TESTING FOR ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL PRESSURE Our field experiment revolves around a door-to-door fund raising drive for two charities,a local children's hospital,which has a reputation as a premier hospital for children,and an out- of-state charity,unfamiliar to most solicitees.Between April and October 2008 proached 7,668 households in the to e crucial spect of the experin ental desic toallow individuals to sort,that is,to either seek orav solicitor.In our first treatment,a flyer on the doorknob notifies households one day in advance about the one-hour time interval in which a solicitor will arrive at their homes the next day.In the se cond treatment,opt- also includes a bo to be checked if the househ es not w t to o be disturbe compare these two conditi to a b aseline treatment,whereir solicitors approach households in the usual manner without a flyer.We estimate the treatment effects on both the share of households that open the door and the share that give. This design allows for a simple test of(pure or impure)altru- ism versus so press e in doo or giving.Ifalt ruism is th main driver of giving,the flyer sh ould increa ase both the presence at home and giving.Because giving is utility-enhancing,givers should sort into staying at home,provided that alternative ways of donating to these charities require more effort.In addition. givers who would like to give in response to the flyer but who find it too costly to be at ho should give to the ch means,such as mailing a eck.Co nv rsely,if so I pressure is the main driver of giving,the flyer should lower both the frequency of opening the door and the frequency of giving.Since being asked to give is welfare-diminishing,potential givers should sort out of the door and should not give via Internet or check ese forms of donatio are I su t to sc pressure We report four main n result which are sim ar acros two charities.First,the flyer lowers the frequency ofopening the door. Relative to a baseline rate of 41 percentage points,the share of households opening the door is 9%lower after receiving the Aver and 23%lo ng the flyer with an opt-out o (includi ng the h seholds that check th e opt-out box nd,the simple flyer s not reduce giving.However the flyer with an opt-out checkbox decreases giving significantly,by 28%relative to a baseline of 7%for the local charity and 40%relative to a 5% baseline giving for the out-of-state charity.Third,the decrease in giving in the opt-out treatment is driven by small donations up to $10: above $10, instead incre ease slightly (not TESTING FOR ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL PRESSURE 3 Our field experiment revolves around a door-to-door fund￾raising drive for two charities, a local children’s hospital, which has a reputation as a premier hospital for children, and an out￾of-state charity, unfamiliar to most solicitees. Between April and October 2008, we approached 7,668 households in the towns sur￾rounding Chicago. The crucial aspect of the experimental design is to allow individuals to sort, that is, to either seek or avoid the solicitor. In our first treatment, a flyer on the doorknob notifies households one day in advance about the one-hour time interval in which a solicitor will arrive at their homes the next day. In the second treatment, opt-out, the flyer also includes a box to be checked if the household does not want to be disturbed. We compare these two conditions to a baseline treatment, wherein solicitors approach households in the usual manner without a flyer. We estimate the treatment effects on both the share of households that open the door and the share that give. This design allows for a simple test of (pure or impure) altru￾ismversus social pressureindoor-to-doorgiving. If altruismis the main driver of giving, the flyer should increase both the presence at home and giving. Because giving is utility-enhancing, givers should sort into staying at home, provided that alternative ways of donating to these charities require more effort. In addition, givers who would like to give in response to the flyer but who find it too costly to be at home should give to the charity via other means, such as mailing a check. Conversely, if social pressure is themaindriverofgiving, theflyershouldlowerboththefrequency of opening the door andthe frequency of giving. Since being asked to give is welfare-diminishing, potential givers should sort out of openingthedoorandshouldnot givevia Internet orcheckbecause these forms of donation are not subject to social pressure. We report four main results, which are similar across the two charities. First, the flyer lowers the frequency of opening the door. Relative to a baseline rate of 41 percentage points, the share of households opening the door is 9% lower after receiving the flyer and 23% lower after receiving the flyer with an opt-out box (including the households that check the opt-out box). Second, the simple flyer does not reduce giving. However, the flyer with an opt-out checkbox decreases giving significantly, by 28% relative to a baseline of 7% for the local charity and 40% relative to a 5% baseline giving for the out-of-state charity. Third, the decrease in giving in the opt-out treatment is driven by small donations up to $10; donations above $10, instead, increase slightly (not by guest on September 20, 2012 http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from