Special Section: Open Forum Why we are not allowed to sell that which We Are encouraged to donate BARBRO BJORKMAN Introduction It is a reality today that people die waiting in line for transplant organs Something needs to be done to remedy this dire situation and allev broadly g, barring scientific progress that might mal ial organs and stem cell therapy viable alternatives, three options are available to us: increase voluntary donation, compel access to organs via government policy, or open up for a commercial market in organs ks It has proven hard to explain why so many of us are convinced that donation the only morally permissible form of transaction when it comes to organs from the living. This is particularly surprising in light of the fact that we live in a liberal, capitalist society that has seen fit to not only commodity, but indeed, also commercialize just about everything else. Naturally it would be a different matter altogether if organs were nontransferable, that come what may no human being could be allowed to part with his/her organs. But this is not so-quite the contrary, the citizens of the Western world are exposed to campaigns encouraging donations. It is quite difficult to come up with other examples of objects that we are encouraged to donate and at the same time morally forbidden to sell. Bearing in mind the current organ shortage, ethical questions relating to organ procurement are becoming increasingly pressing what can we allow ourselves, and others to do with our bodies? In this paper I attempt to show that virtue ethics could provide an explana- tion of why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell organs which seems to correlate with our moral intuitions on this matter. The position defended here is that it is morally wrong to sell organs because this is omething a virtuous person would not do. Given the choice between selling 4.d donating an organ the virtuous agent would choose the latter, and this is why it is not permissible to sell ones organs. I, first, however take a closer look at some standard arguments for and against the selling of organs. Then I move on to a discussion about whether virtue ethics can give us the necessary tools for explaining why we are not allowed to sell that which we are encouraged to donate. The purpose is to show that a strong case can be made that, given the choice, a virtuous person would donate rather than sell his or her organs article could not have been written without the help of Dr. Martin Petersson and Professor Ove hans tarterly of Healthcare Ethics(2006), 15, 60-70. Printed in the USA. G 2006 Cambridge University Press 0963-1801/06 $16.00Special Section: Open Forum Why We Are Not Allowed to Sell That Which We Are Encouraged to Donate BARBRO BJÖRKMAN Introduction It is a reality today that people die waiting in line for transplant organs. Something needs to be done to remedy this dire situation and alleviate the suffering. Broadly speaking, barring scientific progress that might make artifi￾cial organs and stem cell therapy viable alternatives, three options are available to us: increase voluntary donation, compel access to organs via government policy, or open up for a commercial market in organs. It has proven hard to explain why so many of us are convinced that donation is the only morally permissible form of transaction when it comes to organs from the living.1 This is particularly surprising in light of the fact that we live in a liberal, capitalist society that has seen fit to not only commodify, but, indeed, also commercialize just about everything else. Naturally it would be a different matter altogether if organs were nontransferable, that come what may no human being could be allowed to part with his/her organs. But this is not so—quite the contrary, the citizens of the Western world are exposed to campaigns encouraging donations. It is quite difficult to come up with other examples of objects that we are encouraged to donate and at the same time morally forbidden to sell.2 Bearing in mind the current organ shortage, ethical questions relating to organ procurement are becoming increasingly pressing— what can we allow ourselves, and others, to do with our bodies? In this paper I attempt to show that virtue ethics could provide an explana￾tion of why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell organs, which seems to correlate with our moral intuitions on this matter. The position defended here is that it is morally wrong to sell organs because this is something a virtuous person would not do.3 Given the choice between selling and donating an organ the virtuous agent would choose the latter, and this is why it is not permissible to sell one’s organs. I, first, however take a closer look at some standard arguments for and against the selling of organs. Then I move on to a discussion about whether virtue ethics can give us the necessary tools for explaining why we are not allowed to sell that which we are encouraged to donate. The purpose is to show that a strong case can be made that, given the choice, a virtuous person would donate rather than sell his or her organs. This article could not have been written without the help of Dr. Martin Petersson and Professor Sven Ove Hansson. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2006), 15, 60–70. Printed in the USA. 60 Copyright © 2006 Cambridge University Press 0963-1801/06 $16.00