was incorrect. The difficulty in explaining firms'payout policy in the Modigliani- Miller framework extended to include taxes(the so-called"dividend puzzle")Chapter 4 Agency Problems in Corporate Finance 4.1 Introduction As we discussed in the Chapters 1 and 2 when we covered Modigliani-Miller the standard theory of capital structure that has been the mainstay of text￾books is the trade-off theory. This argues that the benefit of debt is the tax shield and the cost is the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The tradi￾tional view was that these deadweight costs were bankruptcy and liquidation costs. In the 1970’s this theory was criticized because it didn’t seem it could satisfactorily explain observed capital structures. For long periods of time corporations in the US have on average had long term debt worth about 30-40% of their total value (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)). They have also paid corporate taxes most of the time. Evidence on bankruptcy costs provided by Warner (1977) and others suggested that the direct costs of bankruptcy such as lawyers’ fees were low. Haugen and Senbet (1978) pointed out that bankruptcy and liquidation costs should not be confused. If liquidation costs were high they could be avoided by renegotiation with debtholders in bankruptcy. Given bankruptcy costs are low and corporate tax rates in the US at that time were 46% the standard theory seemed to suggest that if corporations increased their debt slightly they could increase their value. The fact that they did not do this suggested that the theory was incorrect. The difficulty in explaining firms’ payout policy in the Modigliani￾Miller framework extended to include taxes (the so-called ”dividend puzzle”) 1