THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO THE KOREAN WAR an early North Korean military assault against South Korea.Shen Zhihua argues that no On December 14,the evidence supports this conclusion.Rather,Mao,in a demonstration of"internationalist" secure a cease-fire.On J sympathy,authorized the return of most of the North Korean soldiers in 1949 because had drafted calling for a he feared that the ROK might attack the DPRK.The repatriation in 1950 was the result of commission,with a prom the Korean troops wanting to return and Chinese leaders concentrating on cost cutting supplementary report pi and demobilizing since the Chinese Civil War was virtually over(Shen 2003:188-9). would organize a confei More recently,Kim Donggil cites new documents to affirm these conclusions,adding States,Britain,and the that the PLA's ethnic Korean units were of Manchurian rather than North Korean origin. United Nations,and oth Furthermore,"at no time did North Korea dispatch troops to Northeast China in order to resolution was similar t help Chinese communists in the Chinese Civil War..."(Kim 2012:227). December 22,1950."In re Numerous studies have assessed the reasons for Chinese intervention in the Korean have offered Beijing a gol War.Initially,Western writers viewed it as an act of unprovoked aggression and proof of seized the diplomatic in a well-coordinated Communist scheme for worldwide expansion(Oliver 1950,Rees 1964). because it expected Chin Allen S.Whiting(1960)would argue instead that motivating Beijing's response was the CPVF to resume its offen perception of a U.S.military threat to Chinese national security.His thesis prevailed for Shen 2☑hihua and Ya a generation(Spurr 1988).Indeed,many scholars began to speculate that had UNC forces advantage had Beijing cc stopped at the 38th parallel after compelling the defeated KPA to retreat into North Korea, Korean forces marched a China would not have entered the war(Simmons 1975,Shen and Meng 1988,Hao and the UNC forces back int Zhai 1990,Hunt 1992).In the late 1980s,access to documents from the Communist side entry into the war.Politi initiated an in-depth reassessment of China's decision to intervene.Several scholars came thereby realized Mao's a to the conclusion that safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border was one of many elements enter the war to fight th determining the PRC's behavior (Chen 1994,Zhang 1995,Sheng 1997).Chen Jian argues This achievement would that Chinese intervention was inevitable because Mao sought"to win a glorious victory" Diplomatically,had Beij that would restore China's world status as the "Central Kingdom"(Chen 1994:4-5).But gained the support of w other scholars contend that if the UNC had not crossed the 38th parallel,the PRC would Militarily,China would not have intervened(Pang and Li 2000,Zhang 2000,Qing 2012).Consensus exists,however, vanquished,creating ley that Chinese leaders viewed the U.S.decisions to enter the Korean War,deploy its Seventh threat to China's natior Fleet in the Taiwan Strait,and increase aid to France in Indochina as marking an escalation Korea as a buffer.This s of overall U.S.interference in East Asia that required a defiant PRC response(Niu 2002). the PRC's admission to I UNC forces first clashed with CPVF units in northeastern Korea on October 26,capturing to start armistice negotia the first Chinese prisoners.A week later,the CPVF staged a sharp attack and then withdrew. Why did the PRC r Failing to heed this warning,General Douglas MacArthur,the UNC commander,launched Beijing did not have mu his"Home by Christmas Offensive"on November 24,expecting to achieve total victory in at that moment and its the Korean War.The CPVF counterattacked in force,inflicting heavy casualties and sending In general,PLA militar UNC forces into a hurried retreat.As impressive as the CPVF's performance was,Chinese UN cease-fire resolution forces soon were in desperate need of a breathing space to consolidate and resupply.During position of defeat and re the period between later October and early December,the CPVF had lost 100,000 troops in allowing them to recove an army totaling 380,000 soldiers.UNC air raids had destroyed all but 260 trucks and yet fighting and was not inte supply line had extended from the Yalu all the way to the 38th parallel.Some 30,000 soldiers it was very unlikely that in the 9th Army were severely frost bitten due to inadequate clothing;more than 1,000 had a cessation of hostilities died.The shortage of ammunition and food also was alarming.Thus,Peng Dehuai appealed newspapers,internal re to Mao on December 8 for an operational pause until spring and a delay for at that point that Mao maintained th of crossing the 38th parallel(Xu 1990,Hong 1990).An important reason for Mao to follow patriotism in reaction to this advice was a windfall opportunity on the diplomatic front that he could seize to win a demonstrating continuin respite for the CPVF.On December 5,India and 12 other non-Western nations proposed that Korean truce talks China halt its military advance to allow negotiations for a cease-fire and an international July 27,1953.Alfred S. conference to search for a peaceful solution to end the war. For a detailed asse Chapter28. 6 For a detailed assessment of the literature on Chinese intervention in the Korean War,see For a detailed asses Chapter 27. 64