international legal scholarship. In fact, like Moliere's Bourgeois Gentilhomme, international lawyers may find to their surprise that they have always spoken new institutional economics, as one of our principal tools of analysis is comparison. On the other hand, we would not be writing this paper if we did not feel that the new institutional economics offers substantial counterintuitive B. Political Prejudices and the Subordination of Non-Economic Values Much criticism of economic analysis on the domestic level focuses on the alleged political biases inherent in this form of analysis 15 Thus, critics have objected to economics alleged conservative political positions. Stated most broadly, economic analysis is often d/smss an or commitment to laissez-faire economic policy, or supposed ideological allegiance to libertaria providing an ideological justification for the unconsidered rejection of government intervention Similarly, economic analysis may be rejected for its supposed elevation of the market, and the economic values that are maximized in market settings, at the expense of other important values. This argument would suggest that economic analysis cannot adequately account for difficult to quantify or incommensurable social values, and necessarily devalues or subordinates those values to economic values apply all L&E methodologies to international legal issues. First, the methodologies that we find Rather, the methodologies we focus on presuppose the potential validity -both the legitimace and the efficiency --of government processes. 16 Contrary to the claims of the critics, in the methodologies we focus on"neither market nor nonmarket forms of organization are primary. 17 Instead under this understanding, legislation -- no less than the market--is a mechanism for preference revelation. However, both the market and the law( the state) are imperfect as such mechanisms. The methologies we explore take as central(and open )the question of which Economic Growth 25 ECoN. INQUIRY 419(1987); Douglass North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. INST& THEORETICAL ECoN. 230(1986); Oliver Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCL. Q. 219 (1994) 15 Scholars from across the political spectrum share this view. See, e. g, George J. Stigler, The Politics of political Economists, in ESsAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 51, 52(1965)(the professional study of economics makes one politically conservative"); Morton J. Horowitz, La to be a claim that economists tend to support decentralized markets over other institutions. Sees and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L REv. 905(1980)(same). We understand Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of efficiency, 144 U PA. L REV. 1987, 2014 (1996). As explained more fully in text, we think this charge of conservative bias cannot fairly be levelled against the methodologies we find most promising 16 See DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE (1995) 17 Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L J 12l1,1214(1991)international legal scholarship. In fact, like Moliere’s Bourgeois Gentilhomme, international lawyers may find to their surprise that they have always spoken new institutional economics, as one of our principal tools of analysis is comparison. On the other hand, we would not be writing this paper if we did not feel that the new institutional economics offers substantial counterintuitive insights. B. Political Prejudices and the Subordination of Non-Economic Values Much criticism of economic analysis on the domestic level focuses on the alleged political biases inherent in this form of analysis.15 Thus, critics have objected to economics’ alleged commitment to laissez-faire economic policy, or supposed ideological allegiance to libertarian or conservative political positions. Stated most broadly, economic analysis is often dismissed as providing an ideological justification for the unconsidered rejection of government intervention. Similarly, economic analysis may be rejected for its supposed elevation of the market, and the economic values that are maximized in market settings, at the expense of other important values. This argument would suggest that economic analysis cannot adequately account for difficult to quantify or incommensurable social values, and necessarily devalues or subordinates those values to economic values. Again, however, we believe that these related objections do not fatally undermine efforts to apply all L&E methodologies to international legal issues. First, the methodologies that we find most promising do not have a “bias” against government regulation and/or in favor of the market. Rather, the methodologies we focus on presupppose the potential validity -- both the legitimacy and the efficiency -- of government processes.16 Contrary to the claims of the critics, in the methodologies we focus on “neither market nor nonmarket forms of organization are primary.”17 Instead, under this understanding, legislation -- no less than the market -- is a mechanism for preference revelation. However, both the market and the law (the state) are imperfect as such mechanisms. The methologies we explore take as central (and open) the question of which Economic Growth 25 ECON. INQUIRY 419 (1987); Douglass North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986); Oliver Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 219 (1994). 15 Scholars from across the political spectrum share this view. See, e.g, George J. Stigler, The Politics of Political Economists, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 51, 52 (1965) (“the professional study of economics makes one politically conservative”); Morton J. Horowitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980) (same). We understand this to be a claim that economists tend to support decentralized markets over other institutions. See Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1987, 2014 (1996). As explained more fully in text, we think this charge of conservative bias cannot fairly be levelled against the methodologies we find most promising. 16 See DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE (1995). 17 Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991). 6