various claimants. This tension nicely illustrates the conflict between the modern liberal view that fairness should be a paramount goal of resource allocation and the classic view that the chief goal of allocation should be to maximize overall output and its growth rate Lurking deeper still in the political roots of the ownership policies is elected(and ap- pointed)officials' genuine fear of their own vulnerability to the popular media. None of the Commissions historical ownership policies can possibly be regarded as growing out of the economic analytical approach embodied in today's Merger Guidelines methodol- ogy. And it is the Merger Guidelines methodology(even if not the particular standards) that defines rational po licy in this area There are indeed economic characteristics of media content that make it difficult to pre- sume that a competitive market outcome is necessarily optimal. Half a century ago Peter Steiner made the point that some listener demand structures would be better served by a radio monopolist than by radio competitors. Later work by Michael Spence and others has generalized this finding. It is fair to say, today, that the public good character of pro- gramming is one of many flaws that impair the functioning of competitive media mar- nevertheless, no one has identified any practical intervention by which the gow ernment could reliably improve this situation, certainly not by ownership rules Horizontal Ownership Issues The analytical tools of competition analysis, as used in antitrust enforcement, apply di- rectly to the Commissions concentration concerns in media economic markets such advertising and programming. The three key questions facing the Commission with re- spect to each of these markets are: Which sellers offer choices that customers find attrac- tive? Are there enough such sellers to provide effective competition? Are there signifi cant barriers to entry? These are the same issues addressed in the Merger Guidelines. In- deed, the antitrust agencies already routinely apply guidelines analysis to proposed me- dia transactions involving radio, television, newspapers, magazine and book publishers, The models developed by Steiner, Spence and others are described in detail in Bruce M. Owen an Steven S. wildman. Video economics. Harvard Univ Press. 199310 various claimants. This tension nicely illustrates the conflict between the modern liberal view that fairness should be a paramount goal of resource allocation and the classic view that the chief goal of allocation should be to maximize overall output and its growth rate. Lurking deeper still in the political roots of the ownership policies is elected (and ap￾pointed) officials’ genuine fear of their own vulnerability to the popular media. None of the Commission’s historical ownership policies can possibly be regarded as growing out of the economic analytical approach embodied in today’s Merger Guidelines methodol￾ogy. And it is the Merger Guidelines methodology (even if not the particular standards) that defines rational policy in this area. There are indeed economic characteristics of media content that make it difficult to pre￾sume that a competitive market outcome is necessarily optimal. Half a century ago Peter Steiner made the point that some listener demand structures would be better served by a radio monopolist than by radio competitors. Later work by Michael Spence and others has generalized this finding. It is fair to say, today, that the public good character of pro￾gramming is one of many flaws that impair the functioning of competitive media mar￾kets.10 Nevertheless, no one has identified any practical intervention by which the gov￾ernment could reliably improve this situation, certainly not by ownership rules. Horizontal Ownership Issues The analytical tools of competition analysis, as used in antitrust enforcement, apply di￾rectly to the Commission’s concentration concerns in media economic markets such as advertising and programming. The three key questions facing the Commission with re￾spect to each of these markets are: Which sellers offer choices that customers find attrac￾tive? Are there enough such sellers to provide effective competition? Are there signifi￾cant barriers to entry? These are the same issues addressed in the Merger Guidelines. In￾deed, the antitrust agencies already routinely apply Guidelines analysis to proposed me￾dia transactions involving radio, television, newspapers, magazine and book publishers, 10 The models developed by Steiner, Spence and others are described in detail in Bruce M. Owen and Steven S. Wildman, Video Economics, Harvard Univ. Press., 1993