chosen institution functions as well as the one discarded would have. A road may be built at the left bank of the river or at the right bank of the river, but the left bank is not any"better" than the right bank In case of this weak-form path dependence, there are no obstacles for harmonisation. The type of rules one would think of as touched by this form of path dependence are those related to the more technical aspects of the law. Whether prescription periods or other time-related devices in the law are two years, five years or ten years is usually arbitrary. On the other hand, an evolution toward some"" rule is not really feasible here either. Courts are usually not willing to reconsider these types of legal norms. In this case, harmonisation is therefore only possible through the imposition of a rule in a centralist way. In other words the framework described in section 2(uniformity as far as legal culture allows) is not inconsistent with a centralist imposing of law upon the various European countries It is not easy to identify the type of rules just described from other types of rules. Watson seems to see an important place for these arbitrary rules: The truth of the matter seems to be that many legal rules make little impact on individuals, and that very often it is important that there be a rule, but what rule actually is adopted is of restricted significance for general human happiness",As far as the substantive parts of contract law, tort law and the law of property are concerned I would rather not qualify these as examples of weak-form path dependence. The idea that it is indifferent which rule to adopt and that any evolution toward rules, better suited for some environment than others, is impossible, is not in line with the idea of these disciplines evolving to more efficient rules to the extent possible This is not to say that path dependence does not play a role in the traditional private law disciplines. To the contrary: other forms than weak path dependence are certainly present. If we assume that the Europeanisation of private law presents a crisis in the evolutionary sense, the path already taken may thus prevent the best possible rules for the new European environment from evolving. Evolution leading to a great amount of uniformity is the least probable where it is only possible to change the present rules at the expense of high cost. This is the least the case with rules that many people rely upon; on the other hand, the amount of uniformity to be attained should theoretically be the most in the case of rules that are only of use for parties that set these rules themselves. Gambaro for example states the following about the law of real property When one considers the nature of various property rights(obligations between neighbours, riparian rights, condominium law, rights of superficies, servitudes, and the like), it becomes rather clear that much property law is deeply rooted in locally developed legal traditions. And, for this reason it is better left to those local legal traditions which for hundreds of years have addressed these issues in the manner most adapted to the locality. 7 Id at 647 6% WATSON, supra note I at96 Roe, supra note 48 at 648 distinguishes between semi-strong path dependence(leading to inefficient paths hat were once satisfactory but are now worth changing but are left intact). In case of strong-form path dependence, the situation is now inefficient and it would be efficient to change it. Here, political pressure groups or a lack of information about the other way" prevents any change11 chosen institution functions as well as the one discarded would have.”68 A road may be built at the left bank of the river or at the right bank of the river, but the left bank is not any “better” than the right bank. In case of this weak-form path dependence, there are no obstacles for harmonisation. The type of rules one would think of as touched by this form of path dependence, are those related to the more technical aspects of the law. Whether prescription periods or other time-related devices in the law are two years, five years or ten years is usually arbitrary. On the other hand, an evolution toward some “best” rule is not really feasible here either. Courts are usually not willing to reconsider these types of legal norms. In this case, harmonisation is therefore only possible through the imposition of a rule in a centralist way. In other words: the framework described in section 2 (uniformity as far as legal culture allows) is not inconsistent with a centralist imposing of law upon the various European countries. It is not easy to identify the type of rules just described from other types of rules. Watson seems to see an important place for these arbitrary rules: “The truth of the matter seems to be that many legal rules make little impact on individuals, and that very often it is important that there be a rule; but what rule actually is adopted is of restricted significance for general human happiness”.69 As far as the substantive parts of contract law, tort law and the law of property are concerned, I would rather not qualify these as examples of weak-form path dependence. The idea that it is indifferent which rule to adopt and that any evolution toward rules, better suited for some environment than others, is impossible, is not in line with the idea of these disciplines evolving to more efficient rules to the extent possible. This is not to say that path dependence does not play a role in the traditional private law disciplines. To the contrary: other forms than weak path dependence70 are certainly present. If we assume that the Europeanisation of private law presents a crisis in the evolutionary sense, the path already taken may thus prevent the best possible rules for the new European environment from evolving. Evolution leading to a great amount of uniformity is the least probable where it is only possible to change the present rules at the expense of high cost. This is the least the case with rules that many people rely upon; on the other hand, the amount of uniformity to be attained should theoretically be the most in the case of rules that are only of use for parties that set these rules themselves. Gambaro for example states the following about the law of real property: When one considers the nature of various property rights (obligations between neighbours, riparian rights, condominium law, rights of superficies, servitudes, and the like), it becomes rather clear that much property law is deeply rooted in locally developed legal traditions. And, for this reason it is better left to those local legal traditions which for hundreds of years have addressed these issues in the manner most adapted to the locality.71 68 Id. at 647. 69 WATSON, supra note 1 at 96. 70 Roe, supra note 48 at 648 distinguishes between semi-strong path dependence (leading to inefficient paths that were once satisfactory but are now worth changing but are left intact). In case of strong-form path dependence, the situation is now inefficient and it would be efficient to change it. Here, political pressure groups or a lack of information about “the other way” prevents any change. 71 Gambaro, supra note 65, at 497