The Anti-Theoretical Nature of civil Law Contract Scholarship and the need for an Economic Theory Aristides n. hatzis* The absence of theories developed for Roman law and the absence of grand heories in Civil contract law scholarship were outcomes of a particularistic ap. proach to the problems created by the deficiencies of markets and driven by the need for the construction of a legal framework conducive to economic progress The generation of efficient results by Civil law through the selection of efficient rules and standards was completed over the course of several centuries and stabi- lized after the great codifications. Common law had for centuries attempted to develop a similar construct that would be stable enough to facilitate economic relations. Borrowing ideas and solutions from Civil law was the easy way out Despite the numerous legal transplants, the Common law fought hard to preserve a false independence and a parallel dilapidated coherence by building unified conclusive, but dogmatic theories. The mimicking of Civil law has led to some efficient solutions, but with many islands of" inefficiency"trapped in the sea of rigid theories(bargain theory, privity, etc. ) On the other hand, Civil law scholar hip and practice has found it increasingly difficult to respond to the fast- changing economic circumstances. For the first time in history, economic rela tions have become so complicated that it is impossible for a judge endowed only with common sense to solve problems created by the dysfunctions of markets Economic expertise is not only helpful, but also required. A responsive eco- nomic theory of contract law is almost imperative if Civil law is to continue playing the role that it has successfully performed for centuries: providing the legal framework that helps the economy function Lecturer of Philosophy of Law Theory of Institutions, University of Athens (LL. B. 1989, LL. M. 1993, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Law, LL. M. 1994, J.S.D. 1999, University of Chicago Law School). An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 14 Annual Conference of the European Asso- ciation of Law Economics held at Barcelona, September 4-6, 1997. I wish to thank the participants for their helpful suggestions, as well as Prof. Katharina Pistor and Dr. Aspasia Tsaoussis. Thanks are also due to the many members of the legal studies Network(SSRN-LSN) who sent me their comments and re- lated work. Email: ahatzis @phs uoa. gr. Copyright o 2003 by Aristides N. Hat-The Anti-Theoretical Nature of Civil Law Contract Scholarship and the Need for an Economic Theory Aristides N. Hatzis∗ Abstract The absence of theories developed for Roman law and the absence of grand theories in Civil contract law scholarship were outcomes of a particularistic ap￾proach to the problems created by the deficiencies of markets and driven by the need for the construction of a legal framework conducive to economic progress. The generation of efficient results by Civil law through the selection of efficient rules and standards was completed over the course of several centuries and stabi￾lized after the great codifications. Common law had for centuries attempted to develop a similar construct that would be stable enough to facilitate economic relations. Borrowing ideas and solutions from Civil law was the easy way out. Despite the numerous legal transplants, the Common law fought hard to preserve a false independence and a parallel dilapidated coherence by building unified, conclusive, but dogmatic theories. The mimicking of Civil law has led to some efficient solutions, but with many islands of “inefficiency” trapped in the sea of rigid theories (bargain theory, privity, etc.). On the other hand, Civil law scholar￾ship and practice has found it increasingly difficult to respond to the fast￾changing economic circumstances. For the first time in history, economic rela￾tions have become so complicated that it is impossible for a judge endowed only with common sense to solve problems created by the dysfunctions of markets. Economic expertise is not only helpful, but also required. A responsive eco￾nomic theory of contract law is almost imperative if Civil law is to continue playing the role that it has successfully performed for centuries: providing the legal framework that helps the economy function. ∗ Lecturer of Philosophy of Law & Theory of Institutions, University of Athens (LL.B. 1989, LL.M. 1993, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Law; LL.M. 1994, J.S.D. 1999, University of Chicago Law School). An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 14th Annual Conference of the European Asso￾ciation of Law & Economics held at Barcelona, September 4-6, 1997. I wish to thank the participants for their helpful suggestions, as well as Prof. Katharina Pistor and Dr. Aspasia Tsaoussis. Thanks are also due to the many members of the Legal Studies Network (SSRN-LSN) who sent me their comments and re￾lated work. Email: ahatzis@phs.uoa.gr. Copyright © 2003 by Aristides N. Hat￾zis