and, finally, the academic and practical contrast. As such, these four contrasts do not describe the differences between civil law and common law inaccurately, but only if it is taken into consideration that the level of discussion is rather abstract and not based upon historical- comparative analysis. The four contrasts are the result of the historical development of the law and the prevailing legal culture. They should not be seen as a static description of the differences but only as still existing, yet changing, characteristics. Is it still true today that English(or Scottish, Irish, American) lawyers are less inclined to reason logically, only think in terms of remedies and precedent and ignore academic writings? Are civil lawyers(from France, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Japan) not interested in experience, but only in rights, principles and academic legal literature? The answer can only be negative. Atiyah certainly recognises this. An English lawyer knows very well how to build a solid argument based upon logical reasoning and a civil lawyer is very much aware of the fact that although his client may invoke an abstract right, this certainly does not always mean victory in a concrete case. Furthermore, in the area of property law it becomes abundantly clear that English lawyers have developed an ability to and special statutes; as abstract and complex, I might add, as can be found in nineteenth. ses construct abstract and complex legal systems of thought out of an enormous amount of ca century German Pandectist legal thinking It is often said that comparative law and legal history are two sides of the same coin comparison. Comparative law is interested in comparison on a horizontal level, legal history on a vertical(diachronic)level. Especially in the area of property law, a historical comparative analysis very often proves to be revealing. 4 Not only does this approach explain the existing law from two perspectives, it can also give ind ications as to the direction in which the law is developing In this paper, based on the historical-comparative method, I would like to focus on a central concept of civil property law: the numerus clausus of absolute rights. Accord ing to the numerus clausus doctrine the number of absolute rights and their content is closed. Is this rigid doctrine really necessary? Could(and should )it be less rigorous and more open to innovation? A more open approach, towards a numerus quasi- clausus, might be the way towards a well-reasoned and gradual acceptance of common law institutions and concepts such as the trust, in the civil law. The civil law will be compared with the common law approach and it will be attempted to find common ground between(civil law) theory and (common law) pragmatism II The feudal system the french revolution and numerus clausus For a better understand ing of the importance of numerus clausus in civil law systems, som historical remarks are necessary. These will concern the role of the feudal system with respect to property relations and the abolition of the feudal system on the continent of Europe as a result of the French Revolution. Consequently, the principles and rules of property law had to be reformulated on the continent. In England, however, the feudal system was not Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, pp. 143 ff. See also my inaugural lecture, held at Maastricht University, Europees Privaatrecht: Postmoderne dilemma's en keuzen. Naareen methode van adequate rechtsvergelij king(Deventer: Kluwer, 1998), also published as European Private Lawv: Postmodern Dilemmas and Choices. Towards a Method of Adequate Comparative Legal Analysis, vol 3. 1 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW,(August 1999)and, finally, the academic and practical contrast. As such, these four contrasts do not describe the differences between civil law and common law inaccurately, but only if it is taken into consideration that the level of discussion is rather abstract and not based upon historical￾comparative analysis. The four contrasts are the result of the historical development of the law and the prevailing legal culture. They should not be seen as a static description of the differences but only as still existing, yet changing, characteristics. Is it still true today that English (or Scottish, Irish, American) lawyers are less inclined to reason logically, only think in terms of remedies and precedent and ignore academic writings? Are civil lawyers (from France, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey and Japan) not interested in experience, but only in rights, principles and academic legal literature? The answer can only be negative. Atiyah certainly recognises this.3 An English lawyer knows very well how to build a solid argument based upon logical reasoning and a civil lawyer is very much aware of the fact that although his client may invoke an abstract right, this certainly does not always mean victory in a concrete case. Furthermore, in the area of property law it becomes abundantly clear that English lawyers have developed an ability to construct abstract and complex legal systems of thought out of an enormous amount of cases and special statutes; as abstract and complex, I might add, as can be found in nineteenth￾century German Pandectist legal thinking. It is often said that comparative law and legal history are two sides of the same coin: comparison. Comparative law is interested in comparison on a horizontal level, legal history on a vertical (diachronic) level. Especially in the area of property law, a historical￾comparative analysis very often proves to be revealing.4 Not only does this approach explain the existing law from two perspectives, it can also give indications as to the direction in which the law is developing. In this paper, based on the historical-comparative method, I would like to focus on a central concept of civil property law: the numerus clausus of absolute rights. According to the numerus clausus doctrine, the number of absolute rights and their content is closed. Is this rigid doctrine really necessary? Could (and should) it be less rigorous and more open to innovation? A more open approach, towards a numerus quasi-clausus, might be the way towards a well-reasoned and gradual acceptance of common law institutions and concepts, such as the trust, in the civil law. The civil law will be compared with the common law approach and it will be attempted to find common ground between (civil law) theory and (common law) pragmatism. II The feudal system, the French Revolution and numerus clausus For a better understanding of the importance of numerus clausus in civil law systems, some historical remarks are necessary. These will concern the role of the feudal system with respect to property relations and the abolition of the feudal system on the continent of Europe as a result of the French Revolution. Consequently, the principles and rules of property law had to be reformulated on the continent. In England, however, the feudal system was not 3 Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, pp. 143 ff. 4 See also my inaugural lecture, held at Maastricht University, Europees Privaatrecht: Postmoderne dilemma’s en keuzen. Naar een methode van adequate rechtsvergelijking (Deventer: Kluwer, 1998), also published as European Private Law: Postmodern Dilemmas and Choices. Towards a Method of Adequate Comparative Legal Analysis, vol 3.1 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, (August 1999), <http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/31/art31-1.html>