Familiarity Breeds Investment August 2010 TABLE 6.Different Samples,Educated Migrants Portfolio FDI Rich→Rich Rich→Poor Rich→Rich Rich→Poor Log(migrant stock from d in s) 0.356* 0.385* 0.424* 0.289* (0.141) (0.118) (0.208) (0.121) with tertiary education -0.153 1.282 0.657 2.165* (0.725) (0.892) (0.998) (1.117) in management/FIRE -11.92 3.053+ 0.315 -0.485 (62.84) (1.505) (78.97) (1.765) Log(product of GDPs) -0.0116 0.132 0.141* 0.162* (0.0508) (0.0963) (0.0751) (0.0934) Log(distance) 0.157 -1.401# -1.130 -1.360* (0.279) (0.407 (0.429) (0.639) Common border -0.314 1.589 -0.187 5.840* (0.301) (2.730) (0.828) (1.624) Official common language -0.241 0.0320 0.145 2.729* (0.303) (0.580) (0.870) (0.845) Correlation of growth rates -0.183 0.196 -0.453 0.0000315 (0.454) (0.401) (0.575) (0.420) Common exchange rate peg 0.394 -0.246 -0.251 -1.618 (0.407 (1.105) (0.847) (2.306) Dual taxation treaty 0.793 0.446 0.852 0.528 (0.490) (0.400) (0.628) (0.633) Preferential trade agreement 2.415* 0.407 0.564 0.970 (0.681) (1.133) (0.890) (1.233) Common legal heritage 0.528* -0.202 0.861 0.609 (0.262) (0.323) (0.639) (0.526) Common dominant religion 0.406* 0.745 0.152 0.115 (0.190) (0.507) (0.652) (0.631) Genetic distance 0.000242 -0.000116 0.000214 -0.000151 (0.000633) (0.000864) (0.00149) (0.000970) Log(bilateral telephone volume) 0.0363 0.0361 -0.0859 -0.167 (0.138) (0.152) (0.398) (0.204) Constant 18.43 -84.95 -112.3* -105.9* (43.74) (66.91) (66.23) (62.47 Observations 583 1.397 587 771 Adjusted R2 0.864 0.731 0.596 0.630 FDI,foreign direct investment;GDP,gross domestic product. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:log(portfolio investment)in columns 1 and 2;log(FDI)in columns 3 and 4. Robust standard errors clustered by both origin and destination country. All models include both origin and destination dummy variables. p<.10:*p<.05. More broadly.it is hoped that this article contributes the political rights of immigrants,and Leblang(2009a.2009b) to broader interdisciplinary discussions about the role that examines the effect of countries of origin extending voting migrant networks play in the process of globalization and rights and dual citizenship rights to their diaspora.However, development.Although the bulk of scholarship on global- these studies only skim the surface.We still know little about ization focuses on the movement (or lack thereof)of com- the benefits accorded to immigrants and the property owner- modities,it gives the movement of people-whether they are ship rights accorded to emigres,and even less about the role laborers or entrepreneurs-short shrift.There are scores of that international organizations from the European Union to studies on the causes and consequences of trade and capital the World Trade Organization(and the General Agreement flows,yet we lack similar studies of labor flows.Numerous on Tariffs and Trade)play in the process of labor migration. works investigate the causes of trade restrictions and capital As governments and social scientists learn more about the controls,but,again,we lack comparable understanding of the multiple ways that disapora communities connect societies, barriers to the international mobility of labor. communities,and economies around the world,both our un- To be fair,there is a body of literature that focuses on derstanding and government policies may change. policies that restrict labor mobility,but this literature focuses Filling these gaps will pay real dividends for our under- on the country of immigration.Howard(2009).for example standing of migration,investment,and political economy details how and why governments of Western Europe restrict more generally. 596Familiarity Breeds Investment August 2010 TABLE 6. Different Samples, Educated Migrants Portfolio FDI Rich → Rich Rich → Poor Rich → Rich Rich → Poor Log(migrant stock from d in s) 0.356∗∗ 0.385∗∗ 0.424∗∗ 0.289∗∗ (0.141) (0.118) (0.208) (0.121) % with tertiary education −0.153 1.282 0.657 2.165∗ (0.725) (0.892) (0.998) (1.117) % in management/FIRE −11.92 3.053∗∗ 0.315 −0.485 (62.84) (1.505) (78.97) (1.765) Log(product of GDPs) −0.0116 0.132 0.141∗ 0.162∗ (0.0508) (0.0963) (0.0751) (0.0934) Log(distance) 0.157 −1.401∗∗ −1.130∗∗ −1.360∗∗ (0.279) (0.407) (0.429) (0.639) Common border −0.314 1.589 −0.187 5.840∗∗ (0.301) (2.730) (0.828) (1.624) Official common language −0.241 0.0320 0.145 2.729∗∗ (0.303) (0.580) (0.870) (0.845) Correlation of growth rates −0.183 0.196 −0.453 0.0000315 (0.454) (0.401) (0.575) (0.420) Common exchange rate peg 0.394 −0.246 −0.251 −1.618 (0.407) (1.105) (0.847) (2.306) Dual taxation treaty 0.793 0.446 0.852 0.528 (0.490) (0.400) (0.628) (0.633) Preferential trade agreement 2.415∗∗ 0.407 0.564 0.970 (0.681) (1.133) (0.890) (1.233) Common legal heritage 0.528∗∗ −0.202 0.861 0.609 (0.262) (0.323) (0.639) (0.526) Common dominant religion 0.406∗∗ 0.745 0.152 0.115 (0.190) (0.507) (0.652) (0.631) Genetic distance 0.000242 −0.000116 0.000214 −0.000151 (0.000633) (0.000864) (0.00149) (0.000970) Log(bilateral telephone volume) 0.0363 0.0361 −0.0859 −0.167 (0.138) (0.152) (0.398) (0.204) Constant 18.43 −84.95 −112.3∗ −105.9∗ (43.74) (66.91) (66.23) (62.47) Observations 583 1,397 587 771 Adjusted R2 0.864 0.731 0.596 0.630 FDI, foreign direct investment; GDP, gross domestic product. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: log(portfolio investment) in columns 1 and 2; log(FDI) in columns 3 and 4. Robust standard errors clustered by both origin and destination country. All models include both origin and destination dummy variables. ∗ p < .10; ∗∗ p < .05. More broadly, it is hoped that this article contributes to broader interdisciplinary discussions about the role that migrant networks play in the process of globalization and development. Although the bulk of scholarship on global￾ization focuses on the movement (or lack thereof) of com￾modities, it gives the movement of people—whether they are laborers or entrepreneurs—short shrift. There are scores of studies on the causes and consequences of trade and capital flows, yet we lack similar studies of labor flows. Numerous works investigate the causes of trade restrictions and capital controls, but, again, we lack comparable understanding of the barriers to the international mobility of labor. To be fair, there is a body of literature that focuses on policies that restrict labor mobility, but this literature focuses on the country of immigration. Howard (2009), for example, details how and why governments of Western Europe restrict the political rights of immigrants, and Leblang (2009a, 2009b) examines the effect of countries of origin extending voting rights and dual citizenship rights to their diaspora. However, these studies only skim the surface. We still know little about the benefits accorded to immigrants and the property owner￾ship rights accorded to emigr ´ es, and even less about the role ´ that international organizations from the European Union to the World Trade Organization (and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) play in the process of labor migration. As governments and social scientists learn more about the multiple ways that disapora communities connect societies, communities, and economies around the world, both our un￾derstanding and government policies may change. Filling these gaps will pay real dividends for our under￾standing of migration, investment, and political economy more generally. 596