The World Health Report 2003 investigate and respond to cases of AFP (4). Furthermore, they had to be available on an ongoing basis. Consequently, the polio partnership focused on working with national au- thorities to expand and strengthen the existing national surveillance infrastructure wherever possible. Where this infrastructure was functionally non-existent, partners worked with na- tional authorities to establish AFP surveillance. In any particular country, the strategy pur- sued to close this human resources gap depended on the broader national strategy fo strengthening health services. In some countries, surveillance personnel received government salaries with operating costs, including vehicles and equipment, covered by international sources. In other countries, national salaries were supplemented by partners as part of a gov ernment strategy to retain highly qualified staff. In still others, WHO and governments es tablished and operated a joint surveillance programme. In addition, WHO hired and deployed nearly 1500 national and international staff to provide technical assistance and even conduct surveillance activities in those areas with the weakest capacity. Through this mix of strategies and approaches to the gap in human resources for health, it has been possible to reach almost every child in the world with OPV and other interventions (such as Vitamin A supplementation), irrespective of socioeconomic status, religion, minor- ty status, geography or even war. In addition, a truly global surveillance and laboratory ca- pacity now exists to identify and respond rapidly to polio, as well as to many other diseases of public health importance such as measles, neonatal tetanus, meningitis, cholera and yellow fever, depending on the country(10). In the Western Pacific Region, this capacity contrib- uted to the international response to the SARS outbreaks of 2002-2003 Prospects for a polio-free future As the result of an aggressive, deliberate and internationally coordinated effort, polio has changed from being a devastating disease with a global distribution to one that is now geo- graphically restricted to seven countries. To capitalize on this progress, substantial effort is now required to interrupt the final chains of polio transmission, certify that achievement, and minimize the risk of polio being reintroduced in the future. The polio partner ship's Polio Eradication Strategic Plan 2004-2008 summarizes these challenges in its major objectives. First, the final chains of poliovirus transmission must be interrupted in the remaining seven countries. Particular effort will be required in India, Nigeria and Pakistan, which now ac count for 99% of the worlds polio burden and remain a source of importation to polio-free areas. Within these countries, five of the 76 states or provinces are the key to global eradica tion; with sustained high-level political engagement, oversight and accountability in each one, high-quality NIDs could rapidly reach all children and halt polio transmission within 12 months Second, the global interruption of wild poliovirus transmission must be verified by the glo- bal Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication. Certification requires that all countries provide documentation demonstrating the absence of wild poliovirus circula tion for at least three years, in the presence of high-quality surveillance, as well as the"con- tainment "of all stocks of wild poliovirus Containment requires that within one year of the interruption of wild poliovirus transmission globally, countries will have identified all stocks of wild poliovirus and ensured their storage and handling under appropriate biosafety con ditions(see Figure 4.3)66 The World Health Report 2003 investigate and respond to cases of AFP (4). Furthermore, they had to be available on an ongoing basis. Consequently, the polio partnership focused on working with national au￾thorities to expand and strengthen the existing national surveillance infrastructure wherever possible. Where this infrastructure was functionally non-existent, partners worked with na￾tional authorities to establish AFP surveillance. In any particular country, the strategy pur￾sued to close this human resources gap depended on the broader national strategy for strengthening health services. In some countries, surveillance personnel received government salaries with operating costs, including vehicles and equipment, covered by international sources. In other countries, national salaries were supplemented by partners as part of a gov￾ernment strategy to retain highly qualified staff. In still others, WHO and governments es￾tablished and operated a joint surveillance programme. In addition, WHO hired and deployed nearly 1500 national and international staff to provide technical assistance and even conduct surveillance activities in those areas with the weakest capacity. Through this mix of strategies and approaches to the gap in human resources for health, it has been possible to reach almost every child in the world with OPV and other interventions (such as Vitamin A supplementation), irrespective of socioeconomic status, religion, minor￾ity status, geography or even war. In addition, a truly global surveillance and laboratory ca￾pacity now exists to identify and respond rapidly to polio, as well as to many other diseases of public health importance such as measles, neonatal tetanus, meningitis, cholera and yellow fever, depending on the country (10). In the Western Pacific Region, this capacity contrib￾uted to the international response to the SARS outbreaks of 2002–2003. Prospects for a polio-free future As the result of an aggressive, deliberate and internationally coordinated effort, polio has changed from being a devastating disease with a global distribution to one that is now geo￾graphically restricted to seven countries. To capitalize on this progress, substantial effort is now required to interrupt the final chains of polio transmission, certify that achievement, and minimize the risk of polio being reintroduced in the future. The polio partner￾ship’s Polio Eradication Strategic Plan 2004–2008 summarizes these challenges in its major objectives. First, the final chains of poliovirus transmission must be interrupted in the remaining seven countries. Particular effort will be required in India, Nigeria and Pakistan, which now ac￾count for 99% of the world’s polio burden and remain a source of importation to polio-free areas. Within these countries, five of the 76 states or provinces are the key to global eradica￾tion; with sustained high-level political engagement, oversight and accountability in each one, high-quality NIDs could rapidly reach all children and halt polio transmission within 12 months. Second, the global interruption of wild poliovirus transmission must be verified by the Glo￾bal Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication. Certification requires that all countries provide documentation demonstrating the absence of wild poliovirus circula￾tion for at least three years, in the presence of high-quality surveillance, as well as the “con￾tainment” of all stocks of wild poliovirus. Containment requires that within one year of the interruption of wild poliovirus transmission globally, countries will have identified all stocks of wild poliovirus and ensured their storage and handling under appropriate biosafety con￾ditions (see Figure 4.3)