434 JACOBSON.MORTENSEN.AND CIALDINI egulation (i.e.,reduction in "will es the effective ndicating a high d f social in Cialdini et al. with the propose toward intraper ng) al effects of n duct and from functi ations of the aturalistic s,large body of fied-basedre h ha o m The Focus Theory of Normative Conduc f-regulatory (as well as bch vioral) ed the first typ nation the om research anc and the the injuncti vidence for f-reguionin other forms of Effortful Self-Regulation ularly relev Within the past o cades,a has nersonal goal of beha (see Bau neister Vohs,2004) 1998).The dich tion (1.e pprov blefordicer and a variety en ology of fo nflu ce also applie s to socia ms and nces u and predict thei he second pro on of focus theory that desc nts),these have e tha scular strength has tode cribe the nature of thi ted b nat:m sage fram purpose to that can b Ad ive nomms are often simulta alable given behav For example despite et al..2007).This provides evidence that the notion of effortfu er t (as element of the self's role in controlling behavior. ing both on the particular behavior and the Self-Regulation in Persuasion and Compliance penen que effec individuals'resp ses to persuasive me pliance techniques.Consistently,this research has supported the In the present research, we advance such understanding by demonstrating that an impaired capacity for effortful self￾regulation (i.e., reduction in “willpower”) increases the effective￾ness of social influence attempts that highlight descriptive norms but decreases the effectiveness of attempts that highlight injunc￾tive norms. Additionally, and consistent with the proposed con￾ceptual rationale for this distinction, we also demonstrate differ￾ences (a) in the norms’ effects on the cognitive accessibility of goal-related concepts, (b) on attention directed toward intraper￾sonal versus interpersonal aspects of self, and (c) on the experience of conflict over decisions to follow or disregard the norm. Our theoretical argument for these differences, discussed subsequently, is derived both from implications of the focus theory of normative conduct and from functional considerations of the roles of effortful self-regulation and normative influence in social life. The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct An initial observation underlying focus theory was that the general term norm, both in common and scientific usage, has often been used to refer to two different types of social information (Schaffer, 1983). Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1991, 1990) labeled the first type of information the descriptive norm, which refers to the perceived prevalence or typicality of a given behavior, and the second type the injunctive norm, which refers to the perceived degree of social approval/disapproval for the behav￾ior. According to the first of two main propositions of the theory, distinguishing between these two types of information is crucial because each is highly relevant for a different fundamental human goal. Whereas the descriptive norm provides information that is particularly relevant for the intrapersonal goal of behaving effec￾tively or accurately (i.e., choosing correctly), the injunctive norm is particularly relevant for the interpersonal goal of building and maintaining social relationships (i.e., social approval; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). The distinction between these two goals as uniquely responsible for different forms of social influence has a relatively long tradition in social psychology (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). A key insight of focus theory is that this general principle of goal-directed influence also applies to social norms and can en￾hance the ability of researchers to understand and predict their effects on behavior. The second proposition of focus theory is that descriptive or injunctive norms will affect an individual’s behavior only to the extent that each form of information is currently salient—a state that can be affected by both situational (e.g., message framing) and dispositional factors (e.g., strong personal endorsement of a par￾ticular norm). This addresses a key challenge for understanding the unique effects of these two types of normative information—the fact that both descriptive and injunctive norms are often simulta￾neously available for any given behavior. For example, despite general social disapproval for littering, the descriptive evidence in a given setting can indicate that this behavior is actually quite common. Furthermore, these norms can either be incongruent (as in the prior example) or congruent (e.g., littering disapproved and uncommon)— depending both on the particular behavior and the particular context in question. Despite this complexity, it remains possible to examine the unique effects of each norm type because these are determined by the norm’s subjective salience rather than by its objective avail￾ability in the situation. As an illustration, in an experiment con￾ducted in a heavily littered parking garage (i.e., descriptive norm indicating a high prevalence of littering), Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1990, Study 4) demonstrated that the presence of a competing injunctive norm against littering (e.g., the litter was swept into large piles) tended to reduce littering behavior— but only when that norm was made salient by the presence of a confederate littering directly in front of the swept litter piles. Thus, in some situations, procedures that selectively heighten the sa￾lience of a descriptive or an injunctive norm can lead to distinctly different behavioral responses (i.e., increased vs. decreased litter￾ing). Focusing primarily on the behavioral effects of norm salience in naturalistic environments, a large body of field-based research has supported these two main propositions of the theory (see Cialdini, in press, for a review). However, implications of the theory for differences in the intervening psychological responses to the two norm types have remained largely unexplored. The present inves￾tigation targets this gap—testing predicted differences in the cog￾nitive, affective, and self-regulatory (as well as behavioral) re￾sponses to descriptive and injunctive social norms in lab-based and naturalistic environments. In addition to the implications of the focus theory, our predictions were derived from research and theory focused on self-regulation as an effortful capacity, prior evidence for self-regulation in other forms of social influence and persuasion, and from functional considerations of the roles of the two types of normative information in social life. Effortful Self-Regulation Within the past two decades, a sizable literature has focused on the manner in which the self exerts control over inner states and overt behaviors (see Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). Evidence sug￾gests that effortful self-regulation is involved in (among other processes and behaviors) impulse restraint, decision making, emo￾tion regulation, thought suppression, and a variety of different kinds of physical and mental task performances (Baumeister, Brat￾slavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky, & Spinrad, 2004; Vohs et al., 2008). Despite clear differences in the processes/behaviors involving effortful self-regulation (e.g., dif￾ferences in cognitive requirements, role of affect, physical require￾ments), these have been shown to rely on a general resource that is limited but renewable (Baumeister et al., 1998). A metaphor of muscular strength has often been used to describe the nature of this self-regulatory capacity—as a general purpose tool that can be temporarily “fatigued” and then regenerated through inactivity or “rest” (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004). Additionally, the consumption of glucose has been shown to attenuate the depleting effects of self-regulatory tasks (Gailliot et al., 2007). This provides evidence that the notion of effortful self-regulation as akin to strength has a tangible, physiological basis—as well as having illustrative value in describing a key element of the self’s role in controlling behavior. Self-Regulation in Persuasion and Compliance Effortful self-regulation has also been shown to play a role in individuals’ responses to persuasive messages and specific com￾pliance techniques. Consistently, this research has supported the 434 JACOBSON, MORTENSEN, AND CIALDINI This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly