watching developments in the dispute. A September 1999 article in the Prague Post cited an American investment banker as saying that he would definitely take the TV Nova affair into consideration when and expertise and then let the locals strip us without recourse. l1 ot expect the U.s. to provide capital contemplating ng in the Czech Republic: " A country should The relationship between the private and public can also imply a more radical function, the very redefinition of the nature of the sovereign. From a perspective of the market for loyalties the line might be drawn between privatising in a way that can question the regime and stations that can question the state itself. Imbedded in some programming, and often quite threateningly so, is a question of whether borders ought to be altered and how power is to be redistributed. Noted cases involve Kurdish voices in Turkey and nationalist Bosnian Serb broadcasts in Republika Srpska. News may be maintained as a monopoly of the state broadcaster, as was the proposed case in India. It is one thing for non-state voices to favor a redistribution of power in a secure society, as from Westminster to Wales or Edinburgh. It is different when a state that is insecure about its boundaries or is facing conflict over them seeks to restrict the power of those not within its direct control. The tension is raised again when the state takes the position that the non-state voices are not only threats to the regime, but also proponents of views inconsistent with the very idea of the state. Independent or non-state voices in Central and Eastern Europe have not yet been perceived as having effective divisive or separatist roles, though undoubtedly, some may have editorial views that have a definition of the state and its role in coalitions different from that of the government Another aspect of privatization, one of the most complex and most important in its relationship to vereignty, is the extent to which, consciously or not, programming on new entrants weakens cultural bonds. There are contexts where sovereignty depends on habits of culture and attitudes, and on the centrality of religion and the preservation of language. State or publicly-controlled broadcasters are caretakers of these values. At their best and most expansive, these institutions are generating programming, making films, supporting orchestras, reinforcing language and setting a benchmark for news and public affairs. These practices can be undermined by long-term exposure to commercial programming and the inevitable erosion of audiences characteristic of global multichannel competition We may be asking this question: Is there something about advancing the privatization of the media that accelerates a phenomenon of cultural attrition of a sort that diminishes citizenship and loyalty? Of course, such programming could and does take place on state or public entities as well, but it is generally assumed that the incursion of private media, to the extent it exists, is most responsible for a corrosive effect. Left in a monopolistic, unchallenged environment, the public or state broadcaster would not reduce its output of state-reinforcing messages. And here, " state-reinforcing" is not a reference to control of news and information that supports the regime. It is a reference, rather, to a mix of imagery that a democratic state might legitimately wish to deploy as an element of strengthening national identity A variant on this complaint, one that demonstrates its censorial side arises in the critique of the private and the global in parts of the Middle East. There, television content represents modern culture and the dangers of exposure to private or uncontrolled media to ancient customs and the very bases, often, of the polity. Laws concerning"representation of women, which outlaw satellite-receive dishes and efforts to maintain an insular information space in other ways, are hallmarks of this view. But the antimodern is not restricted to the mullahs of iraq and Iran. In the United States, it is reflected in debates over indecency and violence on American television. The dangers of the "modern, "as depicted in the forceful images of broadcasting, was the major unstated argument delaying the introduction of television, and then color television, in South Africa. This cultural component is the justification for monopoly control over television imagery in Malaysia and Singapore This question of cultural bonds and loyalty is central to the definition of a civil society and the nature of a particular public sphere. But the acceleration of the private may not alone be responsible for the embrace of the modern. Competition by the public service broadcaster for public funds or increased licensing fees by changing the nature of the monopolists programming is possible, but there are not so many examples of this behavior. Competition between the Russian first and second television channels for example, did not necessarily create demand for Western programming To examine this question more closely, it is necessary to separate the privatization of entertainment programming"from the privatization of news and public information. Most of the public discussion of challenges to sovereignty, or at least to regime-stability, deals with the privatization of the news and information space, or the creation of competition in the arena of news and information. News and public affairs are asserted as the hallmarks of a democracy-spreading global medium. But in termswatching