DERCKX/HONDIUS foetus on the road to being born. By the process of implantation there exists a foetus with which the woman is pregnant. 8 The embryo will be able to rea lise its potential unless further development will be interrupted (for example by the pregnancy being terminated). The progressive protection of dignity entails that, according to the development stage in which the human foetus is in, an ascending level of legal protection is already granted. In the status nascendi, for example, there is a greater degree of protection than during the preceding stage but it is more limited than that of a child which has already been born. The protection of the human embryo rests on the intrinsic value of the em bryo, regardless of whether it is an in-vivo or in-vitro 5 The embryo in international human rights treaties In connection with abortus provoca tus in particuar, the question has arisen in The Netherlands as to whether an em bryo falls within the ambit of the human rights treaties, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(1948), the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(1966), and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(ECHR).20 Art. 3 of the Declaration detem ines: everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Art. 6 of the International Covenant states: every human being has the inherent right to life Leenen has deduced. among other things from the intentions of the drafters. the system of the treaties and the fact that a number of the included rights hardly relate to people who have just been bom, that the embryo cannot fall within the ambit of these treaties 21 Art. 2 ECHR determines that everyone s right to life shall be protected by law and this provision is not only advanced in theabortion(and euthanasia )debates, but also gives rise to questions in the case of modem medical reproduction techniques with regard to the interpretation of this particulararticle Important in this respect is also Art. 3 which states that no one may be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Commission of luman Rights has in antime on numerous occasions considered the adm issibility of abortus provocatus and thereby also the question of whether the embryo falls within the ambit of the ECHR. From the cases of X v. UK22 and Hercz v. Nonway23 it can be deduced that the embryo does not in principle fall within the protection of the ECHR and that abortion provocatus is allowed. 4 It is possible that Sutorius, 1993, P. 236 thinks otherwse. According to him the status nascendi must be limited up until the stage of viable independent existence. Te Braake, 2001, P.8. Rome. 4 November 1950. Leenen/Gevers, 2000, P. 141 13 May 1980, Application no 8416/78, NJ 1981, 110 19 May 1992, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 1993/35 Leenen, 1994, Leenen/Gevers, 2000, p. 143. See also De Bruiin-Luckers who indeed recognses that the decis ions of the European Commiss on do not provide a clear answer t the question of whether and when the foetus can derive rights from the eChr, but who neverthelessDERCKX/HONDIUS 4 foetus on the road to being born. By the process of implantation there exists a foetus with which the woman is pregnant.18 The embryo will be able to realise its potential, unless further development will be interrupted (for example by the pregnancy being terminated). The progressive protection of dignity entails that, according to the development stage in which the human foetus is in, an ascending level of legal protection is already granted. In the status nascendi, for example, there is a greater degree of protection than during the preceding stage, but it is more limited than that of a child which has already been born. The protection of the human embryo rests on the intrinsic value of the embryo, regardless of whether it is an in-vivo or in-vitro embryo.19 5 The embryo in international human rights treaties In connection with abortus provocatus in particular, the question has arisen in The Netherlands as to whether an embryo falls within the ambit of the human rights treaties, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).20 Art. 3 of the Declaration determines: everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person . Art. 6 of the International Covenant states: every human being has the inherent right to life . Leenen has deduced, among other things from the intentions of the drafters, the system of the treaties and the fact that a number of the included rights hardly relate to people who have just been born, that the embryo cannot fall within the ambit of these treaties.21 Art. 2 ECHR determines that everyone s right to life shall be protected by law and this provision is not only advanced in the abortion (and euthanasia) debates, but also gives rise to questions in the case of modern medical reproduction techniques with regard to the interpretation of this particular article. Important in this respect is also Art. 3 which states that no one may be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Commission of Human Rights has in the meantime on numerous occasions considered the admissibility of abortus provocatus and thereby also the question of whether the embryo falls within the ambit of the ECHR. From the cases of X v. UK22 and Hercz v. Norway23 it can be deduced that the embryo does not in principle fall within the protection of the ECHR and that abortion provocatus is allowed.24 It is possible that 18. Sutorius, 1993, p. 236 thinks otherwise. According to him the status nascendi must be limited up until the stage of viable independent existence. 19. Te Braake, 2001, p. 8. 20. Rome, 4 November 1950. 21. Leenen/Gevers, 2000, p. 141. 22. 13 May 1980, Application no. 8416/78, NJ 1981, 110. 23. 19 May 1992, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 1993/35. 24. Leenen, 1994, Leenen/Gevers, 2000, p. 143. See also De Bruijn-Lückers who indeed recognises that the decisions of the European Commission do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether and when the foetus can derive rights from the ECHR, but who nevertheless