Feinberg et al. gossip-with-ostracism game,after learning the results of (M=6.80.SD =3.17)than they did when in either the each round,participants were given the opportunity to basic game (M=491,SD=3.56,1,215)=49.66 game .01.5D with Alse t the bpan d in th that ply knowing about the potental to be with-ostracism game,after receiving the gossip notes (if about and ostracized by future group members was any were sent),participants could anonymously vote to enough to engender an increase in cooperation exclude I participant from playing in the upcoming ihekeieidieremcesnoalconbaion n in the s d the othe n though in 15%of mental Material.If group members ostracized someone the rounds of the gossip-with-ostracism game.partici from the group,the remaining 3 participants engaged in pants were excluded and could not contribute anything the public-goods ex e with a new mu ltiplier for con fund ied bup by 1.5 (see Chang To analyze whether contributions tended to increase or Material for further details). decrease as rounds progressed,we conducted a two-way within-subjects Game Round Number ANOVA. Thi cant on the last game.the e rimenter informed them that the potential linear trend differences across the six rounds fo study was over.The experimenter then debriefed the par each game revealed significant differences between the sm game and both game ,n 38 121 622 wvas a significant linear-trend differ ce betwveen the hasi Results game and the gossip game,(1,215)=10.23.p<.01.ng2= The prosocial function of gossip 05.Separate within-game linear-trend analyses revealed nat the 121 524g 001.n2=43.and the 8 e1.215)=5444 achieve higher levels of cooperation.First,we compared p001.n=.20.a common finding in public-goods the total amount participants contributed to their group studies (Ledyard,1995). In the gossip-with-os fund,aggregat all six roundspo ange game, as pro In the the three experimental games. (2 How gossip promotes cooperation (ANOVA)yi The preceding analyses demons games,R 430=24989,PK00.n ntedthalartcipamis n game game achieve such cooperation?We next examined two 2m factors we hypothesized would drive cooperation within 754 195 the game res the unidue future interaction partners (Barclay.2004) More relevant to our hypothesis,further must readily spread reputational information bout one in the gossip anothe found that,in the two games in which gossip game was po ped often. hen p pr on .66,or the gossip game,1,215)=110.80,p<.001. 5%of the total opportunities.Similarly,when playing in 34.Even in the first round,participants contributed sig- who wer nificantly more when in the gossip-with-ostracism game to gossip (those who were not ostracized in a given4 Feinberg et al. gossip-with-ostracism game, after learning the results of each round, participants were given the opportunity to send a gossip note to the upcoming game partners of 1 of the participants they had just played the game with. Also, at the beginning of each round in the gossip￾with-ostracism game, after receiving the gossip notes (if any were sent), participants could anonymously vote to exclude 1 participant from playing in the upcoming round (see Gossip and Gossip-With-Ostracism Instruc￾tions and Language of Coordinated Action in the Supple￾mental Material). If group members ostracized someone from the group, the remaining 3 participants engaged in the public-goods exercise with a new multiplier for con￾tributions: Instead of the group’s contributions to the group fund being multiplied by 2, they were multiplied by 1.5 (see Changing Group Multiplier in the Supplemental Material for further details). Overall, participants played 18 total rounds of the public-goods exercise—six rounds for each game (see Fig. 1). Once participants completed the final round of the last game, the experimenter informed them that the study was over. The experimenter then debriefed the par￾ticipants, paid them the amount of money they had earned, and dismissed them from the study. Results The prosocial function of gossip Our central hypothesis was that groups in contexts that featured both gossip and a means for exclusion would achieve higher levels of cooperation. First, we compared the total amount participants contributed to their group fund, aggregated across all six rounds (possible range = 0 to 60 points) for each of the three experimental games. In the gossip-with-ostracism game, whenever partici￾pants were ostracized, we coded their contribution for that round as zero. A within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant omnibus difference across games, F(2, 430) = 249.89, p < .001, η2 = .54.1 Comparisons between games revealed that participants contributed significantly more when playing in the gossip game (M = 29.79, SD = 16.54) than they did when playing in the basic game (M = 17.54, SD = 16.28), F(1, 215) = 195.04, p < .001, η2 = .48. This finding captures the unique effect of having one’s behavior potentially communicated to future interaction partners (Barclay, 2004). More relevant to our hypothesis, further comparisons revealed that when participants played in the gossip￾with-ostracism game (M = 42.89, SD = 14.79), they con￾tributed significantly more than they did when playing in either the basic game, F(1, 215) = 417.06, p < .001, η2 = .66, or the gossip game, F(1, 215) = 110.80, p < .001, η2 = .34. Even in the first round, participants contributed sig￾nificantly more when in the gossip-with-ostracism game (M = 6.80, SD = 3.17) than they did when in either the basic game (M = 4.91, SD = 3.56), F(1, 215) = 49.66, p < .001, η2 = .19, or the gossip game (M = 6.01, SD = 3.31), F(1, 215) = 8.83, p < .01, η2 = .04, which suggests that simply knowing about the potential to be gossiped about and ostracized by future group members was enough to engender an increase in cooperation. Importantly, we found differences in total contributions across the six rounds between the gossip-with-ostracism game and the two other games, even though in 15% of the rounds of the gossip-with-ostracism game, partici￾pants were excluded and could not contribute anything. This result points to the significant role gossip plays in fostering cooperation, especially when it can be used for partner-selection purposes. To analyze whether contributions tended to increase or decrease as rounds progressed, we conducted a two-way within-subjects Game × Round Number ANOVA. This analysis yielded a significant omnibus interaction, F(10, 2150) = 22.92, p < .001, ηp 2 = .10. Analyses examining potential linear-trend differences across the six rounds for each game revealed significant differences between the gossip-with-ostracism game and both the basic game, F(1, 215) = 132.91, p < .001, ηp 2 = .38, and the gossip game, F(1, 215) = 62.34, p < .001, ηp 2 = .23. Additionally, there was a significant linear-trend difference between the basic game and the gossip game, F(1, 215) = 10.23, p < .01. ηp 2 = .05. Separate within-game linear-trend analyses revealed that there was a decrease in contributions as rounds pro￾gressed in both the basic game, F(1, 215) = 162.43, p < .001, ηp 2 = .43, and the gossip game, F(1, 215) = 54.44, p < .001, ηp 2 = .20, a common finding in public-goods studies (Ledyard, 1995). In the gossip-with-ostracism game, however, contributions increased as rounds pro￾gressed, F(1, 215) = 15.29, p < .001, ηp 2 = .07 (Fig. 2). How gossip promotes cooperation The preceding analyses demonstrated that participants in the gossip-with-ostracism game were able to achieve high levels of cooperation. How did participants in this game achieve such cooperation? We next examined two factors we hypothesized would drive cooperation within the game. Gossip facilitates partner selection. For gossip to fos￾ter cooperation through partner selection, participants must readily spread reputational information about one another. We found that, in the two games in which gossip was possible, participants gossiped often. When playing in the gossip game, across the 6 opportunities participants had to gossip, they did so an average of 5.1 times, or on 85% of the total opportunities. Similarly, when playing in the gossip-with-ostracism game, participants who were able to gossip (those who were not ostracized in a given Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on February 13, 2014