Forward and backward induction Iterated weak/conditional dom inance and Extensive-Form rationaliza bility R BEN-PORATH, E and DEKEL, E(1992): Signalling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice, Journalof Economic Theory 57: 36-51 L O PEARCE, D(1984): Rationaliza ble Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfectio Econometrica 52: 1029-1050 BATTIGALLI, P(1997): On Rationalizability in Extensive Games, " Journalof Economic Theory 74: 40-61 11.2 Signalling Games and specialized versions of Forward Induction The Intuitive Criterion: a simple test of reasonableness. Monotonicity"of signals: Dn, divinity and friends R CHO, I and KREPS, D(1987):" Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria, Quarterly lof Economics 102: 179-221 12. Invariance and normal-Form refinements 12. 1 The Interplay between Normal and Extensive-form analysis Invariance Perfect and Proper Equilibria Proper and sequentialequilibria 12.2 Strategic Stability and the"axiomatic approach A list of desiderata. and the need for set-valued solutions. "True perfection" and the "Nearby games, Nearby equilibria Principle R KOHLBERG, E and MERTENS,J-F,(1986): On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Econometrica 54. 1003-1037Forward and Backward induction. Iterated weak/conditional dominance and Extensive-Form rationalizability. R BEN-PORATH, E. and DEKEL, E. (1992): “Signalling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice,” Journal of Economic Theory 57:36-51. L O PEARCE, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,” Econometrica 52:1029-1050. BATTIGALLI, P. (1997): “On Rationalizability in Extensive Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 74:40-61. 11.2 Signalling Games and specialized versions of Forward Induction The Intuitive Criterion: a simple test of “reasonableness.” “Monotonicity” of signals: Dn, divinity and friends. R CHO, I. and KREPS, D. (1987): “Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 179-221. 12. Invariance and Normal-Form refinements 12.1 The Interplay between Normal and Extensive-form analysis Invariance Perfect and Proper Equilibria. Proper and Sequential equilibria. L 12.2 Strategic Stability and the “axiomatic approach” A list of desiderata, and the need for set-valued solutions. “True perfection” and the “Nearby games, Nearby equilibria Principle.” R KOHLBERG, E. and MERTENS, J-F., (1986): “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,” Econometrica 54, 1003-1037