recapture the expendable launch vehicle industry from the Europeans. The EELV strategy was fundamentally based on the idea that these vehicles would be developed for the (large commercial market and the air Force could pay a fixed sum(I billion) to get a few of these vehicles for itself. The Air Force would start as the anchor tenant in what would become a large commercial market. In 1997 the market seemed sufficiently rosy that the Air Force decided to fund two competing proposals at a cost of $500 million each. By the end of 1999, this was on the verge of collapse as the launch projections for the business cases continued to erode after the Iridium failure. The NASA RLV was supposed to be a leapfrog approach to get US superiority for a long time. RLV was sold on the basis of $100/lb to LEO. In a shift, nasa decided to put a fixed amount into the X-33 with Lockheed Martin($924 million). The strategy is that once the X-33 shows that RL Vs can work economically, the commercial market will invest to develop The other new element in the launch market is the cheap availability of Chinese and russian launchers after the end of the cold war. Both of these countries being non-market based offered launch to orbit at significantly reduced prices relative to the US prices. The Chinese however, had significantly higher failure rates than the US, a fact that proved to be significant later in the decade. The Us policy was to allow satellites with US components to be launched in these countries with the requirement that the security of the satellites not be compromised and with a limit on the number of launches allowed. this allowed some outlet for domestic satellite companies without allowing the launch market to be swamped by the cheap launchers. The failure of two Chinese Long March-3 rockets with Hughes and Loral satellites led to failure review boards where it was alleged that sensitive information was passed to the Chinese. Since this launcher technology is similar to missile technology, it was alleged that Chinese missiles were improved by this transfer. These allegations led to the reclassification of satellites as munitions and an attempt to rein in where US satellite manufacturers launched their satellites The international growth also led to one of the most innovative ideas which was Sea Launch by Boeing with the Ukranian Zenit. This uses the(former) Soviet technology for rapid launch, puts it on a ship and allows launch from the equator. This is one of the advantages of international cooperation The decade of the nineties is also when the air and space pieces of the Air Force started to integrate in new ways. It started with the Gulf War. In this war, space systems were integral to the conduct of terrestrial operations. This happened in many ways. In the area of communications. 80% of all es to and from the theatre were transmitted by space based communications. There was even a story of a tank in combat getting a software patch from the US via satellite. In navigation, GPS provided the ability for US units to move more freely in the trackless desert and undertake maneuvers that the enemy thought impossible. In an interesting use of strategic assets for tactical use, satellites surveyed bomb damage. In the most creative use DSP satellites( designed for detecting ICBMs) were used to find theater ballistic missile launches, cue the Patriot battery radars looking for them and also provide warning to potentially affected areas. By the end of the decade, in the Kosovo conflict almost all the weapons were dropped by air Force aircraft were guided by GPs. The B-2 was able to overfly the target are and hit 16 targets in one pass with GPS guided bombs. The contrast with Vietnam could not be more stark. In Vietnam, it took 30 sortiesand 176 bombs to hit one target. Thus, GPS which therecapture the expendable launch vehicle industry from the Europeans. The EELV strategy was fundamentally based on the idea that these vehicles would be developed for the (large) commercial market and the Air Force could pay a fixed sum ($1 billion) to get a few of these vehicles for itself. The Air Force would start as the anchor tenant in what would become a large commercial market. In 1997 the market seemed sufficiently rosy that the Air Force decided to fund two competing proposals at a cost of $500 million each. By the end of 1999, this was on the verge of collapse as the launch projections for the business cases continued to erode after the Iridium failure. The NASA RLV was supposed to be a leapfrog approach to get US superiority for a long time. RLV was sold on the basis of $100/lb. to LEO. In a shift, NASA decided to put a fixed amount into the X-33 with Lockheed Martin (~$924 million). The strategy is that once the X-33 shows that RLVs can work economically, the commercial market will invest to develop them. The other new element in the launch market is the cheap availability of Chinese and Russian launchers after the end of the Cold War. Both of these countries being non-market based, offered launch to orbit at significantly reduced prices relative to the US prices. The Chinese however, had significantly higher failure rates than the US, a fact that proved to be significant later in the decade. The US policy was to allow satellites with US components to be launched in these countries with the requirement that the security of the satellites not be compromised and with a limit on the number of launches allowed. This allowed some outlet for domestic satellite companies without allowing the launch market to be swamped by the cheap launchers. The failure of two Chinese Long March-3 rockets with Hughes and Loral satellites led to failure review boards where it was alleged that sensitive information was passed to the Chinese. Since this launcher technology is similar to missile technology, it was alleged that Chinese missiles were improved by this transfer. These allegations led to the reclassification of satellites as munitions and an attempt to rein in where US satellite manufacturers launched their satellites. The international growth also led to one of the most innovative ideas which was Sea Launch by Boeing with the Ukranian Zenit. This uses the (former) Soviet technology for rapid launch, puts it on a ship and allows launch from the equator. This is one of the advantages of international cooperation. The decade of the nineties is also when the air and space pieces of the Air Force started to integrate in new ways. It started with the Gulf War. In this war, space systems were integral to the conduct of terrestrial operations. This happened in many ways. In the area of communications, 80% of all messages to and from the theatre were transmitted by space based communications. There was even a story of a tank in combat getting a software patch from the US via satellite. In navigation, GPS provided the ability for US units to move more freely in the trackless desert and undertake maneuvers that the enemy thought impossible. In an interesting use of strategic assets for tactical use, satellites surveyed bomb damage. In the most creative use, DSP satellites (designed for detecting ICBMs) were used to find theater ballistic missile launches, cue the Patriot battery radar’s looking for them and also provide warning to potentially affected areas. By the end of the decade, in the Kosovo conflict almost all the weapons were dropped by Air Force aircraft were guided by GPS. The B-2 was able to overfly the target area and hit 16 targets in one pass with GPS guided bombs. The contrast with Vietnam could not be more stark. In Vietnam, it took 30 sortiesand 176 bombs to hit one target. Thus, GPS which the