developments in the dispute.” A September 1999 article in the Prague Post cited an American investment banker as saying that he would definitely take the TV Nova affair into consideration when contemplating investing in the Czech Republic: “A country should not expect the U.S. to provide capital and expertise and then let the locals strip us without recourse.”11 The relationship between the private and public can also imply a more radical function, the very redefinition of the nature of the sovereign. From a perspective of the market for loyalties the line might be drawn between privatising in a way that can question the regime and stations that can question the state itself. Imbedded in some programming, and often quite threateningly so, is a question of whether borders ought to be altered and how power is to be redistributed. Noted cases involve Kurdish voices in Turkey and nationalist Bosnian Serb broadcasts in Republika Srpska. News may be maintained as a monopoly of the state broadcaster, as was the proposed case in India. It is one thing for non-state voices to favor a redistribution of power in a secure society, as from Westminster to Wales or Edinburgh. It is different when a state that is insecure about its boundaries or is facing conflict over them seeks to restrict the power of those not within its direct control. The tension is raised again when the state takes the position that the non-state voices are not only threats to the regime, but also proponents of views inconsistent with the very idea of the state. Independent or non-state voices in Central and Eastern Europe have not yet been perceived as having effective divisive or separatist roles, though, undoubtedly, some may have editorial views that have a definition of the state and its role in coalitions different from that of the government. Another aspect of privatization, one of the most complex and most important in its relationship to sovereignty, is the extent to which, consciously or not, programming on new entrants weakens cultural bonds. There are contexts where sovereignty depends on habits of culture and attitudes, and on the centrality of religion and the preservation of language. State or publicly-controlled broadcasters are caretakers of these values. At their best and most expansive, these institutions are generating programming, making films, supporting orchestras, reinforcing language and setting a benchmark for news and public affairs. These practices can be undermined by long-term exposure to commercial programming and the inevitable erosion of audiences characteristic of global multichannel competition. We may be asking this question: Is there something about advancing the privatization of the media that accelerates a phenomenon of cultural attrition of a sort that diminishes citizenship and loyalty? Of course, such programming could and does take place on state or public entities as well, but it is generally assumed that the incursion of private media, to the extent it exists, is most responsible for a corrosive effect. Left in a monopolistic, unchallenged environment, the public or state broadcaster would not reduce its output of state-reinforcing messages. And here, “state-reinforcing” is not a reference to control of news and information that supports the regime. It is a reference, rather, to a mix of imagery that a democratic state might legitimately wish to deploy as an element of strengthening national identity. A variant on this complaint, one that demonstrates its censorial side, arises in the critique of the private and the global in parts of the Middle East. There, television content represents modern culture and the dangers of exposure to private or uncontrolled media to ancient customs and the very bases, often, of the polity. Laws concerning “representation of women,” which outlaw satellite-receive dishes and efforts to maintain an insular information space in other ways, are hallmarks of this view. But the antimodern is not restricted to the mullahs of Iraq and Iran. In the United States, it is reflected in debates over indecency and violence on American television.12 The dangers of the “modern,” as depicted in the forceful images of broadcasting, was the major unstated argument delaying the introduction of television, and then color television, in South Africa. This cultural component is the justification for monopoly control over television imagery in Malaysia and Singapore. This question of cultural bonds and loyalty is central to the definition of a civil society and the nature of a particular public sphere. But the acceleration of the private may not alone be responsible for the embrace of the modern. Competition by the public service broadcaster for public funds or increased licensing fees by changing the nature of the monopolist’s programming is possible, but there are not so many examples of this behavior. Competition between the Russian first and second television channels, for example, did not necessarily create demand for Western programming. To examine this question more closely, it is necessary to separate the privatization of “entertainment programming” from the privatization of news and public information. Most of the public discussion of challenges to sovereignty, or at least to regime-stability, deals with the privatization of the news and information space, or the creation of competition in the arena of news and information. News and public affairs are asserted as the hallmarks of a democracy-spreading global medium. But in terms