1322 Timothy Hildebrandt homosexual,whereas 30 said they would not.When asked a hypothetical question about a family member 'coming out'as gay,10 per cent said they would totally accept them,the same proportion that reported they would totally reject them, while the vast majority fell in the 'tolerate'but 'hope they change'camp.47 Asked about same-sex marriage,70 per cent of respondents were against it,whereas 30 per cent were for it.But on other human rights,respondents were far more supportive of LGBT citizens.Ninety per cent believed they should have equal employment rights and the vast majority (80 per cent)think they are 'equal humans'.These results have led Li to conclude that the situation for homosexual men and women in China is not as gloomy as some would assume.48 Because opposite-sex marriage holds little resonance within society,same-sex marriage might not be seen as a large cultural threat.Moreover,since it would affect so few people,this policy would be even less threatening.When groups are seen as attempting to change the lives of individuals rather than society at large, there is reason to expect less hostility toward them than those groups trying to affect much broader change.49A prominent gay leader reported that when gays and lesbians talk about human rights the government does not see it as sensitive because the population is perceived to be so small in China.so Moreover,the effect of this group mobilisation is not as intimidating to the government.It is for this reason that gay and lesbian organisations,and activists like Li Yinhe,can lobby for same-sex marriage openly with little or no government interference. 'The regime is too closed The brief comparison of Taiwan and Singapore above showed that cultural similarities do not alone explain a country's policies toward homosexuality Another obvious difference between the two countries might have more explana- tory power:regime type.Perhaps Singapore has a more discriminatory policy toward homosexuality because the state is authoritarian.s Taiwan,on the other hand,is a fledging democracy and therefore might be more open to broader 47 Attitudes among younger Chinese are arguably more progressive than the general public.Studies conducted in other Asian countries that share cultural traditions support this assumption:in a 2007 study of 300 junior-and high-school students in Vietnam,80 per cent of respondents said they did not believe homosexuality was 'bad':only two per cent reported that they viewed homosexuals with 'contempt'(HCMC University of Pedagogy). 48 The prevalence of 'tolerance'or 'ambivalence'toward homosexuals(and widespread acceptance of co-habitation)might be representative of a traditionally more fluid spectrum of socially acceptable behaviour (for example,see Brett Hinsch,Passions of the Cut Sleeve:The male homosexual tradition in China(Berkeley:University of California Press,(1992)or,contemporarily,more open attitudes on sexual behaviour.Both of these should be distinguished from homosexuality as a 'social identity which,excepting the small openly gay population in China,has not yet developed in China as it has in the West.This lack of a widely respected gay social identity might also help explain why there has been no large domestic push for same-sex marriage or other gay-related rights.At the same time, it should not serve as a significant barrier in the way of a government-led move toward such a policy.I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. Mayer N.Zald and Robert Ash.Social Movement Organizations:Growth.Decay and Change'. Social Forces,44:3 (1966),pp.327-41. s0 LGBT activist interview,Kunming,China (13 August 2007). si An additional explanation for this variation might be due to colonial legacies.Anti-gay legislations can be traced back to the period of colonisation of the city-state by the British;as explained inhomosexual, whereas 30 said they would not. When asked a hypothetical question about a family member ‘coming out’ as gay, 10 per cent said they would totally accept them, the same proportion that reported they would totally reject them, while the vast majority fell in the ‘tolerate’ but ‘hope they change’ camp.47 Asked about same-sex marriage, 70 per cent of respondents were against it, whereas 30 per cent were for it. But on other human rights, respondents were far more supportive of LGBT citizens. Ninety per cent believed they should have equal employment rights and the vast majority (80 per cent) think they are ‘equal humans’. These results have led Li to conclude that the situation for homosexual men and women in China is not as gloomy as some would assume.48 Because opposite-sex marriage holds little resonance within society, same-sex marriage might not be seen as a large cultural threat. Moreover, since it would affect so few people, this policy would be even less threatening. When groups are seen as attempting to change the lives of individuals rather than society at large, there is reason to expect less hostility toward them than those groups trying to affect much broader change.49 A prominent gay leader reported that when gays and lesbians talk about human rights the government does not see it as sensitive because the population is perceived to be so small in China.50 Moreover, the effect of this group mobilisation is not as intimidating to the government. It is for this reason that gay and lesbian organisations, and activists like Li Yinhe, can lobby for same-sex marriage openly with little or no government interference. ‘The regime is too closed’ The brief comparison of Taiwan and Singapore above showed that cultural similarities do not alone explain a country’s policies toward homosexuality. Another obvious difference between the two countries might have more explana￾tory power: regime type. Perhaps Singapore has a more discriminatory policy toward homosexuality because the state is authoritarian.51 Taiwan, on the other hand, is a fledging democracy and therefore might be more open to broader 47 Attitudes among younger Chinese are arguably more progressive than the general public. Studies conducted in other Asian countries that share cultural traditions support this assumption: in a 2007 study of 300 junior- and high-school students in Vietnam, 80 per cent of respondents said they did not believe homosexuality was ‘bad’; only two per cent reported that they viewed homosexuals with ‘contempt’ (HCMC University of Pedagogy). 48 The prevalence of ‘tolerance’ or ‘ambivalence’ toward homosexuals (and widespread acceptance of co-habitation) might be representative of a traditionally more fluid spectrum of socially acceptable behaviour (for example, see Brett Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve: The male homosexual tradition in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, (1992) or, contemporarily, more open attitudes on sexual behaviour. Both of these should be distinguished from homosexuality as a ‘social identity’ which, excepting the small openly gay population in China, has not yet developed in China as it has in the West. This lack of a widely respected gay social identity might also help explain why there has been no large domestic push for same-sex marriage or other gay-related rights. At the same time, it should not serve as a significant barrier in the way of a government-led move toward such a policy. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 49 Mayer N. Zald and Robert Ash, ‘Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change’, Social Forces, 44:3 (1966), pp. 327–41. 50 LGBT activist interview, Kunming, China (13 August 2007). 51 An additional explanation for this variation might be due to colonial legacies. Anti-gay legislations can be traced back to the period of colonisation of the city-state by the British; as explained in 1322 Timothy Hildebrandt