812 Interational Organization policy-makers have treated migration policy as domestic policy.After the war, policy-makers,recognizing the interactions among trade,finance,and security, forged a patchwork of interlocking international regimes to govern global security, trade,and finance in hopes of recreating the nineteenth-century liberal interational order.Yet apart from provisions to accommodate refugees,provisions governing international economic migration are conspicuously absent from the Anglo- American postwar order.Scholars studying migration have similarly conceptualized migration as domestic concern,focusing on three domestic-level variables to explain changes in policy:the power of organized labor,the importance of immigrant groups, and the rise of nativism. This domestic perspective,however,fails to explain US postwar immigration policy.Briggs,for example,argues that immigration policy has been driven by vari- ation in the power of organized labor.3 Yet immigration was reopened somewhat after World War II when labor was relatively strong and was closed in the 1990s when labor was relatively weak.Other scholars focus on immigrants as an important lob- bying group.4 Nonetheless,the foreign-born have never been more than 14 percent of the population and naturalized foreign born,those who can vote,have never been more than 7 percent of the population,limiting their ability to affect politics.5 Finally,nativist backlash,which is often thought of as the conventional wisdom, has been argued to explain changes in policy.6 Yet,nativist backlash has occurred several times in US history without leading to a change in policy.In the 1840s and 1850s,there was a major outcry against Irish and German immigration,which led to the creation of nativist parties,but not restrictions.Backlash against southern and eastern European immigrants in the 1890s again led to little action on immigra- tion.Most recently,nativist backlash has led to some action on the state level,for example,Arizona's SB1070 or Alabama's Self-Deportation law,but not at the federal level.Nativism is too ubiquitous a phenomenon to be the full explanation for immigration policy.Instead,I argue that scholars must examine when firms serve as a bulwark against nativism and when they choose to stay on the sidelines of the low-skill immigration debate. This article argues that immigration policy-particularly low-skill immigration policy (LSIP)-is largely driven by the economy's need for low-skill labor that,in tum,is affected by the country's trade policy and the ability of firms to move production overseas (what I term,firm mobility.)It is generally accepted that trade closure leads to an increase in low-skill-intensive production in low-skill future work,serious attention should be given to including migration in the analysis of internationaliza- tion."Keohane and Milner 1996,258.Lake's review of Open Economy Politics (OPE)mentions "trade"seventy-eight times,"capital"twelve times,and "immigration"three times.Lake 2009.Oatley's critique of OPE mentions tariffs,monetary,and exchange rate policies and investment flows as part of OEP but not migration.Oatley 2011. 3.Briggs 2001. 4.For example,Tichenor 2002. 5.See Carter et al.2006;and Grieco et al.2012. 6.For example,Zolberg 2006.policy-makers have treated migration policy as domestic policy. After the war, policy-makers, recognizing the interactions among trade, finance, and security, forged a patchwork of interlocking international regimes to govern global security, trade, and finance in hopes of recreating the nineteenth-century liberal international order. Yet apart from provisions to accommodate refugees, provisions governing international economic migration are conspicuously absent from the Anglo￾American postwar order. Scholars studying migration have similarly conceptualized migration as domestic concern, focusing on three domestic-level variables to explain changes in policy: the power of organized labor, the importance of immigrant groups, and the rise of nativism. This domestic perspective, however, fails to explain US postwar immigration policy. Briggs, for example, argues that immigration policy has been driven by vari￾ation in the power of organized labor.3 Yet immigration was reopened somewhat after World War II when labor was relatively strong and was closed in the 1990s when labor was relatively weak. Other scholars focus on immigrants as an important lob￾bying group.4 Nonetheless, the foreign-born have never been more than 14 percent of the population and naturalized foreign born, those who can vote, have never been more than 7 percent of the population, limiting their ability to affect politics.5 Finally, nativist backlash, which is often thought of as the conventional wisdom, has been argued to explain changes in policy.6 Yet, nativist backlash has occurred several times in US history without leading to a change in policy. In the 1840s and 1850s, there was a major outcry against Irish and German immigration, which led to the creation of nativist parties, but not restrictions. Backlash against southern and eastern European immigrants in the 1890s again led to little action on immigra￾tion. Most recently, nativist backlash has led to some action on the state level, for example, Arizona’s SB1070 or Alabama’s Self-Deportation law, but not at the federal level. Nativism is too ubiquitous a phenomenon to be the full explanation for immigration policy. Instead, I argue that scholars must examine when firms serve as a bulwark against nativism and when they choose to stay on the sidelines of the low-skill immigration debate. This article argues that immigration policy—particularly low-skill immigration policy (LSIP)—is largely driven by the economy’s need for low-skill labor that, in turn, is affected by the country’s trade policy and the ability of firms to move production overseas (what I term, firm mobility.) It is generally accepted that trade closure leads to an increase in low-skill-intensive production in low-skill future work, serious attention should be given to including migration in the analysis of internationaliza￾tion.” Keohane and Milner 1996, 258. Lake’s review of Open Economy Politics (OPE) mentions “trade” seventy-eight times, “capital” twelve times, and “immigration” three times. Lake 2009. Oatley’s critique of OPE mentions tariffs, monetary, and exchange rate policies and investment flows as part of OEP but not migration. Oatley 2011. 3. Briggs 2001. 4. For example, Tichenor 2002. 5. See Carter et al. 2006; and Grieco et al. 2012. 6. For example, Zolberg 2006. 812 International Organization