CONSTITUTION, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, CONTRACTS AND TORTS plaintiff. The supreme court based itself on the finding that both sides could indeed each rely on the fundamental human rights referred to and accordingly, in order to come to a solution of the conflict, a concession on the right of one of the opposing parties had to be accepted Whereas the Court of First Instance had not further explicited the basis for its weighting of the interests at stake, the Hoge Raad for its part held that the concession to be relating to tort law under the Civil Code. More particularly, the cout relie es required from one of the opposing parties had to be based on the principles the principle that the perpetrator a tort -action is bound in law to lim it as much he can the damaging consequences of his action. On that basis, derived from civil law, the fundamental human right of the defendant, enshrined in the Constitution had to suffer an exception in the case at hand(Hoge Raad, 18 June 1993, RvdW 1993, 136: NJ NJCM Bulletin 18-7-(1993)p. 786 m.n. L.F.M 1.2 International norms In this paragraph we will address the question whether under Netherlands law and if so, to what extent international norms lim it the freedom of a person(a)to enter into contracts with other private parties and (b)to take unilateral legalacts With regard to this question it should be stressed in the first place that th Netherlands Constitution expressis verbis provides for the precedence of directly effective binding provisions of international treaties and of decisions of public international law organisations(Articles 93 and 94). Accordingly the Dutch courts are bound to assess the possible conflict between self executing provisions of those international law instruments and provisions of Netherands national law. On the er hand, non-written public intermational law and non-self executing provisions of written public international law instruments will not be taken into account on the ame basis(hr 6 March 1959, NJ 1962, no. 2).2 impact which the law of the European Union, more particularly the lw of the uropean Community(fomerly the European Econom ic Community has had on the legal relations between private parties in the Netherlands. Indeed, that body of law permeated the Dutch legal system in such detail and in such scope that any meaningful discussion would require a separate report in its own right. Just to mention two instances, both with regard to competition awas well as the labour w regime as to the equal treatment of men and women the position of private parties has been fundamentally affected by EC law as it has developed over the years. Perhaps more mportant in this regard is the consideration that the body of ec law does not for its effect in Dutch aw, depend on the provisions of the Dutch Constitution(see Court of Justice, 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, (1993)ECR 1, (Van Gend loos) and 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, (1964)ECR 585 (Costa/ENEL ) For that matter, the Dutch courts have generally accepted the doctrines of autonomy and supremacy of EC Law as well as the enforcement mechanisms of direct effect. conform More on the technique of enforcing intemational norms in the Dutch context p 1 1-16CONSTITUTION,INTERNATIONAL TREATIES,CONTRACTS AND TORTS 5 plaintiff. The supreme court based itself on the finding that both sides could indeed each rely on the fundamental human rights referred to and that accordingly, in order to come to a solution of the conflict, a concession on the right of one of the opposing parties had to be accepted. Whereas the Court of First Instance had not further explicited the basis for its weighting of the interests at stake, the Hoge Raad for its part held that the concession to be required from one of the opposing parties had to be based on the principles relating to tort law under the Civil Code. More particularly, the court relied on the principle that the perpetrator of a tort-action is bound in law to limit as much he can the damaging consequences of his action. On that basis, derived from civil law, the fundamental human right of the defendant, enshrined in the Constitution had to suffer an exception in the case at hand (Hoge Raad, 18 June 1993, RvdW 1993, 136; NJ NJCM Bulletin 18-7-(1993) p. 786 m.n. L.F.M. Verhey). 1.2 International norms In this paragraph we will address the question whether under Netherlands law and if so, to what extent international norms limit the freedom of a person (a) to enter into contracts with other private parties and (b) to take unilateral legal acts. With regard to this question it should be stressed in the first place that the Netherlands Constitution expressis verbis provides for the precedence of directly effective binding provisions of international treaties and of decisions of public international law organisations (Articles 93 and 94). Accordingly the Dutch courts are bound to assess the possible conflict between self executing provisions of those international law instruments and provisions of Netherlands national law. On the other hand, non-written public international law and non-self executing provisions of written public international law instruments will not be taken into account on the same basis (HR 6 March 1959, NJ 1962, no. 2).2 Within the context of the present paper it has been decided to leave undiscussed the impact which the law of the European Union, more particularly the law of the European Community (formerly the European Economic Community) has had on the legal relations between private parties in the Netherlands. Indeed, that body of law permeated the Dutch legal system in such detail and in such scope that any meaningful discussion would require a separate report in its own right. Just to mention two instances, both with regard to competition law as well as the labour law regime as to the equal treatment of men and women the position of private parties has been fundamentally affected by EC law as it has developed over the years. Perhaps more important in this regard is the consideration that the body of EC law does not for its effect in Dutch law, depend on the provisions of the Dutch Constitution (see Court of Justice, 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, (1993) ECR 1, (“Van Gend & Loos”) and 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, (1964) ECR 585 (“Costa/ENEL”). For that matter, the Dutch courts have generally accepted the doctrines of autonomy and supremacy of EC Law as well as the enforcement mechanisms of direct effect, conform 2. More on the technique of enforcing international norms in the Dutch context p. 11-16