Official Listing has been replaced by a broader series of tests designed to evaluate an entity's ability to operate as a going concern. An analysis of AsX listings during the 1999 and 2000 hot IPO market reveals that the regulatory amendments did, in fact, facilitate improved access to public equity capital than what was available for SMEs under the earlier listing framework. A total of 69 technology firms secured an official listing on the AsX during 1999. However, 42 firms from this sub-sample(60.9 per cent) secured their listing in the four months following September 1, 1999 when the amended AsX Listing Rules came into effect. A further 87 technology firms were listed on the ASX during 2000. With profitability no longer a disqualifying factor for the achievement of a listing, we anticipate that the average risk profile and level of ex ante uncertainty associated with technology firm IPO candidates since September 1, 1999 particularly high. This provides a valuable setting in which to examine the effectiveness with which the investigating accountants, auditors and management are able to communicate the nherent risk associated with investing in a technology offering to potential investors One mechanism for increasing the credibility of management statements regarding performance is the independent accountant s report contained in the prospectus documents Willenborg and McKeown(2000) find that for a sample of small U.S. offerings, offering firms with pre-issue going-concern opinions suffer less first-day underpricing than similar securities without going-concern opinions. The Australian Corporations Law effectively prevents companies with a going concern qualification from going public. We therefore consider a broader definition of warnings contained in the prospectus that indicate some need for an investor to specifically consider going concern risk for the IPO candidate firm 3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 3.1 Underpricing and stock hype One of the objectives of our research is to investigate whether market sentiment surrounding the listing of IPO candidates is a possible explanation of the extent of observed underpricing. As noted above, previous research suggests hype as a measure of the market sentiment and excitement surrounding a pending issue. The interest in an IPO is fostered by investment bankers, managers and potential investors. Hype surrounding an IPO candidate in the period immediately prior to listing assists in fostering a market for the firms shares We consider two types of measures of hype that reflect the level of interest surrounding a pending issue. We consider hype as reflected by exposure in the media and hype as reflected the market for similar issues The exposure in the print and electronic media generates awareness among potential investors, which results in an increase in demand for the newly listed stock. This provides7 Official Listing has been replaced by a broader series of tests designed to evaluate an entity’s ability to operate as a going concern. An analysis of ASX listings during the 1999 and 2000 hot IPO market reveals that the regulatory amendments did, in fact, facilitate improved access to public equity capital than what was available for SMEs under the earlier listing framework. A total of 69 technology firms secured an official listing on the ASX during 1999. However, 42 firms from this sub-sample (60.9 per cent) secured their listing in the four months following September 1, 1999 when the amended ASX Listing Rules came into effect. A further 87 technology firms were listed on the ASX during 2000. With profitability no longer a disqualifying factor for the achievement of a listing, we anticipate that the average risk profile and level of ex ante uncertainty associated with technology firm IPO candidates since September 1, 1999 is particularly high. This provides a valuable setting in which to examine the effectiveness with which the investigating accountants, auditors and management are able to communicate the inherent risk associated with investing in a technology offering to potential investors. One mechanism for increasing the credibility of management statements regarding performance is the independent accountant’s report contained in the prospectus documents. Willenborg and McKeown (2000) find that for a sample of small U.S. offerings, offering firms with pre-issue going-concern opinions suffer less first-day underpricing than similar securities without going-concern opinions. The Australian Corporations Law effectively prevents companies with a going concern qualification from going public. We therefore consider a broader definition of warnings contained in the prospectus that indicate some need for an investor to specifically consider going concern risk for the IPO candidate firm. 3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 3.1 Underpricing and Stock Hype One of the objectives of our research is to investigate whether market sentiment surrounding the listing of IPO candidates is a possible explanation of the extent of observed underpricing. As noted above, previous research suggests hype as a measure of the market sentiment and excitement surrounding a pending issue. The interest in an IPO is fostered by investment bankers, managers and potential investors. Hype surrounding an IPO candidate in the period immediately prior to listing assists in fostering a market for the firm’s shares. We consider two types of measures of hype that reflect the level of interest surrounding a pending issue. We consider hype as reflected by exposure in the media and hype as reflected in the market for similar issues. The exposure in the print and electronic media generates awareness among potential investors, which results in an increase in demand for the newly listed stock. This provides