also present, although not as starkly, in the economic analysis of domestic law. Other difficulties arise from the particular features of the international legal system. We believe that our identification of these difficulties can inform a research agenda to further our understanding of the appropriate domain of economic analysis of law Finally, in Part VIl, we briefly set forth some ideas about a future research program. We provide, in an Appendix, a bibliography of articles that use economic tools to analyze internationa rather th wve emphasize that our analysis and examples are intended to be illustrative and suggestive be informed by economic analysis, or to apply every possible economic methodology to the international legal problems we do address. Instead, the paper represents an"invitation". we hope to stimulate a series of inquiries into the utility of different forms of economic analysis to analyze a ariety of international legal norms and institutions, and, in so doing, to enrich international le discourse and scholarship Why Have International Lawyers Avoided Law and Economics? While there may be many explanations for why international legal scholars have not articipated in the law and economics("l&E")revolution, we believe that many international lawyers would identify at least one of the following three concerns: (1)L&E's seemingly inaccessible methodologies; (2)L&E's supposedly conservative political prejudices; and (3)l&e's why they provide no rationale for declining to investigate whether L&E methodologies can 2 B these concerns rests upon a misunderstanding of relevant law and economics methodologies. In illuminate international legal problems.6 accessible Methodologies As George Stigler explains, there are two roles that economics may play in law. The first traditional, role of economics is to answer particular questions. For example, economics can speak to the question of market definition in antitrust or anti-dumping, or to the question of whether two oroducts are "like, with the result that discrimination between them is prohibited, 7 by reference to cross-elasticities of demand In this first role, economic analysis supplies inputs to a legal rul e might refer to this role as"economic analysis in law. " This role, which requires the full tools of the professional economist, and can be undertaken without any help from lawyers, is not the focus of our paper A second, more controversial role for economics is in the study of legal institutions and 6 In Part VI, infra, we identify more serious difficulties associated with the of international legal issues 7 E.g., under art. Ill of GATT, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embody ing the results of the Uruguay round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations(Marrakesh, as signed on April 15, 1994), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No 316, 103d Cong, 2d Sess. 1381(1994) “GATT)also present, although not as starkly, in the economic analysis of domestic law. Other difficulties arise from the particular features of the international legal system. We believe that our identification of these difficulties can inform a research agenda to further our understanding of the appropriate domain of economic analysis of law. Finally, in Part VII, we briefly set forth some ideas about a future research program. We provide, in an Appendix, a bibliography of articles that use economic tools to analyze international legal issues. We emphasize that our analysis and examples are intended to be illustrative and suggestive rather than exhaustive. We by no means attempt to explore every international legal issue that can be informed by economic analysis, or to apply every possible economic methodology to the international legal problems we do address. Instead, the paper represents an "invitation": we hope to stimulate a series of inquiries into the utility of different forms of economic analysis to analyze a variety of international legal norms and institutions, and, in so doing, to enrich international legal discourse and scholarship. I. Why Have International Lawyers Avoided Law and Economics? While there may be many explanations for why international legal scholars have not participated in the law and economics ("L&E") revolution, we believe that many international lawyers would identify at least one of the following three concerns: (1) L&E’s seemingly inaccessible methodologies; (2) L&E’s supposedly conservative political prejudices; and (3) L&E’s positivism and its presumed denigration of international law. However, we believe that each of these concerns rests upon a misunderstanding of relevant law and economics methodologies. In this section, we try to clear up the confusions underlying each of these objections, and to explain why they provide no rationale for declining to investigate whether L&E methodologies can illuminate international legal problems.6 A. Inaccessible Methodologies As George Stigler explains, there are two roles that economics may play in law. The first, traditional, role of economics is to answer particular questions. For example, economics can speak to the question of market definition in antitrust or anti-dumping, or to the question of whether two products are “like,” with the result that discrimination between them is prohibited,7 by reference to cross-elasticities of demand. In this first role, economic analysis supplies inputs to a legal rule. We might refer to this role as "economic analysis in law." This role, which requires the full tools of the professional economist, and can be undertaken without any help from lawyers, is not the focus of our paper. “A second, more controversial role for economics is in the study of legal institutions and 6 In Part VI, infra, we identify more serious difficulties associated with the economic analysis of international legal issues. 7 E.g., under art. III of GATT, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh, as signed on April 15, 1994), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1381 (1994) (“GATT”). 4