feeling not on evidence How might we turn this into an argument against Clifford? Consider the idea of a self-defeating claim. It is best captured by examples: Never say"never". No one can construct a grammatical English sentence. I don't exist. [Written: ]I am illiterate. One's claim is self-defeating if something in the act of making the claim contradicts the message being put forward. Try 2)Evidentialism forbids beliefs not based on evidence ence 1)Clifford's belief in evidentialism is based not on evidence but on passion 3)Therefore, Evidentialism forbids Cliffords belief in evidentialism This doesn't show Evidentialism is wrong, just that Clifford is inconsistent. Maybe it is true, but lacking evidence, he shouldn't believe it) Can we develop this into an argument that evidentialism is wrong? One could use the self-defeat argument if one could show that any commitment(not just Cliffords)to evidentialism must be based in passion, i. e, that any absolute commitment to the commandment avoid error;, would have to be passional. But this isn't promising 5. Other arguments for Pragmatism? Remember, James not saying that we can believe anything we like. There are special contexts where passion is permitted Examples: friendship, love, faith The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truthis existence.. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which would say that faith running ahead of evidence is Wrong].(131) Consider religious faith One who would shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the gods acquaintance (132) St Augustine How can you believe if you don ' t know? Answer: I believe in order that I may know truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule. (1-x me from acknowledging certain kinds of Possible Pragmatist principle: "A rule of thinking which would absolutely prever So, (1) By following evidentialism, we are completely shut off from certain kinds of truth (2)A rule which completely shuts us off from certain kinds of truth is wrong ()So evidentialism is wrong.(1, 2) Is(2), our"possible pragmatist principle", plausible? Problem: We should accept rules that shut us off from some kinds of ruths--e.g, we should accept rules that shut us off from beliefs about exactly how many dinosaurs there were. We want to limit belief in cases where evidence is not forthcoming or where only guesswork is possible; So(2)seems like it too strong. Yet, we wouldn 't want a rule that blocked us from all belief about the past, or about distant places, or about otherfeeling, not on evidence. How might we turn this into an argument against Clifford? Consider the idea of a self-defeating claim. It is best captured by examples: Never say "never". No one can construct a grammatical English sentence. I don't exist. [Written:] I am illiterate. One's claim is self-defeating if something in the act of making the claim contradicts the message being put forward. Try: 1) Clifford's belief in evidentialism is based not on evidence but on passion. 2) Evidentialism forbids beliefs not based on evidence. 3) Therefore, Evidentialism forbids Clifford's belief in evidentialism. This doesn't show Evidentialism is wrong, just that Clifford is inconsistent. (Maybe it is true, but lacking evidence, he shouldn't believe it.) Can we develop this into an argument that evidentialism is wrong? One could use the self-defeat argument if one could show that any commitment (not just Clifford's) to evidentialism must be based in passion, i.e., that any absolute commitment to the commandment avoid error, would have to be passional. But this isn't promising. 5. Other arguments for Pragmatism? Remember, James not saying that we can believe anything we like. There are special contexts where passion is permitted. Examples: friendship, love, faith. The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truthís existence...And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which would say that faith running ahead of evidence is [wrong]. (131) Consider religious faith: One who would shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the godsí acquaintance. (132) St. Augustine: How can you believe if you don't know? Answer: I believe in order that I may know. Possible Pragmatist principle: "A rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule." (132) So, (1) By following evidentialism, we are completely shut off from certain kinds of truth. (2) A rule which completely shuts us off from certain kinds of truth is wrong. (3) So evidentialism is wrong. (1,2) Is (2), our "possible pragmatist principle", plausible? Problem: We should accept rules that shut us off from some kinds of truths--e.g., we should accept rules that shut us off from beliefs about exactly how many dinosaurs there were. We want to limit belief in cases where evidence is not forthcoming or where only guesswork is possible; So (2) seems like it too strong. Yet, we wouldn't want a rule that blocked us from all belief about the past, or about distant places, or about other