next section Georg Lukacs archive NOTES 1. Cf. "What is orthodox Marxism? ""Class Consciousness" and"The Changing Function of Historical Materialism". In view of the fact that the themes in these essays are so closely interrelated it has regrettably not al ways been possible to avoid repetition 2. Nachlass Il, p. 132. [ The Holy Family, Chapter 4] 3. Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begrifsbildung, 2nd ed, p. 562 4.Ibid,pp.606-7 5. Cf."What is orthodox Marxism? 7. For eighteenth century materialism, see Plekhanov, op cit, p. 51. In Section I we have shown how this belief underlies the bourgeois theory of crisis, the theory of the origin of law, etc. In history itself anyone can easily understand that an approach that is not world-historical and that does not relate to the overall development must necessarily nterpret the most important turning-points of history as senseless cataclysms as their causes lie outside its scheme. This can be seen, e.g. in the Germanic Migrations, in the downward trend of German history from the Renaissance on, etc 8. Hegels Werke Il, p. 73 9. Ibid., p. 275 10. Cf e.g. Capital Ill, pp.336,349-50,370-1,374-6,383-4 11. Die Philosophie des geldes, p. 531 12. The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 135 13. I would refer the reader once again to plekhanov 's statement of the dilemma confronting older forms of materialism. As Marx showed in his critique of Bruno Bauer (Nachlass Il, pp. 178 et seq. )every bourgeois view of history logically ends up by mechanising the massesand irrationalising the hero. However, exactly the same dualism can be found in such thinkers as Carlyle or Nietzsche. Even a cautious thinker like Rickert, ( despite some reservations, e.g. op. cit, p. 380)is inclined to regard milieu and the"movements of masses'as subject to natural laws and to see only the solated personality as a historical individual. Op. cit, pp. 444, 460-1 14. A Contribution to the Critique of political Economy, p. 304 15. The Poverty of philosophy, pp. 128-9 16. Die Kritik der praktischen Vernunff, pp. 38-9, Cf. ibid., pp. 24, 123; Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 4, 38. Cf also Hegels critique, Werke Ill 17. Werke Ill, p. 147 18.lbd.,p.262. 19. Ibid, pp. 432-5 Plekhanov deserves the credit for having pointed to the importance of this side of Hegel's Logic for the distinction between evolution and revolution as early as 1891(Neue Zeit X/l, pp. 280 et seq ) Regrettably his insight was neglected by later theorists Philosophy of Religion. In particular, Werke Xl, pp. 158-9."There is no immediate u 20. On the methodological side of this question, see above all the first part of Hegel knowledge. Immediate knowledge is where we have no consciousness of mediation, but it is mediated for all that. Similarly in the Preface to the Phenomenology: The true is not an original unity as such or an immediate one, but only this reconstituting equality or reflection in otherness in itself. Werke Il, p. 15 21. Engels in fact accepted the Hegelian theory of the false(which has its finest definition in the Preface to the Phenomenology, Werke ll, p. 30 et seq ) Cf his analysis of the role of 'evil in history, Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy in S w.Il, p. 345 et seq. This refers, of course, only to the truly original representatives of bourgeois thought Epigones, eclectics and simple partisans of the interests of a declining class belong in quite a different categorynext section Georg Lukacs Archive NOTES 1. Cf. “What is orthodox Marxism?", “Class Consciousness” and “The Changing Function of Historical Materialism". In view of the fact that the themes in these essays are so closely interrelated it has regrettably not always been possible to avoid repetition. 2. Nachlass II, p. 132. [The Holy Family, Chapter 4.] 3. Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begrifsbildung, 2nd ed., p. 562. 4. Ibid., pp. 606-7. 5. Cf. “What is orthodox Marxism?" 6. Capital I, p. 441. 7. For eighteenth century materialism, see Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 51. In Section I we have shown how this belief underlies the bourgeois theory of crisis, the theory of the origin of law, etc. In history itself anyone can easily understand that an approach that is not world-historical and that does not relate to the overall development must necessarily interpret the most important turning-points of history as senseless cataclysms as their causes lie outside its scheme. This can be seen, e.g. in the Germanic Migrations, in the downward trend of German history from the Renaissance on, etc. 8. Hegel’s Werke II, p. 73. 9. Ibid., p. 275. 10. Cf. e.g. Capital Ill, pp. 336, 349-50, 370-1, 374-6, 383-4. 11. Die Philosophie des Geldes, p. 531. 12. The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 135. 13. I would refer the reader once again to Plekhanov’s statement of the dilemma confronting older forms of materialism. As Marx showed in his critique of Bruno Bauer (Nachlass II, pp. 178 et seq.) every bourgeois view of history logically ends up by mechanising the ‘masses’ and irrationalising the hero. However, exactly the same dualism can be found in such thinkers as Carlyle or Nietzsche. Even a cautious thinker like Rickert, (despite some reservations, e.g. op. cit., p. 380) is inclined to regard ‘milieu’ and the ‘movements of masses’ as subject to natural laws and to see only the isolated personality as a historical individual. Op. cit., pp. 444, 460-1. 14. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 304. 15. The Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 128-9. 16. Die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, pp. 38-9, Cf. ibid., pp. 24, 123; Die Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 4, 38. Cf. also Hegel’s critique, Werke III, pp. 133 et seq. 17. Werke III, p. 147. 18. Ibid., p. 262. 19. Ibid., pp. 432-5. Plekhanov deserves the credit for having pointed to the importance of this side of Hegel’s Logic for the distinction between evolution and revolution as early as 1891 (Neue Zeit X/I, pp. 280 et seq.). Regrettably his insight was neglected by later theorists. 20. On the methodological side of this question, see above all the first part of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion. In particular, Werke XI, pp. 158-9. “There is no immediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge is where we have no consciousness of mediation; but it is mediated for all that.” Similarly in the Preface to the Phenomenology: “The true is not an original unity as such or an immediate one, but only this reconstituting equality or reflection in otherness in itself.” Werke II, p. 15. 21. Engels in fact accepted the Hegelian theory of the false (which has its finest definition in the Preface to the Phenomenology, Werke II, p. 30 et seq.). Cf. his analysis of the role of ‘evil’ in history, Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in S.W. II, p. 345 et seq. This refers, of course, only to the truly original representatives of bourgeois thought. Epigones, eclectics and simple partisans of the interests of a declining class belong in quite a different category