English Institutional Evolution 811 economic activity that was profitable and whose participants were not part of the king's constituency.This led to a systematic search for and expropriation of quasi-rents in the economy.Moreover,as we will see in the next section,the Crown utilized a different system for enforcing these grants than that used for the older mercantilist controls,and one that was considerably more responsive to the Crown's interests.The system involved circumventing existing rights and the institutions designed to protect these rights. Grants of monopoly clearly disrupted both existing economic inter- ests in the targeted activity and those who depended on it(for example, suppliers and consumers).Monopoly grants thus acted as a tax that, since it expropriated the value of existing investment as well as future profits,was considerably greater at the margin than a 100 percent tax on profits.This risk lowered the rewards from all such new investments and hence discouraged their undertaking. Beyond grants of monopoly,James,and especially Charles,used a variety of other,more subtle forms of expropriation of wealth.Because so many dimensions of public policy were involved,the political risk to citizens increased substantially over previous times.One important example was expansion of the peerage by the Crown,again in exchange for revenue.5 While this expansion had broad social,cultural,and ideological implications,it also had significantly negative effects on existing peers.Expansion of the size of the House of Lords altered the value of an existing seat since it limited the ability of existing lords to protect themselves against the Crown.16 Between the coronation of James I and the outbreak of the Civil War,the Stuarts'sale of peerages doubled the number of lay peers. Governmental power was used in other ways to raise revenue. Employing the ancient power of purveyance,agents of the Crown seized various goods for"public purposes,"paying prices well below market.Purveyance brought in an annual "'unvoted''tax of f40,000 in the 1620s.17 James also put hereditary titles up for sale:for example, offering to sell the title of baronet for f1,095 and promising that only a fixed number would be sold.This brought in f90,000 by 1614.But James soon reneged on this,lowering the price and selling more than the promised number.By 1622 the price had fallen to f220.18 Through the 15 F.W.Maitland,Constitutional History ofEngland(Cambridge,1908):Wallace Notestein,The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons (London,1924);and Stone,Crisis of the Aristocracy. 16 There were two separate reasons for this:the total number of voters was increasing,and the expansion added new members whose views systematically differed from those of existing nobles. The exchange that brought new nobles to the Lords undoubtedly entailed a commitment of support for the king. 17 Hirst,Authority and Conflict,p.103;and C.Hill,Century of Revolution,1603-1714 (2nd edn., New York,1980),chap 4.See also John Kenyon,Stuart England(2nd edn.,New York,1985). 18 Hirst,Authority and Confict,pp.113-14.English Institutional Evolution 811 economic activity that was profitable and whose participants were not part of the king's constituency. This led to a systematic search for and expropriation of quasi-rents in the economy. Moreover, as we will see in the next section, the Crown utilized a different system for enforcing these grants than that used for the older mercantilist controls, and one that was considerably more responsive to the Crown's interests. The system involved circumventing existing rights and the institutions designed to protect these rights. Grants of monopoly clearly disrupted both existing economic inter￾ests in the targeted activity and those who depended on it (for example, suppliers and consumers). Monopoly grants thus acted as a tax that, since it expropriated the value of existing investment as well as future profits, was considerably greater at the margin than a 100 percent tax on profits. This risk lowered the rewards from all such new investments and hence discouraged their undertaking. Beyond grants of monopoly, James, and especially Charles, used a variety of other, more subtle forms of expropriation of wealth. Because so many dimensions of public policy were involved, the political risk to citizens increased substantially over previous times. One important example was expansion of the peerage by the Crown, again in exchange for revenue.15 While this expansion had broad social, cultural, and ideological implications, it also had significantly negative effects on existing peers. Expansion of the size of the House of Lords altered the value of an existing seat since it limited the ability of existing lords to protect themselves against the Crown.16 Between the coronation of James I and the outbreak of the Civil War, the Stuarts' sale of peerages doubled the number of lay peers. Governmental power was used in other ways to raise revenue. Employing the ancient power of purveyance, agents of the Crown seized various goods for "public purposes," paying prices well below market. Purveyance brought in an annual "unvoted" tax of £40,000 in the 1620s.17 James also put hereditary titles up for sale: for example, offering to sell the title of baronet for £1,095 and promising that only a fixed number would be sold. This brought in 290,000 by 1614. But James soon reneged on this, lowering the price and selling more than the promised number. By 1622 the price had fallen to 2220. l8 Through the l5 F. W. Maitland, Constitutional History of England (Cambridge, 1908); Wallace Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons (London, 1924); and Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy. l6 There were two separate reasons for this: the total number of voters was increasing, and the expansion added new members whose views systematically differed from those of existing nobles. The exchange that brought new nobles to the Lords undoubtedly entailed a commitment of support for the king. I' Hirst, Authority and Conflict, p. 103; and C. Hill, Century ofRevolution, 1603-1714 (2nd edn., New York, 1980), chap 4. See also John Kenyon, Stuart England (2nd edn., New York, 1985). l8 Hirst, Authority and Conflict, pp. 113-14