Zander, one of the fund amental characteristics of law is the objective that like cases should e treated alike. 45 It is therefore rational that, all things being equal, one court should follow the decision of another where the facts appear to be similar. 46 The greatest mind of the common law, Sir Edward Coke in his Institutes of the Laws of England, opined Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitem; for reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason; which is understood of an artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every mans naturall reason; for, Nemo nasciturartifex his legall reason est summa ratio. And therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many severall [sic] heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the law in England is47 Moving several hundred years to the present, reason still requires that, as one commentator put it, ' similar cases be understood and dealt with similarity. Otherwise nothing makes sense In order to understand one another and reason accurately we must be consistent. So if law to be a rational(rather than irrational and arbitrary process, judicial decisions must be consistent with one another. The pragmatic ground for the rule of precedent is predictability Lawyers and citizens want to be able to assess their future behavior in terms of current decisions of the courts. 48 Civilian lawyers and citizens also want predictability but they have felt the need [for it] less keenly because of the background of rules provided first by roman in a pure civilian system, however, can be achieved by the use of precedents. Accord to 5 law and cod ified custom, and later by the codes of the Napoleonic era. 49 Predictability, eve Justice Barham of the Louisiana Supreme Court, jurisprudence is a major source of law in Louisiana he writes. Under our Code an through the historical civ ilian tradition, jurisprudence is not a major source of law, yet it has been and it remains such in reality. possibly the belief in jurisprudence as a primary source of w is so strongly em bedded in the minds of many of the judiciary and the practicing bar of louisiana because our civil law system coexists in a nation with states which beca use of their common law herta ge so regard jurisprudence. Even if our barreally believes that legislation is the primary source of law, it practices under the principle that jurisprudence is a major source of law. Lawyers often only perfunctorily exam ine legislative expression before they tum for final authority to the jurisprudence to resolve the legal question posed by their clients'cases. When the court asks the lawyer in argument to give the authority fora point which he advocates, the court probably expects a case citation even when there is positive codalor statutory authority. As a result of the pressure under which we perform our rules that could be generalized out ofjudicial decisions. New problems brought new cases, and these enriched the rules of the common law. Joseph Dainow, The Civil La and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM J COMP L 419, 424-25(1967) MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 179(3d ed, 1989) EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND*$138(emphasis in original); but cf, for an attack on Cokes assertion that the common law is grounded in reason alone, THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAW 54-55( Cropsey, ed 1971). The use of reason as a basis for the common law, according to Hobbes, threatens the foundation of the legal system as a whole because"any Man, of any Law whatsoever may say it is aga inst Reason, and thereupon make a pretence of his disobedience. Id. See also Gerald J Postema, Some Roots ofOur Notion of Precedent, in PRECEDENTIN LAW 11 (Laurence Goldstein ed, 1988)(noting that equating reason with law, in Hobbes's view, was a dangerous undertaking) PATRICIA SMITH THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 141 (Patricia Smith ed, 1993) ZANDER, supra note 45 at 219Zander, one of the ‘fundamental characteristics of law is the objective that like cases should be treated alike.’45 It is therefore rational that, all things being equal, ‘one court should follow the decision of another where the facts appear to be similar.’46 The greatest mind of the common law, Sir Edward Coke in his Institutes of the Laws of England, opined: Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitem; for reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason; which is understood of an artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man’s naturall reason; for, Nemo nascitur artifex. This legall reason est summa ratio. And therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many severall [sic] heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as the law in England is.47 Moving several hundred years to the present, reason still requires that, as one commentator put it, ‘similar cases be understood and dealt with similarity. Otherwise nothing makes sense. In order to understand one another and reason accurately we must be consistent. So if law is to be a rational (rather than irrational and arbitrary) process, judicial decisions must be consistent with one another. The pragmatic ground for the rule of precedent is predictability: Lawyers and citizens want to be able to assess their future behavior in terms of current decisions of the courts.’48 Civilian lawyers and citizens also want predictability but they have ‘felt the need [for it] less keenly because of the background of rules provided first by Roman law and codified custom, and later by the codes of the Napoleonic era.’49 Predictability, even in a pure civilian system, however, can be achieved by the use of precedents. According to Justice Barham of the Louisiana Supreme Court, jurisprudence is a major source of law in Louisiana. He writes: Under our Code an through the historical civilian tradition, jurisprudence is not a major source of law, yet it has been and it remains such in reality. Possibly the belief in jurisprudence as a primary source of law is so strongly embedded in the minds of many of the judiciary and the practicing bar of Louisiana because our civil law system coexists in a nation with states which because of their common law heritage so regard jurisprudence. Even if our bar really believes that legislation is the primary source of law, it practices under the principle that jurisprudence is a major source of law. Lawyers often only perfunctorily examine legislative expression before they turn for final authority to the jurisprudence to resolve the legal question posed by their clients’ cases. When the court asks the lawyer in argument to give the authority for a point which he advocates, the court probably expects a case citation even when there is positive codal or statutory authority. As a result of the pressure under which we perform our rules that could be generalized out of judicial decisions. New problems brought new cases, and these enriched the rules of the common law.’ Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 424-25 (1967). 45 MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 179 (3d ed., 1989). 46 Id. 47 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND* §138 (emphasis in original); but cf., for an attack on Coke’s assertion that the common law is grounded in reason alone, THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAW54-55 (J. Cropsey, ed. 1971). The use of reason as a basis for the common law, according to Hobbes, threatens the foundation of the legal system as a whole because ‘any Man, of any Law whatsoever may say it is against Reason, and thereupon make a pretence of his disobedience.’ Id. See also Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of Our Notion of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 11 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1988) (noting that equating reason with law, in Hobbes’s view, was a dangerous undertaking). 48 PATRICIA SMITH, THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 141 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993). 49 ZANDER, supra note 45 at 219