In 2017, the flagship research conferences of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve-held in Sintra, Portugal, and Jackson Hole, Wyoming, respectively--had something in common: Both had official themes unrelated to monetary policy, or even central banking. The ECB conference(theme: Investment and Growth in Advanced Economies)did include an opening speech by President Mario Draghi on monetary policy and the outlook, before turning to issues like the prospective effects of technological advances on employment. However, the Fed's meeting(theme: Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy), which included papers on topics ranging from fiscal policy to trade to income distribution, made almost no mention of monetary policy. Whether intended or not, the signal, I think, was clear. After ten years of concerted effort first to restore financial stability then to achieve economic recovery through dramatic monetary interventions, central bankers in Europe and the United States believe that they see the ight at the end of the tunnel. They are looking forward to an era of relative financial and economic stability in which the pressing economic issues will relate to growth, globalization, and distribution--issues that are the responsibility of other policymakers and not primarily the province of central bankers Would that it were so simple. Although central bankers can certainly hope that the next ten years will be less dramatic and demanding than the past ten, there will certainly be important new challenges to be met. In this note, I focus selectively on two such challenges: the implications of the secular decline in nominal interest rates for the tools and framework of monetary policy, and the status of central banks within the government, in particular, the questions of whether central banks should and will retain their current independence in making monetary policy. As I will explain, the two challenges are related, in that the low-inflation, low- interest-rate environment in which we now live calls into question some of the traditional rationales for central bank independence The long-term decline in nominal interest rates is well known and has been extensively studied (Rachel et al., 2015). The decline appears to be the product of many causes, including lower inflation rates; aging populations in advanced economies( Gagnon et al., 2016a); slower productivity growth and"secular stagnation"( Summers, 2015); global patterns of saving and investment(Bernanke, 2005); and increased demand for"safe "assets(Del Negro et al., 201 Caballero et al., 2017). Some of these factors may reverse in the medium term--for example1 In 2017, the flagship research conferences of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve—held in Sintra, Portugal, and Jackson Hole, Wyoming, respectively—had something in common: Both had official themes unrelated to monetary policy, or even central banking. The ECB conference (theme: Investment and Growth in Advanced Economies) did include an opening speech by President Mario Draghi on monetary policy and the outlook, before turning to issues like the prospective effects of technological advances on employment. However, the Fed’s meeting (theme: Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy), which included papers on topics ranging from fiscal policy to trade to income distribution, made almost no mention of monetary policy. Whether intended or not, the signal, I think, was clear. After ten years of concerted effort first to restore financial stability, then to achieve economic recovery through dramatic monetary interventions, central bankers in Europe and the United States believe that they see the light at the end of the tunnel. They are looking forward to an era of relative financial and economic stability in which the pressing economic issues will relate to growth, globalization, and distribution—issues that are the responsibility of other policymakers and not primarily the province of central bankers. Would that it were so simple. Although central bankers can certainly hope that the next ten years will be less dramatic and demanding than the past ten, there will certainly be important new challenges to be met. In this note, I focus selectively on two such challenges: the implications of the secular decline in nominal interest rates for the tools and framework of monetary policy; and the status of central banks within the government, in particular, the questions of whether central banks should and will retain their current independence in making monetary policy. As I will explain, the two challenges are related, in that the low-inflation, low￾interest-rate environment in which we now live calls into question some of the traditional rationales for central bank independence. The long-term decline in nominal interest rates is well known and has been extensively studied (Rachel et al., 2015). The decline appears to be the product of many causes, including lower inflation rates; aging populations in advanced economies (Gagnon et al., 2016a); slower productivity growth and “secular stagnation” (Summers, 2015); global patterns of saving and investment (Bernanke, 2005); and increased demand for “safe” assets (Del Negro et al., 2017; Caballero et al., 2017). Some of these factors may reverse in the medium term—for example