of transmission or delivery services for sale to consumers. For ease of reference I will refer to the foregoing as"economic"markets. These markets are addressed in Section II of this Article. The mass media also play an important role in the metaphoric"market place of ideas, which I discuss in Section Ill. I will bring the two types of markets to- ether in Section Iv a brief summary of my proposed approach to FCC media ownership policy is as follow The most sensible way to consider the effects of ownership concentration in media eco- nomic markets is to use the Merger Guidelines approach. But if the Commission adopts this rational policy it will duplicate the work of the Antitrust Division, which would be a aste of public and private resources. The commission also has monitored the effects of concentration in the marketplace of ideas. However, as a practical matter, enforcement of the Clayton Act in media economic markets will serve to prevent undue concentration in markets for ideas and information. as a result, there is no longer a rational basis for the Commission to regulate media ownership Rules versus case-by-case analysis Rules(e.g, a ban on newspaper- TV station cross-ownership [ownership of a cross is still permitted) conserve public and private resources, but at the cost of increased Type I and Type II errors. Rules also increase predictability. Case-by-case analysis reduces errors but is more expensive for regulators and applicants The Commissions traditional ownership policies might be justified on the basis of what is called"judicial economy. For example, the nature and definition of local advertising markets might be so well-established through prior experience, and the appropriate stan- dards necessary to prevent mergers or natural concentration from harming consumers or advertisers might be so well-understood, that a general rule would save everyone n- These errors correspond respectively, here, to incorrectly permitting the harmful and to incorrectly forbidding the beneficial The common law process can in principle be inexpensive if there is stare decisis and a sufficient body of applicable precedent. In the present context, with rapidly changing technology and market arrangements, new fact issues will have to be analyzed7 of transmission or delivery services for sale to consumers. For ease of reference I will refer to the foregoing as “economic” markets. These markets are addressed in Section II of this Article. The mass media also play an important role in the metaphoric “market￾place of ideas,” which I discuss in Section III. I will bring the two types of markets to￾gether in Section IV. A brief summary of my proposed approach to FCC media ownership policy is as follows: The most sensible way to consider the effects of ownership concentration in media eco￾nomic markets is to use the Merger Guidelines approach. But if the Commission adopts this rational policy it will duplicate the work of the Antitrust Division, which would be a waste of public and private resources. The Commission also has monitored the effects of concentration in the marketplace of ideas. However, as a practical matter, enforcement of the Clayton Act in media economic markets will serve to prevent undue concentration in markets for ideas and information. As a result, there is no longer a rational basis for the Commission to regulate media ownership. Rules versus case-by-case analysis Rules (e.g., a ban on newspaper-TV station cross-ownership [ownership of a cross is still permitted) conserve public and private resources, but at the cost of increased Type I and Type II errors.7 Rules also increase predictability. Case-by-case analysis reduces errors, but is more expensive for regulators and applicants.8 The Commission’s traditional ownership policies might be justified on the basis of what is called “judicial economy.” For example, the nature and definition of local advertising markets might be so well-established through prior experience, and the appropriate stan￾dards necessary to prevent mergers or natural concentration from harming consumers or advertisers might be so well-understood, that a general rule would save everyone in- 7 These errors correspond respectively, here, to incorrectly permitting the harmful and to incorrectly forbidding the beneficial. 8 The common law process can in principle be inexpensive if there is stare decisis and a sufficient body of applicable precedent. In the present context, with rapidly changing technology and market arrangements, new fact issues will have to be analyzed