Criminal Law in Cyberspace criminal wrongdoing in a way that conventional law enforcement would not. 4 Civil forfeiture of computers and equipment, and postconviction use/training restrictions on computers can also increase perpetration costs and prevent recidivism. Criminal law scholars should incorporate monetary costs just as they should recognize social norms and architecture, into their calculations about optimal deterrence. This multifaceted strategy of regulation is particularly important for crimes where offenders tend to be heterogenous Put a different way, the emergence of computer crime threatens an implicit calculus that thus far has constrained realspace crime. Computers make it easier for criminals to evade the constraint of social norms(through pseudonymity and removal from the physical site of the crime ), legal sanctions ( the probability of getting caught may be reduced for similar reasons), and monetary cost(because the resource inputs necessary to cause a given unit of harm are much lower ). The standard Beckerian solution to this problem is to increase the legal sanction, but situating cybercrime within these other constraints reveals other solutions. These other strategies might be more effective because it may be difficult to increase the sanction enough to compensate for a very low probability of getting caught. Some examples of perpetration cost strategies have been given, so the point will be illustrated by architectural regulation. Government could redress the lowered constraints against crime by enacting regulations that would prevent pseudonymity by regulating the Internet Protocol and software manufacturers(thus increasing the power of social norms as a constraint on crime, as well as increasing the probability of getting caught ), by insisting upon mechanisms that ensure electronic tracing of computer signals to locate offenders(thus increasing the probability of getting caught), or by requiring IThe perverse incentive problem created by such regulation, as well as a fuller discussion of the role of monetary costs in deterrence is discussed infra Tan 96-?Criminal Law in Cyberspace Page 10 14The perverse incentive problem created by such regulation, as well as a fuller discussion of the role of monetary costs in deterrence, is discussed infra TAN 96-?. criminal wrongdoing in a way that conventional law enforcement would not.14 Civil forfeiture of computers and equipment, and postconviction use/training restrictions on computers can also increase perpetration costs and prevent recidivism. Criminal law scholars should incorporate monetary costs, just as they should recognize social norms and architecture, into their calculations about optimal deterrence. This multifaceted strategy of regulation is particularly important for crimes where offenders tend to be heterogenous. Put a different way, the emergence of computer crime threatens an implicit calculus that thus far has constrained realspace crime. Computers make it easier for criminals to evade the constraint of social norms (through pseudonymity and removal from the physical site of the crime), legal sanctions (the probability of getting caught may be reduced for similar reasons), and monetary cost (because the resource inputs necessary to cause a given unit of harm are much lower). The standard Beckerian solution to this problem is to increase the legal sanction, but situating cybercrime within these other constraints reveals other solutions. These other strategies might be more effective because it may be difficult to increase the sanction enough to compensate for a very low probability of getting caught. Some examples of perpetration cost strategies have been given, so the point will be illustrated by architectural regulation. Government could redress the lowered constraints against crime by enacting regulations that would prevent pseudonymity by regulating the Internet Protocol and software manufacturers (thus increasing the power of social norms as a constraint on crime, as well as increasing the probability of getting caught), by insisting upon mechanisms that ensure electronic tracing of computer signals to locate offenders (thus increasing the probability of getting caught), or by requiring