Next, the petitioners claimed that limiting marriage to opposite-gender cou violated Articles 8 and 12 of the ECHR and Article 23 of the ICCPR, which guarantee the freedom to have a family and the freedom to marry. The Hoge Raad, however, referred to two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights involving transgendered individuals who were seeking the right to marry. 22 In these decisions, the European Court held that Article 12 of the EChR refers to the >traditional concept of marriage. =23 Thus, the hoge Raad found that it was bound by this precedent and was not in a position to interpret Article 12 more broadly than the European Court of Human Rights. 24 Given this interpretation of the right to marry under Article 12 of the ECHR, the Netherlands Supreme Court also stated that it should be assumed that Article 23 of the ICCPr also referred to the >trad itional marriage involving persons of opposite sexes. =25 In addition, the petitioners= claim that a refusal to allow same-gender couples to marry interfered with one=s private and/or family life, as stated in Article 8 of the ECHR, was rejected by the Hoge Raad because of its interpretation of the term >marriage= in Article 12. Consequently, there had been no >interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right= as provided in article 8.26 Because the Hoge Raad defined marriage in Article 12 of the ECHR and Article 23 of the ICCPR as meaning >traditional marriage involving persons of opposite sexes, =it found there was no claim under the nondiscrimination provisions of Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 2 of the ICCPR that the petitioners were being denied their right to marry a person of the same gender, because that right was limited by the definition of marriage, which only applied to persons of opposite genders Finally, the Netherlands Supreme Court examined whether there had been a violation of Article 26 of the ICCPR, which contains a broader nondiscrimination, equal protection provision than Article 2 of the same treaty. In its opinion, however, this was >not the case The opinion continued as follows Civil marriage is since time immemorial understood to be an enduring bond between a man and a woman to which a number of legal consequences are attached, which partly relate to the difference in x and the consequences connected therewith for the descent of children. Marriage has these characteristics not only in the netherlands but in many countries moreover, it cannot be said that the general opinion in the legal community has developed such that the considerations just mentioned de not justify the distinction in treatment on the grounds of sexualorientation, which can manifest itself in the impossibility to enter a relationship-like marriage with a person of the same sex as oneself. However, the Supreme Court=s decision d id recognize the >possibility= that other benefits of Rees v United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., judgment 17 October 1986, Series A no 106, 33-51; NJ 1987,945,m.nt.e.a.Alkema,http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoCldoc/hejud/sift/149.txt;Cosseyv.United Kingdom, Eur. Court. H.R., judgment 27 September 1990 Series A no 184, 30-48, Martens J dissent Cossey v United Kingdom, Eur. Court. H.R. 27 Septem ber 1990 Series A vol. 184 >Since this Court [ the European Court of Human Rights] clearly esta blished the scope of Article 12 recently, the Hoge Raad has not found any freedom for a more liberal interpretation of the prov isions of th treaty. HR 19 oktober 1990, NJ1992, 192, m nt EAAL en EAA(homohuwelijk; trans. Duck Obbink) Art 8 ECHR. HR 19 oktober 1990, NJ1992, 192, m nt EAAL en EAA(homohuwelijk; trans. Caroline ForderNext, the petitioners claimed that limiting marriage to opposite-gender couples violated Articles 8 and 12 of the ECHR and Article 23 of the ICCPR, which guarantee the freedom to have a family and the freedom to marry. The Hoge Raad, however, referred to two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights involving transgendered individuals who were seeking the right to marry.22 In these decisions, the European Court held that Article 12 of the ECHR refers to the >traditional concept of marriage.= 23 Thus, the Hoge Raad found that it was bound by this precedent and was not in a position to interpret Article 12 more broadly than the European Court of Human Rights.24 Given this interpretation of the right to marry under Article 12 of the ECHR, the Netherlands Supreme Court also stated that it should be assumed that Article 23 of the ICCPR also referred to the >traditional marriage involving persons of opposite sexes.= 25 In addition, the petitioners= claim that a refusal to allow same-gender couples to marry interfered with one=s private and/or family life, as stated in Article 8 of the ECHR, was rejected by the Hoge Raad because of its interpretation of the term >marriage= in Article 12. Consequently, there had been no >interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right= as provided in Article 8.26 Because the Hoge Raad defined marriage in Article 12 of the ECHR and Article 23 of the ICCPR as meaning >traditional marriage involving persons of opposite sexes,= it found there was no claim under the nondiscrimination provisions of Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 2 of the ICCPR that the petitioners were being denied their right to marry a person of the same gender, because that right was limited by the definition of marriage, which only applied to persons of opposite genders. Finally, the Netherlands Supreme Court examined whether there had been a violation of Article 26 of the ICCPR, which contains a broader nondiscrimination, equal protection, provision than Article 2 of the same treaty. In its opinion, however, this was >not the case.= The opinion continued as follows: Civil marriage is since time immemorial understood to be an enduring bond between a man and a woman to which a number of legal consequences are attached, which partly relate to the difference in sex and the consequences connected therewith for the descent of children. Marriage has these characteristics not only in the Netherlands but in many countries. Moreover, it cannot be said that the general opinion in the legal community has developed such tha t the considerations just mentioned do not justify the distinction in treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation, which can manifest itself in the impossibility to enter a relationship-like marriage with a person of the same sex as oneself.27 However, the Supreme Court=s decision did recognize the >possibility= that other benefits of 22 Rees v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., judgment 17 October 1986, Series A no. 106, '' 33-51; NJ 1987, 945, m.nt. E.A. Alkema, http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/Hudoc1doc/HEJUD/sift/149.txt; Cossey v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court. H.R., judgment 27 September 1990 Series A no. 184, '' 30-48, Martens J.dissent., http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/Hudoc1doc/HEJUD/sift/226.txt 23 Cossey v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court. H.R. 27 September 1990 Series A vol. 184. 24 >Since this Court [the European Court of Human Rights] clearly established the scope of Article 12 recently, the Hoge Raad has not found any freedom for a more liberal interpretation of the provisions of the treaty.= HR 19 oktober 1990, NJ 1992, 192, m.nt. EAAL en EAA (homohuwelijk; trans. Duck Obbink). 25 Id. 26 Art. 8, ECHR. 27 HR 19 oktober 1990, NJ 1992, 192, m.nt. EAAL en EAA (homohuwelijk; trans. Caroline Forder)