Not surprisingly, other web 2.0 success stories demonstrate playedthe platformcard, trumpingeven themost dominant applications this same behavior. eBay enables occasional transactions of windows allowed Microsoft to displace Lotus 1-2-3 with Excel only a few dollars between single individuals, acting as an wordPerfect with Word, and Netscape Navigator with Internet Explorer. automated intermediary Napster(though shut down for legal reasons) built its network not by building a centralized This time, though, the clash isnt between a platform and an application, song database, but by architecting a system in such a way but between two platforms, each with a radically different business that every downloader also became a server, and thus grew model: On the one side, a single software provider, whose massive the network installed base and tightly integrated operating system and APIs give contro over the programming paradigm; on the other, asystem without Akamai ys, Bittorrent an owner, tied together by a set of protocols, open standards and agreements for cooperation. Like Double Click, Akamai is optimized to do business with the head, not the tail, with the center, not the edges. While it Windows represents thepinnacle oft proprietary control via software APIs serves the benefit of the individuals at the edge of the web by Netscapetried towrestcontrol fram Mirosot using the same techniques smoothing their access to the high-demand sites at the that Mcrosoft itself had used against cher rival, and talled Bu Apache, center, it collects its revenue from those central sites which held tothe open standards of the weh has prospered. The battle s longer unequal, a platform versus a single application, but platform BitTorrent, like other pioneers in the P2P movement takes a versus platform, with the question being which platform, and more radical approach to internet decentralization. Every client is profoundly, which architecture, and which business model, is better also a server, files are broken up into fragments that can be suited to the opportunity ahead. served from multiple locations, transparently harnessing the network of downloaders to provide both bandwidth and data windows was a brilliant solution to the problems of the early PCeraIt to other users. The more popular the file, in fact, the faster it leveled the playing feld for application developers, salving a host of can be served, as there are more users providing bandwidth problems that had previously bedeviled the industry. But a single and fragments of the complete file monolithic approach, controlled by a single vendor, is no longer a solution, it's a problem. Communications-oriented systems, as the BitTorrent thus demonstrates a key Web 2.0 principle: the internet-as-platform most certainly is, require interoperability. Unlessa service automatically gets better the more people use it. vendor cancontrol bothends of every interaction, While Akamai must add servers to improve service, every lock-in via software APIs are limited BitTorrent consumer brings his own resources to the party There's an implicit "architecture of participation, a built-in Any Web 2. 0 vendor that seeks to lock in its application gains by ethic of cooperation, in which the service acts primarily as an controlling the platform will, by definition, no longer be playing to the intelligent broker, connecting the edges to each other and strengths of the platform ng the power of the users themselves. This is not to say that there are not opportunities for lock-in and 2. Harnessing Collective competitive advantage, but we believe they are not to be found via control oversoftwae API and protocols. There is a new gameafoot. The Intelligence companies that succeed in the Web 2. era wll be thasethat understan therules of that game, rather than trying togo backto the rules of the PC software era The central principle behind the success of the giants born in the Web 1.0 era who have survived to lead the Web 2.0 era appears to be this, that they have embraced the ower of the web to harness collective intelligenceNot surprisingly, other web 2.0 success stories demonstrate this same behavior. eBay enables occasional transactions of only a few dollars between single individuals, acting as an automated intermediary. Napster (though shut down for legal reasons) built its network not by building a centralized song database, but by architecting a system in such a way that every downloader also became a server, and thus grew the network. Akamai vs. BitTorrent Like DoubleClick, Akamai is optimized to do business with the head, not the tail, with the center, not the edges. While it serves the benefit of the individuals at the edge of the web by smoothing their access to the high-demand sites at the center, it collects its revenue from those central sites. BitTorrent, like other pioneers in the P2P movement, takes a radical approach to internet decentralization. Every client is also a server; files are broken up into fragments that can be served from multiple locations, transparently harnessing the network of downloaders to provide both bandwidth and data to other users. The more popular the file, in fact, the faster it can be served, as there are more users providing bandwidth and fragments of the complete file. BitTorrent thus demonstrates a key Web 2.0 principle: the service automatically gets better the more people use it. While Akamai must add servers to improve service, every BitTorrent consumer brings his own resources to the party. There's an implicit "architecture of participation", a built-in ethic of cooperation, in which the service acts primarily as an intelligent broker, connecting the edges to each other and harnessing the power of the users themselves. 2. Harnessing Collective Intelligence The central principle behind the success of the giants born in the Web 1.0 era who have survived to lead the Web 2.0 era appears to be this, that they have embraced the power of the web to harness collective intelligence: played the platform card, trumping even the most dominant applications. Windows allowed Microsoft to displace Lotus 1-2-3 with Excel, WordPerfect with Word, and Netscape Navigator with Internet Explorer. This time, though, the clash isn't between a platform and an application, but between two platforms, each with a radically different business model: On the one side, a single software provider, whose massive installed base and tightly integrated operating system and APIs give control over the programming paradigm; on the other, a system without an owner, tied together by a set of protocols, open standards and agreements for cooperation. Windows represents the pinnacle of proprietary control via software APIs. Netscape tried to wrest control from Microsoft using the same techniques that Microsoft itself had used against other rivals, and failed. But Apache, which held to the open standards of the web, has prospered. The battle is no longer unequal, a platform versus a single application, but platform versus platform, with the question being which platform, and more profoundly, which architecture, and which business model, is better suited to the opportunity ahead. Windows was a brilliant solution to the problems of the early PC era. It leveled the playing field for application developers, solving a host of problems that had previously bedeviled the industry. But a single monolithic approach, controlled by a single vendor, is no longer a solution, it's a problem. Communications-oriented systems, as the internet-as-platform most certainly is, require interoperability. Unless a vendor can control both ends of every interaction, the possibilities of user lock-in via software APIs are limited. Any Web 2.0 vendor that seeks to lock in its application gains by controlling the platform will, by definition, no longer be playing to the strengths of the platform. This is not to say that there are not opportunities for lock-in and competitive advantage, but we believe they are not to be found via control over software APIs and protocols. There is a new game afoot. The companies that succeed in the Web 2.0 era will be those that understand the rules of that game, rather than trying to go back to the rules of the PC software era