414 WORLD POLITICS Operating as they do in a world of interdependence and uncertainty, they must focus on promoting their brand name and assuring the mar- ket share for their product. But are the dollar,yen,and euro like Boeing,Coke,and Kodak?In at least one crucial way,the answer is no.It is not the obvious difference between public and private that undermines the analogy but rather the difference between the real and monetary sides of the economy.Boe- ing,for example,has orders and contracts that will take years to fulfill. It also has physical plants and equipment,technical know-how,and a small number of identifiable competitors.Entry and exit for producers and consumers in the aerospace industry,while certainly possible,is a relatively slow process.Thus,if Boeing has a bad quarter or even a few bad quarters,it may lose some of its market share.But it will lose only so much.There will be no "flight from Boeing"(as it were),even if it faced a great crisis,as might occur if one of its planes were found to have a design flaw. But currencies are different.Ultimately,they are worth,well,what people think they are worth.And if confidence wavers,people can get rid of that asset and almost immediately acquire any of dozens of alter- native assets.Further,those very actions may be self-fulfillingcreating expectations of further flight and a "rational"erosion of confidence. Cohen himself is quite explicit about the ephemeral nature of a cur- rency's attractiveness(p.97,and also pp.10-13)-it is attractive as long as it conforms to those policies that the market finds attractive.As Cohen notes,reputation,which comes at"considerable cost and effort," is crucial (p.141). But this raises a fundamental point.While the international use of currency may look like an oligopoly(concentrated use in a few brands), this does not mean that the producers enjoy oligopolistic power.What distinguishes oligopolists from other actors in a market economy is that they are not mere"price takers."Rather,they can affect the market and the price for their good-in a much more limited fashion than monop- olists,to be sure,but still to an extent that distinguishes them sharply from the textbook firm.But in currency affairs exit is so easy and the extent to which states are adhering to market preferences is so trans- parent that issuing states in fact may have very little leeway to act as oli- gopolists. Cohen's own arguments make this clear.Efforts to protect a cur- rency's reputation will be successful if they "make significant conces- sions to market sentiment"(p.122).This is true even for states at the very top of the currency pyramid.Cohen had argued that such statesOperating as they do in a world of interdependence and uncertainty, they must focus on promoting their brand name and assuring the mar￾ket share for their product. But are the dollar, yen, and euro like Boeing, Coke, and Kodak? In at least one crucial way, the answer is no. It is not the obvious difference between public and private that undermines the analogy but rather the difference between the real and monetary sides of the economy. Boe￾ing, for example, has orders and contracts that will take years to fulfill. It also has physical plants and equipment, technical know-how, and a small number of identifiable competitors. Entry and exit for producers and consumers in the aerospace industry, while certainly possible, is a relatively slow process. Thus, if Boeing has a bad quarter or even a few bad quarters, it may lose some of its market share. But it will lose only so much. There will be no “flight from Boeing” (as it were), even if it faced a great crisis, as might occur if one of its planes were found to have a design flaw. But currencies are different. Ultimately, they are worth, well, what people think they are worth. And if confidence wavers, people can get rid of that asset and almost immediately acquire any of dozens of alter￾native assets. Further, those very actions may be self-fulfilling—creating expectations of further flight and a “rational” erosion of confidence. Cohen himself is quite explicit about the ephemeral nature of a cur￾rency’s attractiveness (p. 97, and also pp. 10–13)—it is attractive as long as it conforms to those policies that the market finds attractive. As Cohen notes, reputation, which comes at “considerable cost and effort,” is crucial (p. 141). But this raises a fundamental point. While the international use of currency may look like an oligopoly (concentrated use in a few brands), this does not mean that the producers enjoy oligopolistic power. What distinguishes oligopolists from other actors in a market economy is that they are not mere “price takers.” Rather, they can affect the market and the price for their good—in a much more limited fashion than monop￾olists, to be sure, but still to an extent that distinguishes them sharply from the textbook firm. But in currency affairs exit is so easy and the extent to which states are adhering to market preferences is so trans￾parent that issuing states in fact may have very little leeway to act as oli￾gopolists. Cohen’s own arguments make this clear. Efforts to protect a cur￾rency’s reputation will be successful if they “make significant conces￾sions to market sentiment” (p. 122). This is true even for states at the very top of the currency pyramid. Cohen had argued that such states 414 WORLD POLITICS