millions of dollars in research and development without the carrot of a twenty-year patent monopoly 36 2. Economic Incentive/Efficiency rationales Economic incentive rationales have unquestionably become the dominant paradigm used to justify protection for all forms of IPR's in modern times.37As commentators have noted, [ Judicial, legislative and academic authorities routinely justify granting inventors, artists and business people property rights in their intangible creations on the ground that they need an incentive to engage in creative process. In copyright and patent law, for example, it is well established that Constitution's patent copyright clause exists to spur the production of creative and inventive works by providing compensation to individual authors and inventors. Incentive rationales are entrenched among courts, Congress and academics, notwithstanding the fact that there is little hard data to prove or disprove the assumption that property rights are needed as an incentive or that the amount of creative output in the United States would significantl decrease if property rights were reduced or denied. In the copyright area, particularly, 56 See e. g, KIMBERLY PACE MOORE, PAUL R MICHEL, RAPHAEL V LUPO, PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 4(1999 (noting that absent"the promise of exclusive rights, companies would not risk the capital expenditures in research and development and fewer inventions would reach the public.) See e.g.,K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the Presumption of irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173 197(1999)(noting that "[a] consensus exists that economic considerations provided the primary theoretical basis of copyright law. See MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 19(1995 See, e.g. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201(1954) (discussing"economic philosophy "of patent-copyright clause). See also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69U. CHI. L REV. 263, 293(2002)(noting that copyright protection"is justified solely as an incentive for the creation and distribution of content)10 millions of dollars in research and development without the carrot of a twenty-year patent monopoly.36 2. Economic Incentive/Efficiency Rationales Economic incentive rationales have unquestionably become the dominant paradigm used to justify protection for all forms of IPR’s in modern times.37 As commentators have noted, “[j]udicial, legislative and academic authorities routinely justify granting inventors, artists and business people property rights in their intangible creations on the ground that they need an incentive to engage in creative process.”38 In copyright and patent law, for example, it is well established that Constitution’s patent￾copyright clause exists to spur the production of creative and inventive works by providing compensation to individual authors and inventors.39 Incentive rationales are entrenched among courts, Congress and academics, notwithstanding the fact that “there is little hard data to prove or disprove the assumption that property rights are needed as an incentive or that the amount of creative output in the United States would significantly decrease if property rights were reduced or denied.”40 In the copyright area, particularly, 36 See e.g., KIMBERLY PACE MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL, RAPHAEL V. LUPO, PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 4 (1999)(noting that absent “the promise of exclusive rights, companies would not risk the capital expenditures in research and development and fewer inventions would reach the public.”). 37 See e.g., K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 197 (1999)(noting that “[a] consensus exists that economic considerations provided the primary theoretical basis of copyright law.”). 38 See MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (1995). 39 See, e.g. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)(discussing “economic philosophy” of patent-copyright clause). See also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 293 (2002)(noting that copyright protection “is justified solely as an incentive for the creation and distribution of content”)